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The Internet has enabled the collection, aggregation and analysis of personal
data on a massive scale. It has also enabled the sharing of collected data
in various ways: wholesale outsourcing of data warehousing, partnering with
advertisers for targeted advertising, data publishing for exploratory research,
etc. This has led to complex privacy questions related to the leakage of sen-
sitive user data and mass harvesting of information by unscrupulous parties.
These questions have information-theoretic, sociological and legal aspects and
are often poorly understood.
There are two fundamental paradigms for how the data is released: in
the interactive setting, the data collector holds the data while third parties
vii
interact with the data collector to compute some function on the database.
In the non-interactive setting, the database is somehow “sanitized” and then
published. In this thesis, we conduct a thorough theoretical and empirical
investigation of privacy issues involved in non-interactive data release.
Both settings have been well analyzed in the academic literature, but
simplicity of the non-interactive paradigm has resulted in its being used almost
exclusively in actual data releases. We analyze several common applications in-
cluding electronic directories, collaborative filtering and recommender systems,
and social networks. Our investigation has two main foci. First, we present
frameworks for privacy and anonymity in these different settings within which
one might define exactly when a privacy breach has occurred. Second, we use
these frameworks to experimentally analyze actual large datasets and quantify
privacy issues.
The picture that has emerged from this research is a bleak one for non-
interactivity. While a surprising level of privacy control is possible in a limited
number of applications, the general sense is that protecting privacy in the
non-interactive setting is not as easy as intuitively assumed in the absence of
rigorous privacy definitions. While some applications can be salvaged either
by moving to an interactive setting or by other means, in others a rethinking of
the tradeoffs between utility and privacy that are currently taken for granted
appears to be necessary.
viii
Contents
Acknowledgments v
Abstract viii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Understanding data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.1 Types of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 Release process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.3 Utility of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Protecting privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Chapter 2 Contributions of this thesis 12
2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.1 The (in)security of passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.2 Obfuscating directories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.3 Anonymity of sparse datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.4 Privacy in social networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.5 Privacy of online recommender systems . . . . . . . . . 17
ix
2.2 Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Chapter 3 Overview of related work 25
3.1 Password security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Database obfuscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Privacy-preserving data mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4 Privacy and anonymity in social networks . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.5 Privacy of online recommender systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Chapter 4 Insecurity of Human-Memorable Passwords 31
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2 Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2.1 Markovian filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2.2 Filtering using a finite automaton . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3 Time-space tradeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.1 Generic time-space tradeoff using index lookup property 45
4.4 Indexing algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.4.1 Zero-order Markovian dictionary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.4.2 First-order Markovian dictionary . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.4.3 Deterministic finite automaton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4.4 Any keyspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.4.5 Hybrid Markovian/DFA dictionary . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.6 Multiple keyspaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4.7 Possible optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
x
Chapter 5 Obfuscated Databases and Group Privacy 60
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.2 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.3 Directed-access databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.4 Group-exponential databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.4.1 Group privacy policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.4.2 Obfuscating the database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4.3 Accessing the obfuscated database . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.4.4 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.4.5 Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.5 Arbitrary predicates over equalities on attributes . . . . . . . 83
5.5.1 Obfuscating non-monotone circuits . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.6 Alternative privacy policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Chapter 6 Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets 95
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.2 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.4 De-anonymization algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.4.1 Analysis: general case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.4.2 Analysis: sparse datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.4.3 De-anonymization from a sample . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.5 Case study: Netflix Prize dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
xi
Chapter 7 De-anonymizing Social Networks 137
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.2 State of the Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.3 Background and related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
7.3.1 Privacy properties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
7.3.2 De-anonymization attacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.3.3 Defenses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.3.4 On “Personally Identifiable Information” . . . . . . . . 149
7.4 Model and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.4.1 Social network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.4.2 “Identity” in social networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
7.4.3 Data release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.4.4 Threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.4.5 Breaching privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.4.6 Measuring success of an attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
7.5 De-anonymization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
7.5.1 Seed identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
7.5.2 Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
7.6 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
7.6.1 Seed identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.6.2 Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
7.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Chapter 8 Privacy Risks of Collaborative Filtering 186
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
8.2 Recommender systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
xii
8.2.1 Item-to-item recommendations and a broader definition 192
8.3 Privacy Risks in Recommender Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
8.4 Passive attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
8.4.1 Prediction algorithm and pseudocode . . . . . . . . . . 203
8.4.2 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
8.5 Passive attack on Amazon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
8.6 Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
8.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Chapter 9 Conclusions 224
Appendix A Regular expressions for common password patterns226
Appendix B Glossary: De-anonymization of sparse datasets 230
Appendix C Glossary: Social networks 232
Appendix D Measuring the effect of perturbation 234
Appendix E Glossary: Collaborative filtering 236
Bibliography 238
Vita 273
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction
The ease of large-scale data collection. Before the growth of the Internet,
collection of data from individuals on a national or global scale was feasible
only for governments and very large corporations. The infrastructure required
for collecting and aggregating data was either in the form of a door-to-door
survey as in a census, or a pervasive physical presence, such as a large super-
market chain collecting data on people’s shopping habits. Clearly, the Internet
has changed the equation dramatically: one might grasp the magnitude of the
change by considering that the 2010 U.S. Census, which does not take advan-
tage of information technology, is estimated to cost 14 billion USD, whereas a
purely electronic survey of that scale, although hardly as rigorous, would cost
orders of magnitude less.
Data sharing. The other emerging trend is sharing of collected data.
There are several ways in which data collected about people is shared:
• Internet-scale data warehousing for tasks such as Customer Relationship
Management is a specialized capability and is often outsourced, occasion-
1
ally to offshore providers. In addition, lower costs and higher reliability
are cited as reasons for outsourcing.
• Highly targeted marketing and advertising are an important part of the
business model of many Web 2.0 businesses. In fact, customer data
allowing targeted advertising is considered the primary monetizable asset
of companies such as Facebook. It is often necessary to share detailed
customer data with advertisers for this purpose. Several companies such
as Phorm, NebuAd and Front Porch are developing advertising systems
based on behavioral targeting, which involve building detailed profiles of
user behavior [258].
• Companies also make data available for exploratory research purposes.
Such research is usually done in-house in corporations with dedicated
research departments, but with the increasing ease of data collection by
smaller companies, academia is often recruited for this purpose. Recent
data releases by AOL [129] and Netflix [126] come to mind.
• Allowing users to search for and access information about other individ-
uals is frequently an essential part of the functionality for which the data
was collected. Social-network services are the most visible example of
such functionality.
• More complex sharing situations arise when there is more than one party
who owns a part of a dataset and joint analyses or computations need to
be performed on the data. A joint medical study between two hospitals
might involve sensitive patient data that needs to be aggregated to enable
analysis. A network-security response center might aggregate audit log
2
data from dozens of institutions.
Finally, a truly distributed computation involves thousands or millions
of users participating. Such systems are increasingly coming into fruition
in the form of cloud computing, raising serious and largely unexplored
privacy questions [130].
The factors described above have led to an explosion in the amount
of personal data collected. This has given rise to complex privacy questions
related to leakage of sensitive data on individuals and the mass harvesting
of personal information by unscrupulous parties. Before we can discuss the
privacy questions, however, it helps to have an understanding of the nature of
the data being collected and the data-release processes.
1.1 Understanding data
1.1.1 Types of data
While all databases can be viewed simply in terms of rows and columns, it is
useful to make further distinctions based on the semantics of the data.
Micro-data vs. aggregate data. Micro-data refers to data about in-
dividuals while aggregate data is information about a group of users or about
the database as a whole. The terms originate from census terminology. Data
when collected is always micro-data, whereas when sharing a database, one
might choose not to make micro-data available. It is increasingly common
to share micro-data because of the increasing complexity of the data being
collected and the algorithmic complexity of the analyses that need to be per-
formed. When micro-data is shared, it is often in an anonymized form.
3
High-dimensional data. The rows or records in a database typically
respresent individuals, and the columns represent attributes. By dimension-
ality we mean the number of columns or attributes in the database. The
terminology comes from viewing a record as a point in a vector-space. We em-
pirically define high-dimensional databases as those for which algorithms that
are exponential in the dimension are infeasible. While these could theoreti-
cally include any type of data, databases in current practice that we consider
high-dimensional are those containing transaction profiles of users, which are
vectors consisting of their preferences, behavior, purchase or transactional his-
tory for a variety of items of the same type.
Graph-structured data. Graph-structured data is derived from real-
world networks of individuals and consists of nodes and edges, possibly with at-
tributes corresponding to each node and edge. Since edges and edge-attributes
cannot be associated with any single individual, a different abstraction be-
comes necessary.
Sensitive attributes. The semantics of the attributes sometimes make
it meaningful to distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive attributes. For
instance, name and gender may not be sensitive but attributes pertaining to
medical history might be. A similar notion is that of access vs. data at-
tributes, for instance name vs. phone number in the context of a telephone di-
rectory. The statistical-database literature uses the notion of quasi-identifiers
[69], which are attributes that are not structurally unique but potentially
empirically unique, either by themselves or in combination with other quasi-
identifiers, for instance ZIP code together with birth date in the context of a
census database.
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1.1.2 Release process
Interactive vs. non-interactive sharing. We can identify four categories
of data sharing in the decreasing order of interactivity of the process. Tradi-
tionally, release of sensitive data involved manual auditing of each data access
request to ensure compliance with privacy policies. For a recent example
of HIPAA compliance guidelines involving manual auditing, see [200]. As
privacy-preserving data mining techniques have matured—for example, the
SuLQ framework [35] enables sophisticated query control and perturbation of
query outputs—it has become possible to automate this process. This type of
data sharing has not yet seen widespread adoption, as we will explain presently.
Moving further down on the scale of interactivity, the data collector
might implement a lightweight query interface to the data, without additional
safeguards such as output perturbation. Essentially, the data can be retrieved
by crawling such a system. This allows some query control, but when such con-
trols are not implemented, it can be viewed as equivalent to the final scenario,
which is simply publishing the data, perhaps after “sanitization.”
The appeal of non-interactivity. Non-interactive data release has
been pursued aggressively in recent years because it avoids the costs and de-
lays of implementing manual privacy safeguards. Compared to automated but
interactive data sharing, non-interactive data release avoids the need to set up
a reliable, high-performance, low-latency infrastructure for performing compu-
tations on databases. The added overhead of the privacy requirement means
that interactive data release is often infeasible given current technological con-
straints.
In addition, rationing resources such as queries, computation and mem-
5
ory when there are multiple third parties interested in data analysis might
very well prove insoluble in an interactive setting. Data mining often has a
competitive aspect, even if it may not always be explicit. Genetic association
studies are a good example [124].
Further, most work on interactive data mining does not address the
requirement of privacy for the client, which is also important given the com-
petitiveness of data mining. Thus, choosing an interactive setting might dis-
courage interested third parties from participating.
1.1.3 Utility of data
Finally, we classify datasets based on the purpose for which they are shared.
There are three categories that we will encounter: directory, data mining and
statistical utility. This is not meant to be an exhaustive classification.
We use the term directory database or electronic directory in this work
to refer to databases where the utility comes from the information associated
with individual users (e.g., a college alumni directory).
In a statistical database, the utility comes from learning statistical re-
lationships (e.g., census data). Typical uses are computing marginals, joint
distributions and cross-attribute correlations. By data mining we mean various
computations like clustering, classifiers, and collaborative filtering. The dis-
tinction between the latter two categories is fuzzy. In both of these categories,
however, the utility comes from aggregate information and not individual data.
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1.2 Protecting privacy
The nature of the privacy requirement depends on the intended utility of the
data. In databases with an aggregate utility, the privacy constraint is that
information associated with individuals should not be revealed. Directory
databases, on the other hand, exist to make individual data available. How-
ever, one would like mass harvesting to be infeasible.
We now describe five broad strategies for protecting privacy. Note that
these are not mutually exclusive.
Access control. Some form of access control is necessary for most
datasets. The most common form of coarse-grained access control is passwords.
Password-based authentication is often sufficient protection for data when the
sharing requirements are not very complex. More fine-grained access control
based on roles and privileges is an active research area and is available in
commercial relational database systems [220, 205].
Query control can be a powerful tool for privacy protection in the
interactive setting. It involves query filtering, such as allowing only SUM,
COUNT and other aggregate queries; query logging and monitoring; and fi-
nally query auditing [6, 150]. Automated filtering of queries to ensure that
responses do not leak sensitive information is hard; for instance, even denials
might violate privacy. Technical solutions include simulatable auditing [146],
but in many situations, occasional review of audit logs combined with authen-
tication and the threat of punitive measures such as the revocation of query
privileges might be sufficient to enforce self-policing of queries.
Perturbation-based techniques have a long history and include tools
such as generalization, suppression, cell swapping and addition of noise. (How-
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ever, the term perturbation is used in the literature to refer only to the last of
these.) References may be found in Chapter 3.
Secure multi-party computation is a set of general cryptographic
techniques that allow a set of players to compute joint functions of their inputs
while leaking no information other than their respective outputs [264, 114]. It
has been adopted to the problem of privacy-preserving data mining with some
success [164, 163].
Anonymity is increasingly being used as a tool for protecting privacy
in databases with aggregate utility in the non-interactive setting [241]. The
rationale is that users are “de-identified”, i.e., identifying information about
users is removed, then privacy is protected as long as the adversary cannot
re-link the identity of an individual with their record in the database.
There are two reasons why anonymity has been especially popular as
a privacy protection technique. First, de-idenitfication can be implemented
easily and cheaply, as opposed to alternatives such as secure multi-party com-
putation. Secondly, anonymized data release is often motivated by privacy
laws. Even though such laws might not explicitly require anonymity as a pre-
condition of release of sensitive data, they are often interpreted as such. We
discuss this extensively in Section 7.3.4.
The use of de-identification as a “catch-all” privacy-protection mecha-
nism, especially in the non-interactive data release scenario, is very tempting
because it avoids the need to reason about the types of computations that
users should (or should not) be able to perform on the released data. How-
ever, this thinking is flawed: privacy can only be meaningfully defined as a
property of specific computation — as differential privacy does [82] — and not
as a property of the data itself.
8
We believe that the dual trends of increasing non-interactivity in data
sharing and the increasing reliance on (syntactically defined) anonymity for
privacy protection have serious implications for privacy in data sharing. For
this reason, much of this thesis is devoted to the analysis of anonymity (in
particular, the threat of re-identification) in published data.
1.3 Applications
In this section we describe common applications where privacy is a concern in
sharing data. These are the applications that this thesis focuses on.
Electronic directory. Electronic directory databases have a precursor
in the form of telephone directories, with a long history going back to 1878 [67].
Interestingly, reverse telephone directories have been compiled for decades,
although their availability to the general public has sometimes raised legal
questions because of privacy issues.
Electronic directories potentially allow finer-grained functionality and
privacy control. The operator may choose to make the existence of individuals
in the database hidden unless there is enough information to identify them;
access might be permitted based on certain fields and not on others; and mass
harvesting may or may not be allowed. In fact, it is usually preferable to
make mass harvesting infeasible. In the context of email, this concern is well
known as the directory harvest attack; however, it is an issue in any electronic-
directory setting.
This flexibility leads to some interesting and complex privacy issues.
For instance, Facebook recently faced a privacy gaffe where users who chose
to make the values of some attributes (such as religion and sexual orientation)
9
hidden found their privacy violated when their profiles showed up in searches
based on specific values for those attributes [230].
Collaborative filtering. The term collaborative filtering refers to al-
gorithms for predicting future user behavior by analyzing transactional profiles
of a large number of users in conjunction. It is used primarily in online recom-
mendation systems. Collaborative filtering algorithms operate, in an abstract
sense, on a matrix (database) that contains a score for each (user, item) pair.
An alternate output of collaborative filtering algorithms is item-similarity
information, i.e., numerical similarity scores between each pair of items. This
is useful, for instance, in deciding what items to put next to each other in a
supermarket, or related items to show on a web page pertaining to the item
currently being viewed
At an intuitive level, users do not like their purchase history being
revealed, and yet would like to be able to feed this history into some system
that is capable of making useful predictions. A formal framework for defining
this notion is necessary. Purchase histories are usually protected by the privacy
policy, and furthermore, there are often strong legal protections in place such
as the Video Privacy Protection Act [87].
Social networks. Unique privacy challenges arise with sharing social-
network data because the data is non-relational. Therefore, it is perhaps
unsurprising that there currently exists no comprehensive framework for ana-
lyzing privacy and anonymity in social networks.
Online social-network services, which are a new development, face even
more challenges because the data has both directory and aggregate purposes:
users and application developers need access to the individual information
of other users. On the other hand, researchers and advertisers need access
10
to aggregate information. For instance, Facebook alone has faced storms of
privacy-related criticism of the way it shares data with users [243], applications
[94], and advertisers [262].
Telephone-call graphs arguably contain much more sensitive informa-
tion. The AT&T call graph, for instance, contains 1.9 trillion edges going back
decades.1 Law enforcement regularly mines information from such graphs.
More worryingly, anonymized versions of call graphs are often published or
shared for research purposes [5, 154].
The release of social-network data in anonymized form is hardly limited
to the above situations, however. To give just one example, sexual relations
between students in a number of high schools (totalling about 90,000 par-
ticipants) have been collected as part of the Add Health dataset; the data
from each school (often involving a thousand students) can be viewed as a
social network. Such graphs are often published with identifying information
removed [28].
1An edge in this context represents a single call.
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Chapter 2
Contributions of this thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and understand privacy in non-
interactive data sharing. We believe that a combination of theoretical and
empirical methods is called for. On the one hand, there is currently a lack of
rigorous privacy definitions and frameworks for analyzing privacy. Often, when
doing a data release, there is no way of asserting that privacy is protected.
On the other hand, purely theoretical methods might produce algo-
rithms that do not scale very well, or lead to definitions that are impossible
to achieve in practice. Therefore, we will try to evaluate our definitions and
algorithms as much as possible on real-world datasets.
Much of our work takes the form of studying fundamental problems
with existing ways of sanitizing data. This consists of two parts: first, we
provide a rigorous framework for defining privacy for a variety of applications;
second, we provide an adversarial analysis of large datasets in each of these
categories. There are striking similarities in these projects even though the
data we are working with is very diverse: the Netflix prize dataset (Section 6)
is a user-item similarity matrix. The social-network datasets (Section 7) are
12
graph-structured. The Amazon recommendations dataset (Section 8) consists
mainly of an item-item similarity matrix. In every case, privacy vulnerabilities
exist because of the fact that the adversary possesses background knowledge
(sometimes referred to as auxiliary information), by which we mean knowledge
about the individuals represented in the dataset obtained outside of the data
release process under consideration.
In each of these analyses, we use a “scoring function” that associates a
score with each user; the score represents the likelihood that a piece of back-
ground knowledge matches that user. The principles that go into building
the heuristics for each scoring function are very similar. Each is tolerant to
a large amount of noise, which refers to inconsistencies between the auxiliary
information and the released dataset, whether accidental or deliberately in-
troduced. Thus, we present a highly flexible, generic and robust algorithm for
achieving de-anonymization. This reveals a fundamental inadequacy of the
non-interactive data release paradigm. Section 2.2 discusses these and other
common themes in greater detail.
2.1 Overview
2.1.1 The (in)security of passwords
Human-memorable passwords are a fundamental tool in protecting data in
directory databases.1 To decrease vulnerability of passwords to brute-force
dictionary attacks, many organizations enforce complicated password-creation
rules and require that passwords include numerals and special characters. We
1Of course, passwords are a mainstay of computer security in general; thus our work
described in this section has a much broader impact than directory databases.
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demonstrate that as long as passwords remain human-memorable, they are
vulnerable to “smart-dictionary” attacks even when the space of potential
passwords is large.
Our first insight is that the distribution of letters in easy-to-remember
passwords is likely to be similar to the distribution of letters in the users’
native language. Using standard Markov modeling techniques from natural
language processing, it becomes possible to dramatically reduce the size of the
password space to be searched. Our second contribution is an algorithm for
efficient enumeration of the remaining password space. This allows application
of time-space tradeoff techniques, limiting memory accesses to a relatively
small table of “partial dictionary” sizes and enabling a very fast dictionary
attack.
We evaluated our method on a database of real-world user password
hashes. Our algorithm successfully recovered 67.6% of the passwords using a
2× 109 search space. This is a much higher percentage than Oechslin’s “rain-
bow” attack [199], which is the fastest known general technique for searching
large keyspaces. These results call into question viability of text-based pass-
words as a privacy protection mechanism.
The key accomplishment in this work was the enumeration algorithm
for “Markovian” and regular language spaces, enabling a time-space tradeoff.
Chapter 4 (originally published as [192]) describes this work in detail.
2.1.2 Obfuscating directories
We investigate whether it is possible to encrypt an electronic directory database
and then give it away in such a form that users can still access it, but only in
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a restricted way. In contrast to conventional privacy mechanisms that aim to
prevent any access to individual records, we aim to restrict the set of queries
that can be feasibly evaluated on the encrypted database.
We start with a simple form of database obfuscation which makes
database records indistinguishable from lookup functions. The only feasible
operation on an obfuscated record is to look up some attribute Y by supply-
ing the value of another attribute X that appears in the same record (i.e.,
someone who does not know X cannot feasibly retrieve Y ). We then (i) gener-
alize our construction to conjunctions of equality tests on any attributes of the
database, and (ii) achieve a new property we call group privacy. This prop-
erty ensures that it is easy to retrieve individual records or small subsets of
records from the encrypted database by identifying them precisely, but “mass
harvesting” queries matching a large number of records are computationally
infeasible.
Our constructions are non-interactive. The database is transformed
in such a way that all queries except those explicitly allowed by the privacy
policy become computationally infeasible, i.e., our solutions do not rely on
any access-control software or hardware.
The key accomplishment in this work was the constuction of a secret-
sharing-based cryptographic scheme for query control in the offline setting.
Chapter 5 (originally published as [193]) describes this work in detail.
2.1.3 Anonymity of sparse datasets
We present a framework for reasoning about anonymity for highly multidimen-
sional databases containing anonymized records of individuals. We present an
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algorithm that enables an attacker who has only a small amount of back-
ground knowledge about an individual to identify this individual’s record if it
is present in the database. We use our framework to reason about the efficacy
of this algorithm. Our de-anonymization methods are robust to perturbation
of attribute values in the published records, tolerate errors and fuzziness in
the attacker’s background knowledge, and work even in the situations where
only a subset of the original database has been published.
We apply our de-anonymization methodology to the Netflix Prize dataset,
which contains anonymous movie ratings of 500,000 subscribers of Netflix, Inc.
We demonstrate that an attacker who knows only a little bit about an indi-
vidual subscriber can easily identify this subscriber’s record if it is present
in the released dataset, or, at the very least, identify a small set of records
which include the subscriber’s record. This knowledge need not be precise,
e.g., the dates may only be known to the attacker with a 14-day error, the
ratings may be known only approximately, and some of the ratings may even
be completely wrong. Using the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) as our
source of background knowledge, we successfully identified Netflix records of
non-anonymous IMDb users, uncovering information—such as their apparent
political preferences—that could not be determined from their public IMDb
ratings.
The key accomplishmentss in this work were the development of a pri-
vacy framework for sparse datasets, a de-anonymization algorithm tolerant to
large amounts of noise and a numerical confidence measure of the result of
the algorithm. Chapter 6 (originally published in [194]) describes this work in
detail.
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2.1.4 Privacy in social networks
We propose a comprehensive mathematical model that provides an abstrac-
tion for the type of data collected in a social network, the background knowl-
edge available to the adversary, the privacy policy, the data sanitization and
release/sharing process, and what it means for the adversary to compromise
privacy. Our privacy definition is builds on the notion of node re-identification.
We then present an attack that achieves node re-identification and thus
violates anonymity and privacy. We identify a paradigm for de-anonymization
consisting of two phases: seed identification and a feedback-based process that
we call percolation, and discuss how each can be achieved. We discuss the
implications of our attack in a world of increasingly portable and aggregated
social-network data. We show how the defenses in the literature fail to stop
our attacks. We motivate the use of centrality measures for measuring the
effectiveness of attacks.
The key accomplishments in this work were the development of a privacy
framework for social networks, and a “self-correcting” algorithm that produces
a mapping between two different network graphs based on a small amount of
overlapping edge structure. Chapter 7 (originally published in [195]) describes
this work in detail.
2.1.5 Privacy of online recommender systems
Unlike the setting in Chapter 6 where the data is released in anonymized form,
online recommender systems do not release transactional profiles of individual
users in any form. However, two types of data are often available: the item-
similarity matrix, and background knowledge consisting of a small number
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of preferences in the form of publicly available reviews written by customers.
We show a way of exploiting these two types of information to cause a privacy
breach which leaks the purchases of users that are not part of the public record.
The key accomplishments in this work were the reverse-engineering of
the amazon.com recommendation system and the development of an algorithm
for statistical deduction of customer purchases based on observation of item
similarity lists. Chapter 8 describes this work in detail; further information
can be found in [48].
2.2 Themes
In this section we describe several common themes related to de-anonymization
that arose in the course of this work. Broadly, these can be divided into con-
ceptual and methodological themes. The conceptual themes relate to simi-
larities in the types of data that we deal with and the relationship between
the data and the amount of auxiliary information that the adversary needs.
The methological themes pertain to the issues of validating and measuring the
performance of the adversarial algorithms that we develop.
First, all of the large-scale real-world datasets that we work with (in
Chapters 6, 7 and 8) are high-dimensional. The number of columns ranges
from tens of thousands to millions.2
In addition to the total number of columns being large, the average
number of non-null or non-empty columns in each record is also large, typically
in the tens or hundreds. What this means is that each user has participated
2In the context of a social network, the dimensionality equals the number of nodes when
we represent the graph as an adjacency matrix.
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in a large number of transactions, which may include purchasing or reviewing
items, designating other users as friends, etc. The average number of movies
rated by a customer in the Netflix dataset is 213 (Chapter 6). Facebook claims
an average degree of 120 in their network as of May 2009 [91]; the networks that
we work with in Chapter 7 are smaller and have average degrees of around 30.
In the subset of Amazon reviewers that we discuss in Chapter 8, the average
number of reviews per user is 126.
One consequence of this fact is that the notion of similarity between
users (or more precisely, user records) breaks down. According to [34], under
a “broad set of conditions,” as the dimensionality increases, the distance to
the nearest data point approaches the distance to the farthest data point. The
failure of commonly used anonymization techniques when the dimensionality
of the data is large is explored from a theoretical perspective in [10].
We term datasets with this property sparse. A recurring theme through-
out this work is that in a sparse dataset, a very small number of attributes of
a user are sufficient to uniquely identify his record in the dataset. Theoretical
justification for this fact is provided in Theorems 5, 6 and 7 in Chapter 6—we
find that a logarthmic number3 of attributes to be sufficient under a variety of
assumptions.
Numerically, between 2 and 8 attributes seem to suffice for movie rat-
ing data in Chapter 6; the seed-identification algorithm in Chapter 7 makes
accurate inferences using no more than 10 individual pieces of information;
in Chapter 8, we find that predictions of the form “user X bought item Y”
can be made based on (roughly) 9 pieces of auxiliary information about past
user purchases. In work not reported in this thesis, we observe the same
3Logarithmic in the number of records in the dataset.
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principle in a dataset published in anonymized form by Lending Club [191].
Golle and Partridge find that just two pieces of geo-location information about
an individual—home and work location, to the granularity of a U.S. Census
block—are uniquely identifying on average [117].
As noted above, the effect of the size of the dataset on the amount of
auxiliary information required is weak, i.e., logarithmic. The computational re-
quirements increase linearly (Chapter 6) or in some cases super-linearly (Chap-
ter 7) as the size of the dataset increases. However, we do not believe that
computational requirements of are a serious impediment to de-anonymization,
because the size of the dataset is upper bounded, regardless of the application,
by the total human population, which is currently less than 233 and grows at
a far slower rate than the adversary’s computing power.
The final conceptual theme that we would like to discuss is the fact
that the term “Personally Identifiable Information” (PII), commonly used in
privacy law and breach disclosure law, has no particular technical meaning.
Algorithms that can identify a user in an anonymized dataset are agnostic to
the semantics of the data elements. While some data elements may be uniquely
identifying on their own, any element can be identifying in combination with
others. Our de-anonymization work in this thesis has repeatedly demonstrated
this fact. In Section 7.3.4, we present a detailed discussion of laws that mention
PII.
Turning to methological issues, the primary hurdle that any demonstra-
tion of a de-anonymization algorithm must overcome is the lack of “ground
truth,” i.e., knowledge of the true identities of the users that have been re-
identified. Ground truth is needed in order to verify that the algorithm has
succeeded. Note that if ground truth is available as part of the auxiliary infor-
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mation, re-identification is trivial, obviating the de-anonymization algorithm!
In Chapter 6, we develop a novel solution to this problem. We propose
a measure called eccentriticy, which measures, given an anonymized dataset
and auxiliary information about one of the records, how well the record that
most closely matches the auxiliary information “stands out” from the rest of
the records. We use this technique to find matches in the anonymized Netflix
dataset of movie ratings that are as many as 28 standard deviations away from
the second-best match, giving a high degree of confidence in the output of the
de-anonymization algorithm.
We take an alternate approach in Chapter 7. We construct the ground-
truth mapping between the two social networks that we investigate as part of
the large-scale deanonymization exercise. We do this using information such
as username, real name and location reported by users on the two networks.
The de-anonymization algorithm itself entirely ignores the information used to
construct the ground-truth mapping, and attempts to match nodes between
two graphs where there is no identifying information attached to the nodes.
While it is true that the existence of ground truth information means that our
experiments did not cause actual de-anonymization (in the sense of recovering
previously unknown identities), we present a detailed list of scenarios in Section
7.2 where our algorithm is applicable and can in fact cause an anonymity
breach.
The use of the eccentricity measure has an important side-effect. It
allows the de-anonymization algorithm to determine if a match is “spurious,”
i.e., the auxiliary information corresponds to a record that is not actually in
the database. This is a pressing concern whenever the released dataset is only
a sample from a larger dataset, i.e., it does not encompass all the individuals
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from whom data was collected.
To recap, the eccentricity heuristic protects against two sources of error:
one, a false match, whereby where the matching record is not the “true”
record that corresponds to the auxiliary information, and two, a spurious
match, where the “true” record is not even a part of the released dataset.
Our numerical results clear demonstrate its effectiveness: from Figure 6.5, it
can be seen that the adversary can simultaneously achieve a false positive
rate and a false negative rate of under 10%, with only a slight increase in the
amount of auxiliary information required.
This leads us to conclude that data trustees are often mistaken when
making claims that anonymously published data is safe because some of the
samples were withheld. An example of such a mistaken claim is this quote
from the International HapMap Project [214]:
The samples are anonymous with regard to individual identity.
Samples cannot be connected to individuals, and no personal in-
formation is linked to any sample. As an additional safeguard,
more samples were collected from each population than were used,
so no one knows whether any particular person’s DNA is included
in the study.
Another major hurdle that any de-anonymization algorithm must over-
come is noise. By noise we mean inconsistencies between the anonymized
data and the auxiliary information available to the adversary. There are many
sources of noise. Accidental inaccuracies are one obvious possibility—auxiliary
information typically comes from users participating in multiple systems that
collect the same data, and the data is often provided inaccurately or incom-
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pletely.
Systemic differences are a more serious source of noise—two systems
might collect broadly similar but subtly different data. For instance, in the case
of movie ratings, one system might collect the date when the user watched the
movie, and another might collect the date when they reviewed it. In the case
of social networks, one expects the friendships of an individual to be similar
across different networks, but not the same, due to the differing semantics of
friendship.
The final category is noise that is deliberately injected into the anonymized
dataset that is released, as part of the sanitization process. Such sanitization
has been shown to be less effective than is often assumed, due to the inevitable
destruction of the utility of the data [45]. Our experience mirrors this finding:
in our analyses of real-world datasets, noise due to systemic differences and
inaccurate reporting were by far the more prominent sources.
We have succeeded in developing algorithms that are significantly more
robust to noise than previous de-anonymization efforts. For instance, Frankowski
et al., who also de-anonymize movie rating data, report that their algorithm
is easily foiled by discrepancies between the auxiliary information and the
anonymized record [102]. By contrast, our algorithm tolerates different types
of noise as well as a higher level of noise (Section 6.4.1, Figure 6.10). In Chap-
ter 7, we find that we can identify users across social networks even though
the overlap in their relationships on the two networks is only 15%.
A major reason why our algorithms are robust to noise is that are built
by combining many heuristics. It may not always be clear which heuristics
will be effective before testing on real-world data; at the same time, there are
many general principles that have guided us. A good example is the effect
23
of the rarity of an attribute: we have found that an attribute contributes to
de-anonymization in proportion to the inverse logarithm of the frequency of
its occurence (see, for instance, Section 6.4). The intuitive justification for this
is that the entropy required to describe an attribute is inversely proportional
to the logarithm of its frequency.
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Chapter 3
Overview of related work
3.1 Password security
Research on password security predating our work used both Markov modeling
and time-space tradeoffs. The “Extensible Multilingual Password Generator”
software, written by Jon Callas in 1991, used precisely this technique to gener-
ate passwords for users. The password-guessing rules used in John the Ripper
could be considered a form of finite-automaton-based enumeration. There is a
long line of research on time-space tradeoff techniques for password cracking,
starting from Hellman [134] and Rivest [74], continuing with [95, 155, 156] and
culminating in the so-called rainbow crack of Oechslin [199, 228, 1] which our
work builds on.
There are two main categories of defenses against the sort of attacks that
we come up with. The first is to move away from alpha-numeric passwords, for
instance graphical passwords (see [141] or [237] for a survey) and passwords
based on mouse movement, facial recognition, and keystroke dynamics [186].
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These systems face an uphill battle for adoption: first, because their usability
is not well-established [58], and second, because they often fall prey to attacks
[116, 72].
A much more promising alternative is “Password-based Authenticated
Key Exchange” (PAKE) [32, 33, 169, 44, 31, 143] which essentially bootstraps
a low-entropy passphrase into a cryptographic key. Recent work [111, 110] has
eliminated limitations such as the need for multiple servers and the need to
store the passphrase in plaintext on the server.
From the perspective of an attacker (passive or active) listening on the
network, PAKE removes the ability to carry out offline attacks. While online
attacks have the same complexity as offline attacks, they are far harder because
the server is “in the loop,” and therefore, can mount defenses such as rate-
limiting the number of connections. This might enable the attacker to cause
a denial of service, but this is presumably a much less serious attack than
discovering passwords.
Section 4.1 discusses related work on password security in greater detail.
3.2 Database obfuscation
Our work on database obfuscation applies the cryptographic notion of obfus-
cation to the database privacy problem. The notion of obfuscation was first
comprehensively studied by Barak et al. [27]. The obfuscation of “point func-
tions” in the random oracle model, while perhaps a folklore construction, was
first stated formally by Lynn, Prabhakaran and Sahai [170].
There are several lines of work that tackle variants of the problem.
Perhaps the closest in spirit to our work is attribute-based encryption [223].
26
It achieves fine-grained access control by granting different access rights to
different users. Recent work such as [118] achieves the ability to implement
flexible policies where decryption keys are associated with access structures.
In the online setting, the harvesting problem can be solved by rate
throttling. This also largely ameliorates the dictionary-attack vulnerability.
However, it introduces the new problem of privacy for the client. Oblivious
keyword search [103] is a way to solve the problem of privacy for the client.
Section 5.2 discusses related work on obfuscation in greater detail.
3.3 Privacy-preserving data mining
There is a very long line of research on statistical disclosure control and
privacy-preserving data mining. It can be broadly divided into three cate-
gories in the increasing order of rigor: informally specified privacy, formally
but non-adversarially specified privacy, and finally adversarially defined pri-
vacy. These categories roughly correspond to the statistics, database, and
cryptography research communities.
Traditional work used techniques such as cell suppression, quantization,
aggregation, perturbation, swapping, and sampling [79, 259, 96]. Typically,
privacy is specified informally in these papers. Another strategy involves re-
constructing statistical models of the data instead of sharing micro-data. Later
work focused on techniques like k-anonymity and l-diversity [241, 172] and
other data-oriented privacy definitions [11, 13, 12, 89].
Focusing on adversarially defined privacy, traditional cryptographic work
on Secure Multi-party Computation [265, 114] has been adapted to solve some
specific privacy-preserving data mining problems [92, 209]. In the interac-
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tive setting, the SuLQ framework [35] provides strong privacy guarantees.
There are various impossibility results, both in the interactive and in the
non-interactive model [77, 81]. Finally, differential privacy has emerged as a
powerful definition in both models. The definition has been adapted to a va-
riety of settings and applications [179, 106, 82] and has matured from theory
to practice in a very short period of time.
There is very little work that focuses on high-dimensional databases,
as can be seen from the paucity of papers on privacy-preserving collaborative
filtering. Even papers with “multi-dimensional” in the title involve algorithms
that are exponential in the dimension [158].
k-anonymity also fails on high-dimensional data [10], since it fundamen-
tally relies on locality of data. In fact, the expected distances to the nearest
and farthest neighbors are almost the same for high-dimensional data under a
variety of distributions [34].
Previous work on anonymity of movie ratings (which we consider in
Chapter 6) reached similar, if weaker conclusions as we did: Frankowski et
al. demonstrated in [102] that it is possible to correlate public mentions of
movies in the MovieLens discussion forum with the MovieLens users’ movie
rating histories in the internal MovieLens dataset.
Section 6.2 discusses related work on anonymity of transactional data
in greater detail.
3.4 Privacy and anonymity in social networks
Research on social networks is roughly a century old [104]. The study of social
networks form a key part of epidemiology [19, 187], sociology [119, 248], and
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economics [41, 25], among many other disciplines.
The formal study of privacy in social networks appears to be fairly
new. Backstrom, Dwork and Kleinberg present “active attacks” (where the
attacker is capable of modifying the network) and a weaker passive attack with
the goal of recovering edge relations [23]. A few papers have proposed defenses
against these and similar attacks: Hay et al. study perturbation as a tool to
defend against specific re-identification attacks [131]. Liu and Terzi propose
modifying the graph to anonymize degree sequences [167]. We note that both
these defenses have fairly limited scope. In another vein, Jagatic et al. report
an interesting experiment where the availability of friend relationships between
users to the attacker dramatically increases the success of phishing [139].
Hanneman and Riddle provide a good introduction to centrality and
power from a sociology perspective [128]. The work of Bonacich and Lloyd
takes a more algorithmic approach [38]. Kempe, Kleinberg and Tardos consider
the complexity of the problem of selecting the most influential nodes in a
network [145].
Section 7.3 discusses related work on privacy and anonymity in social
networks in greater detail.
3.5 Privacy of online recommender systems
To our knowledge, Ramakrishnan et al. were the first to discuss privacy risks
in recommender systems. Their focus is on “straddlers”, i.e., customers who
purchase a variety of rare items in different categories [216]. Their analyses
pertain to the model where the recommendations made to the users—rather
than item-similarity scores—leak sensitive information. This is a significant
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limitation because the former type of data is much harder for an attacker to
obtain.
There are two papers that tackle privacy issues in collaborative filter-
ing using a secure-multi-party-computation-like protocol with each participant
keeping control of their own data [54, 212].
McSherry and Mironov have recently developed a technique for provid-
ing provable privacy guarantees in collaborative filtering based on a relaxed
definition of differential privacy [178]. While the accuracy of the output of the
system is somewhat diminished, the authors evaluate their approach on the
Netflix Prize dataset and find that an accuracy that is superior to the Cine-
match baseline can be achieved while providing a reasonable level of privacy.
Linden et al. provide a description of amazon.com’s recommendation
system [165] (Chapter 8). Further information is found in a patent [166].
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Chapter 4
Insecurity of
Human-Memorable Passwords
4.1 Introduction
It is often said that humans are always the weakest link in the security chain.
Social engineering is more frequently successful in penetrating a system than
buffer overflow attacks. Similarly, cracking a password is rarely accomplished
by breaking the cipher used and more often by exploiting the circumstance
that it was generated by a human.
The problem of guessing human-generated passwords has been studied
for a long time. Morris and Thompson [188] in their 1979 paper on UNIX
password security describe brute-force and dictionary attacks that are all too
familiar to the modern reader. The former is based on the observation that
short strings are easier for humans to remember, and the latter on the fact that
meaningful words are far more memorable than random character sequences.
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The state of the art in dictionary attacks has not advanced much since
then. Current password crackers such as John the Ripper [204] use essentially
the same two techniques, plus a few rules to turn each dictionary word into a
set of related words (such as suffixing a digit). The brute-force attack can be
made somewhat more efficient by using a time-space tradeoff such as Oechslin’s
“rainbow” technique [199, 1], which employs precomputation to speed up the
process of cracking individual passwords. A common defense is the use of
password-creation rules, called composition rules, that require passwords to
be drawn from certain regular languages, and require passwords to include
digits and non-alphanumeric characters. The goal is to increase the size of the
search space, making naive dictionary attacks infeasible.
We demonstrate that fast, devastating “smart-dictionary attacks” can
be staged even on large password spaces that are not vulnerable to brute-force
or straightforward dictionary attacks. Our insight is that passwords, even if
long and sprinkled with extra characters, must still be human-memorable. Hu-
man limitations imply that the entropy of passwords is rather small: an NIST
document [47] estimates that user-generated 8-character passwords have be-
tween 18 and 30 bits of randomness, even when English dictionary words are
filtered out and composition rules are enforced. In a very general sense, our
attacks work by rapidly enumerating candidate passwords that can be pro-
duced with a small amount of randomness. For instance, the string
asasasasasasasasasasasasasasasas, at 32 characters, is far beyond the
reach of brute-force attacks using current hardware. Intuitively, however, this
string is not very random, and should be easily guessable.
Formally, this can be modeled by saying that the Kolmogorov com-
plexity [161] of this string is low. The Kolmogorov complexity (a.k.a. K-
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complexity) of a string is defined as the length of the shortest Turing Machine
that outputs it and then halts. The sequence of instructions
repeat print "as" 16 times in any reasonable encoding scheme should have
a complexity of around 30 bits, which is in keeping with our intuition that the
resulting string is easily guessable.
An obvious approach would be to try to enumerate all strings which
have a K-complexity smaller than some threshold, and use the result as the
dictionary. There are two problems with this. First, K-complexity is uncom-
putable. Second, human perception of randomness in different from compu-
tational randomness. Subjective randomness has been studied by cognitive
scientists Griffiths and Tenenbaum [121, 122], who argue that we need a dif-
ferent way to measure the perceived information content of a string. What
is needed is a rigorous multidisciplinary study of human password generation
processes, as well as the algorithms for very efficient enumeration of the re-
sulting password spaces. The existence of such algorithms would be a strong
indicator of vulnerability to fast dictionary attacks.
We take the first steps in both directions. We posit that phonetic simi-
larity with words in the user’s native language is a major contributor to mem-
orability. We capture this property using “Markovian filters” based on Markov
models, which is a standard technique in natural language processing [215].
Our other observation is that the way in which humans use non-alphabetic
characters in passwords can be modeled by finite automata, which can be
considered a generalization of the “rules” used by John the Ripper and other
password cracking tools.
Secondly, we present an algorithm to efficiently enumerate all strings of
a given length that satisfy a Markovian filter, and an algorithm to efficiently
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enumerate all strings of a given length accepted by a deterministic finite au-
tomaton. More precisely, we give algorithms that, given an index i, generate
the ith string satisfying each of these properties (without searching through
the entire space!). Next, we combine these two algorithms into a hybrid algo-
rithm that produces the ith string satisfying both the Markovian filter and the
regular language. Finally, we show how to use this algorithm to implement a
time-space tradeoff over this search space.
The best-known brute-force attack technique using the time-space trade-
off was proposed by Oechslin [199]. It uses a special data structure called the
“rainbow table.” Our hybrid attack has the same precomputation time, stor-
age requirement and mean cryptanalysis time as the rainbow attack over a
search space of the same size. Yet, compared to the vanilla rainbow attack
over the entire fixed-length keyspace (e.g., “all alphanumeric strings of length
8”), our attack has a significantly higher coverage since our search space is cho-
sen wisely and consists only of “memorable” strings that have low subjective
randomness.
Of course, coverage of a dictionary attack can only be measured by
applying it to “real-world” user passwords. Results obtained on artifically
generated passwords would not be very convincing, since there is no guarantee
that the generation algorithm produces passwords that are similar to those
users choose for themselves. We evaluated our techniques on a database of 150
real user passwords provided to us by Passware. Our hybrid attack achieved
67.6% coverage (i.e., more than two thirds of the passwords were successfully
recovered), using a search space of size 2× 109. Detailed results are presented
in Section 4.5. The filters we used can be found in Appendix A. By contrast,
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Oechslin’s attack achieves coverage of only 27.5%1.
We believe that with a larger search space (around 3 × 1012, which is
what the passcracking.com implementation uses), and more comprehensive
regular expressions, coverage of up to 90% can be achieved.
Defenses against dictionary attacks. Salting of password hashes defeats
offline dictionary attacks based on precomputation, and thus foils our hybrid
attack.
Using an inefficient cipher slows the attacker down by a constant factor,
and this is in fact done in the UNIX crypt() implementation. This technique,
however, can only yield a limited benefit because of the range of platforms that
the client may be running. Javascript implementations in some browsers, for
example, are extremely slow.
Feldmeier and Karn [93] surveyed methods to improve password secu-
rity and concluded that the only technique offering a substantial long term
improvement is for users to increase the entropy of the passwords they gener-
ate. As we show, achieving this is far harder than previously supposed.
By far the strongest line of defense against our attacks is Password-
Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) [32, 169, 31, 44, 143, 113, 111, 109,
270, 108]. The goal of PAKE is to enable participants to “bootstrap” a shared
password into a high-entropy cryptographic session key. Early PAKE protocols
were found to have flaws [149, 207, 263], but recent ones offer provable security
and have been standardized as RFC [136].
To understand how PAKE protects against our attacks, we must analyze
1We used the character set consisting of lowercase alphabets and numerals for Oechslin’s
attack. Simple tricks can improve the coverage, such as running more than one timespace
tradeoff with different character sets, and using brute force up to some small length.
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the points of vulnerability in a typical scenario where a user authenticates
himself to a server over the network.
• The attacker may observe the authentication process by listening on the
network, and use the transcript of the interaction to launch an offline
attack.
• The attacker may try to discover the password in an online fashion, by
repeatedly executing the client side of the authentication protocol using
various password guesses as input.
• The attacker may break into the server where authentication material is
stored; this may give him a “password verification string,” using which
he can launch an offline attack.
A good PAKE protocol has the property that the transcript of a success-
ful authentication does not provide the attacker with a way to verify password
guesses. Note that it is impossible to prevent an attacker who breaks into the
server from obtaining password verification material, because access to the
storage on the server allows the attacker to simulate both the client side and
the server side of the authentication protocol in an offline fashion.
Thus, if PAKE is used, there are two ways in which our smart-dictionary
attack may still be mounted: either via an online attack, or via a server break-
in. Neither of these is as powerful an attack mode as an offline attack using the
network transcript. There are a number of heuristics to protect against online
password-guessing attacks, such as rate-limiting of protocol instantiations and
blacklisting IP addresses with suspected malicious activity. These measures
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come at a cost, because they may enable the attacker to cause a denial of
service to legitimate users.
Needless to say, PAKE protects against attacks involving a time-space
tradeoff—compared to salting, PAKE is a much more powerful way of ran-
domizing the stored material on the server.
PAKE is not useful for authenticating a user on a local system, since
there is no network activity to protect against. In conclusion, PAKE fails to
mitigate against our attack in some situations (local login), prevents the time-
space tradeoff component of our attack in others (network login), and makes
even the smart-dictionary attack without precomputation much harder in yet
other situations (network login involving no server compromise).
The above discussion assumes that PAKE can be easily implemented
wherever applicable. This is far from the case, due to the cost of upgrading
legacy systems—software needs to be upgraded, and more importantly, users
must re-enter their passwords into the system. Re-entry of passwords is neces-
sary because the server-side password verification material in PAKE protocols
cannot be derived from the hashed passwords that are typically stored on the
server.
In the absence of a generic defense, our attacks call into our question
whether it is meaningful for humans to generate their own character-sequence
passwords. The situation can only become worse with time because hardware
power grows exponentially while human information-processing capacity stays
constant [182]. Considering that there is a fundamental conflict between mem-
orability and high subjective randomness, our work could have implications
for the viability of passwords as an authentication mechanism in the long run.
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Organization of this chapter. In Section 4.2, we explain filtering based
on Markovian models and deterministic finite automata. In Section 4.3, we
discuss the time-space tradeoff in general and Oechslin’s rainbow attack in
particular, and show that it works over any search space as long as there is an
efficient algorithm to compute its ith element. In Section 4.4, we present our
search space enumeration algorithms for strings satisfying a Markovian filter,
strings accepted by a DFA and strings that satisfy both conditions. Section 4.5
consists of our experimental results. A summary is found in Section 4.6.
4.2 Filtering
In the rest of this chapter, we will use the words key and password, ciphertext
and password hash, and keyspace and dictionary interchangeably. The reason
for this is that standard techniques for brute-force cryptanalysis, such as those
described in Section 4.3, typically refer to keys and ciphertexts even when
applied to passwords and their hash values.
4.2.1 Markovian filtering
An alphabetical password generated by a human, even if it is not a dictionary
word, is unlikely to be uniformly distributed in the space of alphabet sequences.
In fact, if asked to pick a sequence of characters at random, it is likely that
an English-speaking user will generate a sequence in which each character is
roughly equidistributed with the frequency of its occurrence in English text.
Analysis of our password database reveals a significant number of alphabetical
passwords which are neither dictionary words, nor random sequences (we used
the openwall.com dictionary which contains about 4 million words [203]).
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Markov models are commonly used in natural language processing, and
are at the heart of speech recognition systems [215]. A Markov model defines
a probability distribution over sequences of symbols. In other words, it allows
sampling character sequences that have certain properties. In fact, Markov
models have been used before in the context of passwords. Subsequent to
this work, we learned of the “Extensible Multilingual Password Generator”
software, which was written by Jon Callas in 1991 and used precisely this
technique to generate passwords for users. (We are also told that a similar
method for generating “random, yet pronounceable” passwords was used at
the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the late 1980s.) It should come as no
surprise, then, that Markov modeling is very effective at guessing passwords
generated by users.
In a zero-order Markov model, each character is generated according
to the underlying probability distribution and independently of the previously
generated characters. In a first-order Markov model, each digram (ordered
pair) of characters is assigned a probability and each character is generated by
looking at the previous character. Mathematically, in the zero-order model,
P (α) = Πx∈αν(x)
while in the first-order model,
P (x1x2 . . . xn) = ν(x1)Π
n−1
i=1 ν(xi+1|xi)
where P (.) is the Markovian probability distribution on character sequences,
xi are individual characters, and the ν function is the frequency of individual
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letters and digrams in English text.
Of course, a dictionary is not a probability distribution, but a set.
Therefore, to create a Markovian dictionary, we discretize the probabilities
into two levels by applying a threshold θ. This defines the zero-order dictio-
nary
Dν,θ = {α : Πx∈αν(x) ≥ θ}
and the first-order dictionary
Dν,θ = {x1x2 . . . xn : ν(x1)Πn−1i=1 ν(xi+1|xi) ≥ θ}
The zero-order model produces words that do not look very natural,
but it can already drastically reduce the size of the plausible password space
by eliminating the vast majority of character sequences from consideration.
Consider 8-character sequences. If θ is chosen so that the dictionary size
is 1
7
of the keyspace (i.e., 86% of sequences are ignored), then a sequence
generated according to the model has the probability of 90% of belonging to
the dictionary. In other words, 15% of the password space contains 90% of all
plausible passwords. Other interesting points on the curve are: a dictionary
containing 1
11
of the keyspace has 80% coverage, and a dictionary with 1
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of
the keyspace has 50% coverage, i.e., only 2.5% of the keyspace needs to be
considered to cover half of all possible passwords! The first-order model can
do even better. The results are shown in Figure 4.1.
The zero-order model is not obviated by the first-order model. The
former is better for certain commonly used password-generation strategies,
such as acronyms consisting of first letters of each word in a sentence.
Needless to say, the distribution of letter frequencies used in keyspace
40
Figure 4.1: Coverage compression graph
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compression via Markovian filtering is language-specific, and the distribution
used in this work applies only to passwords chosen by English-speaking users
(presumably, similar distributions can be found for other alphabet-based lan-
guages). There are two ways in which the technique can be generalized if
the user’s native language is not known. First, it is possible to combine the
keyspaces for two or more languages (Section 4.4.6). Second, it may be pos-
sible to come up with a distribution that works reasonably well for multiple
languages (e.g., all Germanic or all Romance languages). We have not tried
doing this and don’t know how well it might work.
4.2.2 Filtering using a finite automaton
A search space consisting of only alphabetic sequences is unlikely to have a
good coverage of the plausible password space. Humans often mix upper-
and lowercase characters in their passwords, and system-enforced password-
creation rules often require them to throw in some numerals and sometimes
special characters. Yet, even with these additions, the distribution of resulting
passwords is far from random. Below are examples of a few common patterns
(this list is by no means definitive):
• In an alphanumeric password, all numerals are likely to be at the end.
• The first character of an alphabetic sequence is far more likely to be
capitalized than the others.
• While alphabetic sequences consisting of mostly lowercase characters and
a few uppercase characters are common, the converse is not true.
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Deterministic finite automata are ideal for expressing such properties.
First, we specify a set of common regular expressions (“all lowercase,” “one
uppercase followed by all lowercase,” “uppercase characters followed by nu-
merals,” and so on). We define our dictionary to be the set of sequences
matching the Markovian filter and also accepted by at least one of the finite
automata corresponding to the regular expressions. Thus Dν,θ,〈Mi〉 = {α :
Πx∈αν(x) ≥ θ, and ∃i : Mi accepts α}. Our complete alphabet consists of
26 lowercase and 26 uppercase characters, 10 numerals and 5 special charac-
ters (space, hyphen, underscore, period and comma). We have chosen these
five somewhat arbitrarily because we felt they are the ones that occur most
commonly in human-generated passwords. It is not possible to consider all
special characters without knowing what the actual character set is for the
application.
This gives us a 67-character alphabet. The associated keyspace of 8-
letter sequences is 1015, making brute-force search infeasible. While it is possi-
ble to write regular expressions for this 67-character symbol set, the resulting
algorithms are not very efficient. Therefore, we give up a little bit of expres-
sivity and group the character set into four categories (lowercase, uppercase,
numerals, and special characters, which we will denote, respectively, as a, A, n
and s), and consider the input alphabet of our automata to consist of just these
four symbols. The regular expressions we have used are listed in Appendix A.
4.3 Time-space tradeoff
The most basic precomputation technique is to compute and store the hashes
of all the passwords in the keyspace ordered by hash, so that cryptanalysis
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is almost instantaneous. However, this requires storage equal to the keyspace
size. Hellman [134] showed how to decrease storage requirements at the ex-
pense of attack time in the general context of cryptanalyzing a cipher. This
tradeoff works as follows.
Given a fixed plaintext P , define a mapping f on the keyspace K as
f(k) = R(Ek(P )) where E is the encryption function and R is a reduction
function which maps ciphertexts to keys. By iterated applications of f , we
create a “chain” of keys. The crucial observation is that by storing only the
first and last elements of a chain, we can determine if the key corresponding
to a given ciphertext belongs to that chain (and also find the key) in time O(t)
where t is the length of the chain.
Creating a chain works as follows. Given a starting point k0, we compute
k1 = f(k0), k2 = f(k1), . . . , kt = f(kt−1). The keys k0 and kt are stored, while
the rest are thrown away. When given a ciphertext C to cryptanalyze, we
recover the key by computing k = R(C) and ki = f
i−1(k) for i = 1, 2, . . ..
Observe that if the key k belongs to the chain, i.e., k = ki for some i, then
f t−i(k) = kt. Thus, after at most t applications of f , we can determine whether
or not the chain contains k. Further i− 1 applications of f suffice to compute
ki−1 from k0. Since ki−1 satisfies the property that C = Eki−1(P ), it is the key
we are looking for.
This does not work with certainty because different chains may merge.
Therefore, we need to use multiple tables with a different reduction function
for each table, with many chains in each table. The storage requirement as
well as the cryptanalysis time for this algorithm are O(|K|2/3), where K is the
keyspace.
Rivest [74, p.100] suggested an improvement which greatly speeds up
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the practical performance of the algorithm by decreasing the number of mem-
ory accesses during cryptanalysis. This is done using “distinguished points,”
which are keys with some special property (such as the first 10 bits being zero).
The advantage of requiring that the endpoints of a chain be distinguished
points is that during cryptanalysis, a key must be looked up in memory only
if it has the distinguished property. Further papers [95, 155, 43, 156, 233]
presented optimizations and/or better analyses of the distinguished points al-
gorithm.
A major improvement was made by Oechslin [199] by using “rainbow
chains” instead of distinguished points. Rainbow chains use a different reduc-
tion function for each point in the chain. It was shown in [199] that rainbow
chains achieve the same coverage as distinguished points with the same storage
requirement but a significantly faster cryptanalysis time.
Experimental results are impressive. The online implementation of the
rainbow attack [1] inverts MD5 hashes of passwords of length up to 8 over the
character set [a-z0-9] (a keyspace size of 2.8 × 1012). Its success probabil-
ity is 0.996 with an amortized cryptanalysis time of under 10 minutes using
precomputed tables of size about 48 GB.
4.3.1 Generic time-space tradeoff using index lookup
property
We observe that in both Rivest’s and Oechslin’s algorithms, the reduction func-
tion can be expressed as a mapping from the ciphertext space to {0, 1, . . . |K|−
1}, composed with a mapping from {0, 1, . . . |K| − 1} to K. Neither the re-
duction function, nor any other part of the algorithms makes any assumptions
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about the keyspace other than its size. In Rivest’s attack, the property of
being a distinguished point can be computed from the keyspace index rather
than the key itself. In the case of the rainbow attack, the mapping from the
ciphertext space to keyspace indices is parameterized by the choice of the rain-
bow table, but the mapping from the keyspace index to the key is the same
as in Rivest’s attack. Therefore, we can implement either attack over the
compressed dictionary of plausible passwords described in Section 4.2.
This is not trivial, however. The compressed dictionary must have
have the property that there exists an efficient enumeration algorithm which
takes index i as input and outputs the ith element of the dictionary. In the
next section, we present such indexing algorithms for zero-order Markovian
dictionaries, first-order Markovian dictionaries, deterministic finite automata
(DFA), an arbitrary keyspace with some indexable superspace, and, finally,
for hybrid Markovian/DFA dictionaries.
4.4 Indexing algorithms
4.4.1 Zero-order Markovian dictionary
The dictionary we use is a slightly modified version of the zero-order Marko-
vian filter, in which we only consider fixed-length strings. This is because we
want to use different thresholds for different lengths. The hybrid algorithm in
Section 4.4.5 will demonstrate how multiple dictionaries can be combined into
one. The modified dictionary is Dν,θ,` = {α : |α| = ` and Πx∈αν(x) ≥ θ}
The key to the algorithm in this section is discretization of the proba-
bility distribution. To do this, we first rewrite the filter in an additive rather
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than multiplicative form: Dν,θ,` = {α : |α| = ` and
∑
x∈α µ(x) ≥ λ} where
µ(x) = log ν(x) and λ = log θ.
Next, we discretize the values of µ to the nearest multiple of µ0 for
some appropriate µ0. If we use a larger value for µ0, we lower our memory
requirement, but lose accuracy as well. In our experiments, we have chosen µ0
such that there are about 1000 “levels” (see below).
Next, we define “partial dictionaries” Dν,θ,`,θ′,`′ as follows. Let α be any
string such that |α| = `′ and Πx∈αν(x) = θ′. Then Dν,θ,`,θ′,`′ = {β : αβ ∈
Dν,θ,`}.
Note that Dν,θ,`,θ′,`′ is well-defined because
Πx∈αβν(x) = Πx∈αν(x)Πx∈βν(x) = θ′Πx∈βν(x)
Therefore, it doesn’t matter which α we choose. Intuitively, for any string
prefix, the partial dictionary contains the list of all possible character sequences
which could be appended to this prefix so that the resulting full string satisfies
the Markovian property.
We now present a recursive algorithm to compute the size of a partial
dictionary
|Dν,threshold, total length, level, current length|
Observe that this algorithm is executed only once and only during the precom-
putation stage (rather than once for each key), and, therefore, its efficiency
does not affect the cryptanalysis time. Here mu refers to the discretized version
of the µ function above.
partial_size1(current_length, level)
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{if level >= threshold: return 0
if total_length = current_length: return 1
sum = 0
for each char in alphabet
sum = sum + partial_size(current_length+1,
level+mu(char))
return sum
}
Computation of Dν,θ,`,.,`′ depends on Dν,θ,`,.,`′+1. Thus the partial sizes
are computed and stored in a 2-D array of size ` times the number of levels,
the computation being done in the decreasing order of `′.
We are not particularly concerned about the efficiency of this algorithm
because it is executed only during precomputation. Note, however, that run-
ning time (for computing all partial sizes) is linear in the product of the total
length, number of characters and the number of levels.
The following is another recursive algorithm which takes as input an
index into the keyspace and returns the corresponding key (this algorithm is
executed during the cryptanalysis stage):
get_key1(current_length, index, level)
{
if total_length = current_length: return ""
sum = 0
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for each char in alphabet
new_level = level + mu(char)
// looked up from precomputed array
size = partial_size1[
current_length+1][new_level]
if sum + size > index
// ’|’ refers to string concatenation
return char | get_key1(
current_length+1,
index-sum, new_level)
sum = sum + size
// control cannot reach here
print "index larger than keyspace size"; exit
}
The get_key algorithm uses partial_size to determine the first char-
acter (this results in a value being looked up in the precomputed table of partial
sizes), and then recurs on the index recomputed relative to the first character
and the threshold adjusted based on the frequency of the first character.
To index into the entire keyspace, we call get_key1 with current_length =
0 and level = 0.
We note the similarity of the ideas used in this algorithm to the well-
known Viterbi algorithm from speech processing [99].
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4.4.2 First-order Markovian dictionary
As in the case of the zero-order model, we define length-restricted dictionaries
and their partial versions. After reading a partial string, however, we now
need to keep track of the last character because this time we are using digram
frequencies.
partial_size2(current_length, prev_char, level)
{
if level >= threshold: return 0
if total_length = current_length: return 1
sum = 0
for each char in alphabet
if current_length = 0
new_level = mu(char)
else
new_level = level + mu(prev_char, char)
sum = sum + partial_size2(current_length+1,
char, new_level)
}
get_key2(current_length, index, prev_char, level)
{
if total_length = current_length: return ""
sum = 0
for char in alphabet
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if current_length = 0
new_level = mu(char)
else
new_level = level + mu(prev_char, char)
size = partial_size2(current_length+1,
char, new_level)
if sum + size > index
return char | get_key2(
current_length+1,
index-sum, char, new_level)
sum = sum + size
// control cannot reach here
print "index larger than keyspace size"; exit
}
4.4.3 Deterministic finite automaton
This algorithm is similar to the algorithm for zero-order Markovian dictionar-
ies, except that instead of levels and character frequencies we have states and
state transitions. The get_key3 algorithm is very similar to get_key1 and is
omitted.
partial_size3(current_length, state)
{
if current_length = total_length
if state is an accepting state: return 1
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else: return 0
sum = 0
for char in alphabet
new_state = transition(char, state)
if new_state is not NULL
sum = sum + partial_size3(
current_length+1, new_state)
return sum
}
4.4.4 Any keyspace
We now describe an indexing algorithm for any keyspace K, which works as
long as there is an indexing algorithm for some superspace K′ ⊃ K and a
testing procedure which, given α ∈ K′, decides whether α ∈ K. For instance,
we can trivially index into (unfiltered) character sequences of a given length
and test if a character sequence satisfies a Markovian filter, and, therefore, we
can use this algorithm to index into Markovian dictionaries. The disadvantage
is that precomputation involves enumerating K′ via its indexing algorithm
which might be prohibitively expensive if K is sparse in K′. For instance, it is
quite reasonable to consider 10-character password sequences with a first-order
Markovian filter. This compresses the keyspace by a factor of 105, but to use
the algorithm below to achieve this would involve iterating over a keyspace
larger than 1014. Furthermore, the indexing itself is not very efficient. On the
other hand, it provides a good starting point because further keyspace-specific
52
optimizations may be possible.
Given a parameter t, the algorithm divides the space K′ into bins of
size t, precomputes the number of members of K in each bin and stores them.
When it gets an index, it quickly figures out which bin it falls into, iterates
over all keys in K′ in that bin and tests each one for membership.
Let |K′| = mt.
compute_bins(t)
{
count=0
for i = 0 to m-1
for j = i*t to i*t+(t-1)
if the j’th key of K’ belongs to K
count = count+1
bin[i] = count
}
For each i, this computes the cumulative counts for the first i bins.
get_key(index)
{
i = binary_search(bin[], index)
// i.e., bin[i] < index <= bin[i+1]
count=0
for j = i*t to i*t+(t-1)
key = the j’th key of K’
if key belongs to K
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count++
if count = index - bin[i]
return key
}
This algorithm requires O(|K′|) precomputation time,
O( |K
′|
t
) storage and O(t+ log |K
′|
t
) indexing time. Observe that this algorithm
is very similar to the algorithm for finding the nth prime [40].
4.4.5 Hybrid Markovian/DFA dictionary
LetA be the set of characters, and consider the combined dictionaryDν,θ,`1,M,`2 =
{α : |α| = `,∑x∈α,x∈A = `′,Πx∈α,x∈Aν(x) ≥ θ, and M accepts α}.
As mentioned earlier, our finite automaton works over the symbol set
{A, a, n, s}. All lowercase characters are represented by a, all uppercase char-
acters by A, all numerals by n and all special characters by s in the input to
the automaton.
get_key5(index)
{
count1 = partial_size1(0, 0)
count2 = partial_size2(0, initial_state)
index1 = index/count2 // quotient is truncated
index2 = index - index1 * count2
key1 = get_key1(0, index1, 0)
// wlog we assume that key1 consists of
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// lowercase characters
key2 = get_key2(0, index2, initial_state)
key = ""
pos = 1
for char in key2:
if char is ’a’
append key1[pos] to key
pos = pos+1
if char is ’A’
append uppercase(key1[pos]) to key
pos = pos+1
if char is neither ’a’ nor ’A’
append char to key
return key
}
Essentially, this algorithm looks at the positions in the output of get_key2
where alphabet characters are expected, and substitutes the string returned
by get_key1. Combining an automaton with a first-order Markovian filter
works similarly.
4.4.6 Multiple keyspaces
Finally, we show how multiple disjoint keyspaces can be combined into a single
space.
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get_key6(K1, K2, ... Kn, index)
{
sum = 0
for i = 1 to n
if sum + size(Ki) > index
return get_key(Ki, index-sum)
sum = sum + size(Ki)
// this cannot be reached
print "index larger than sum of keyspace sizes"
}
4.4.7 Possible optimizations
In this section, we describe some optimizations that we did not implement.
The main criterion for the hybrid attack is that indexing should take less time
than the hashing algorithm. So we want the hybrid algorithm to use about
50− 100 table lookups and the table must fit into the cache. The automaton
algorithm is very fast because its input alphabet is very small; get_key6 can
be slow when there is a large number of keyspaces, but it can accelerated by
precomputation of the cumulative sums and binary search for the appropriate
keyspace. Our main concern, then, are the Markovian filters. We can speed
up get_key1 by reordering the characters so that the more frequent ones come
first, reducing the average number of iterations to 6 (from 13, if the characters
are ordered alphabetically). This reduces table lookups to less than 50 for
8-character strings. The same strategy works for get_key2, too.
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4.5 Experiments
Our first experiment involves measuring the coverage of Oechslin’s rainbow at-
tack vs. our hybrid attack. We used a database containing 142 real user pass-
words kindly provided by Passware (operator of http://LostPassword.com),
which we believe to be a representative source. We used the search space of 6-
character alphanumeric sequences (lowercase characters only) for the rainbow
attack, which gives a keyspace size of 366 = 2.17 × 109. To model common
password patterns, we created a set of around 70 regular expressions, which
are listed in Appendix A.
The following table compares the number of passwords recovered by the
Rainbow attack vs. our attack.
Category Count Rainbow Hybrid
Length at most 5 63 29 63
Length 6 21 10 17
Length 7 18 0 10
Length 8, A* or a* 9 0 6
Others 31 0 0
Total 142 39(27.5%) 96(67.6%)
only length ≥ 6 79 10(12.7%) 33(41.8%)
The effect of the probabilistic nature of the time-space tradeoff has been
neglected, since the probability can be arbitrarily increased by increasing table
size (and the dependence is the same for both attacks).
This experiment validates our basic hypothesis, but further experiments
are needed. Passwords in our database may not have been representative of
typical user passwords due to the way the database was compiled by Pass-
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ware. We had access to the passwords when creating our regular expressions,
although we did take the utmost care to write the expressions without using
specific knowledge about the passwords in the database. A better experiment
would involve a database containing only hashes of passwords, e.g., the con-
tents of an /etc/passwd file obtained from a system with a large, diverse user
base.
4.6 Summary
There are a variety of attacks against passwords, of which dictionary-based
attacks are only one subclass. The simplest to deploy are social engineering
attacks such as impersonation, bribery, phishing and login spoofing. Other at-
tacks that directly exploit human vulnerabilities include shoulder surfing and
dumpster diving. Password-based authentication systems appear particularly
susceptible to protocol weaknesses, which can be exploited by keystroke log-
ging, “Google hacking,” wiretapping and side-channel attacks based on timing
and acoustic emanations. Among dictionary-based attacks, it is worth men-
tioning that the United States Secret Service recently reported [147] success
with custom dictionaries built from victim-specific information gleaned from
analyzing their hard drives, including their documents, email messages, web
browser cache and contents of visited websites.
Defending against dictionary attacks on human-memorable passwords is
a difficult task. Possible techniques include graphical passwords [141, 246, 72],
reverse Turing tests [210, 236], and hardening passwords with biometric in-
formation [186]. These techniques, however, require substantial changes in
the authentication infrastructure. An interesting question for future research
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is whether human-memorable passwords drawn from non-textual spaces (e.g.,
faces or geometric images) are vulnerable to attacks such as ours, based on fil-
tering out unlikely candidates and very efficient enumeration of the remaining
ones. Investigating this question will only be possible after one of the proposed
methods is widely adopted and there is a significant body of such passwords
chosen by real users.
Online dictionary attacks are generally considered easier to defend against
than offline attacks. This work provides more evidence for this belief: the
speedup of our smart-dictionary attack using a time-space tradeoff works only
in the offline setting. To the extent possible, we recommend preventing the
possibility of offline attacks, such as by implementing PAKE rather than naive
hash-based password authentication.
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Chapter 5
Obfuscated Databases and
Group Privacy
5.1 Introduction
Conventional privacy mechanisms usually provide all-or-nothing privacy. For
example, secure multi-party computation schemes enable two or more parties
to compute some joint function while revealing no information about their
respective inputs except what is leaked by the result of the computation.
Privacy-preserving data mining aims to completely hide individual records
while computing global statistical properties of the database. Search on en-
crypted data and private information retrieval enable the user to retrieve data
from an untrusted server without revealing the query.
In this chapter, we investigate a different concept of privacy. Consider
a data owner who wants to distribute a database to potential users. Instead
of hiding individual data entries, he wants to obfuscate the database so that
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only certain queries can be evaluated on it, i.e., the goal is to ensure that the
database, after it has been given out to users, can be accessed only in the ways
permitted by the privacy policy. Note that there is no interaction between the
data owner and the user when the latter accesses the obfuscated database.
Our constructions show how to obfuscate the database before distribut-
ing it to users so that only the queries permitted by the policy are compu-
tationally feasible. This concept of privacy is incomparable to conventional
definitions because, depending on the policy, a permitted query may or even
should reveal individual data entries.
For example, a college alumni directory may be obfuscated in such a
way that someone who already knows a person’s name and year of graduation
is able to look up that person’s email address, yet spammers cannot indiscrim-
inately harvest addresses listed in the directory. Employees of a credit bureau
need to have access to customers’ records so that they can respond to reports
of fraudulent transactions, yet one may want to restrict the bureau’s ability
to compile a list of customers’ addresses and sell it to a third party.
We develop provably secure obfuscation techniques for several types of
queries. We do not assume that users of the obfuscated database access it
through a trusted third party, nor that they use trusted or “tamper-proof”
access-control software or hardware (in practice, such schemes are vulnerable
to circumvention and reverse-engineering, while trusted third parties are scarce
and often impractical). Our constructions are cryptographically strong, i.e.,
they assume an adversary who is limited only by his computational power.
We prove security in the standard “virtual black-box” model for ob-
fuscation proposed by Barak et al. [27]. Intuitively, a database is securely
obfuscated if the view of any efficient adversary with access to the obfuscation
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can be efficiently simulated by a simulator who has access only to the ideal
functionality, which is secure by definition. The ideal functionality can be
thought of as the desired privacy policy for the database. One of our contri-
butions is coming up with several ideal functionalities that capture interesting
privacy policies for databases.
Directed-access databases. Our “warm-up” construction is a directed-
access database. Some attributes of the database are designated as query
attributes, and the rest as data attributes. The database is securely obfuscated
if, for any record, it is infeasible to retrieve the values of the data attributes
without supplying the values of the query attributes, yet a user who knows
the query attributes can easily retrieve the corresponding data attributes.
To illustrate by example, a directed-access obfuscation of a telephone
directory has the property that it is easy to look up the phone number corre-
sponding to a particular name-address pair, but queries such as “retrieve all
phone numbers stored in the directory” or “retrieve all names” are computa-
tionally infeasible. Such a directory is secure against abusive harvesting, but
still provides useful functionality. Note that it may be possible to efficiently
enumerate all name-address pairs because these fields have less entropy than
regular cryptographic keys, and thus learn the entire database through the
permitted queries. Because the database is accessed only in permitted ways,
this does not violate the standard definition of obfuscation. Below, we give
some examples where it is not feasible to enumerate all possible values for
query attributes.
The directed-access property of a single database record can be modeled
as a point function, i.e., a function from {0, 1}n to {0, 1} that returns 1 on
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exactly one input x (in our case, query attributes are the arguments of the
point function). Directed-access obfuscation guarantees that the adversary’s
view of any obfuscated record can be efficiently simulated with access only
to this point function. Therefore, for this “warm-up” problem, we can use
obfuscation techniques for point functions such as [170]. Informally, we encrypt
the data attributes with a key derived from hashed query attributes. The only
computationally feasible way to retrieve the data attributes is to supply the
corresponding query attributes. If the retriever does not know the right query
attributes, no information can be extracted at all.
Group-exponential databases. We then consider a more interesting pri-
vacy policy, which requires that computational cost of access be exponential
in the number of database records retrieved. We refer to this new concept
of privacy as group privacy. It ensures that users of the obfuscated database
can retrieve individual records or small subsets of records by identifying them
precisely, i.e., by submitting queries which are satisfied only by these records.
Queries matching a large number of records are infeasible.
We generalize the idea of directed access to queries consisting of con-
junctions of equality tests on query attributes, and then to any boolean cir-
cuit over attribute equalities. The user can evaluate any query of the form
attributej1 = value1 ∧ . . . ∧ attributejt = valuet, as long as it is satisfied by a
small number of records. Our construction is significantly more general than
simple keyword search on encrypted data because the value of any query at-
tribute or a conjunction thereof can be used as the “keyword” for searching the
obfuscated database, and the obfuscator does not need to know what queries
will be evaluated on the database.
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To distinguish between “small” and “large” queries, suppose the query
predicate is satisfied by n records. Our construction uses a form of secret
sharing that forces the retriever to guess n bits before he can access the data
attributes in any matching record. (If n=1, i.e., the record is unique, the
retriever still has to guess 1 bit, but this simply means that with probability 1
2
he has to repeat the query.) The policy that requires the retriever to uniquely
identify a single record, i.e., forbids any query that is satisfied by multiple
records, can also be easily implemented using our techniques. Our construction
can be viewed as the non-interactive analog of hash-reversal “client puzzles”
used to prevent denial of service in network security [142], but, unlike client
puzzles, it comes with a rigorous proof of security.
For example, consider an airline passenger database in which every
record contains the passenger’s name, flight number, date, and ticket pur-
chase details. In our construction, if the retriever knows the name and date
that uniquely identify a particular record (e.g., because this information was
supplied in a court-issued warrant), he (almost) immediately learns the key
that encrypts the purchase details in the obfuscated record. If the passenger
traveled on k flights on that date, the retriever learns the key except for k
bits. Since k is small, guessing k bits is still feasible. If, however, the retriever
only knows the date and the flight number, he learns the key except for m
bits, where m is the number of passengers on the flight, and retrieval of these
passengers’ purchase details is infeasible.
A database obfuscated using our method has the group privacy property
in the following sense. It can be accessed only via queries permitted by the
privacy policy. The probability of successfully evaluating a permitted query is
inversely exponential in the number of records that satisfy the query predicate.
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In particular, to extract a large number of records from the database, the
retriever must know a priori specific information that uniquely identifies each
of the records, or small subsets thereof. The obfuscated database itself does
not help him obtain this information.
In obfuscated databases with group privacy, computational cost of ac-
cess depends on the amount of information retrieved. Therefore, group privacy
can be thought of as a step towards a formal cryptographic model for “eco-
nomics of privacy.” It is complementary to the existing concepts of privacy,
and appears to be a good fit for applications such as public directories and
customer relationship management (CRM) databases, where the database user
may need to access an individual record for a legitimate business purpose, but
should be prevented from extracting large subsets of records for resale and
abusive marketing.
While our constructions for group privacy are provably secure in the
“virtual black-box” sense of [27], the cost of this rigorous security is a quadratic
blowup in the size of the obfuscated database, rendering the technique imprac-
tical for large datasets. We also present some heuristic techniques to decrease
the size of the obfuscated database, and believe that further progress in this
area is possible.
Alternative privacy policies. Defining rigorous privacy policies that cap-
ture intuitive “database privacy” is an important challenge, and we hope that
this work will serve as a starting point in the discussion. For example, the
group privacy policy that we use in our constructions permits the retriever to
learn whether a given attribute of a database record is equal to a particular
value. While this leaks more information than may be desirable, we conjecture
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that the privacy policy without this oracle is unrealizable.
We also consider privacy policies that permit any query rather than
just boolean circuits of equality tests on attributes. We show that this policy
is vacuous : regardless of the database contents, any user can efficiently ex-
tract the entire database by policy-compliant queries. Therefore, even if the
obfuscation satisfies the virtual black-box property, it serves no useful pur-
pose. Of course, there are many types of queries that are more general than
boolean circuits of equality tests on attributes. Exact characterization of non-
vacuous, yet realizable privacy policies is a challenging task, and a topic of
future research.
Organization of this chapter. We discuss related work in Section 5.2.
The ideas are illustrated with a “warm-up” construction in Section 5.3. In
Section 5.4, we explain group privacy and the corresponding obfuscation tech-
nique. In Section 5.5, we generalize the class of queries to boolean circuits
over attribute equalities. In Section 5.6, we show that policies which permit
arbitrary queries are vacuous, and give an informal argument that a policy
that does not allow the retriever to verify his guesses of individual attribute
values cannot be realized. A summary is in Section 5.7.
5.2 Related work
This work uses the “virtual black-box” model of obfuscation due to Barak et
al. [27]. In addition to the impossibility result for general-purpose obfusca-
tion, [27] demonstrates several classes of circuits that cannot be obfuscated.
We focus on a different class of circuits.
To the best of our knowledge, the first provably secure constructions
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for “virtual black-box” obfuscation were proposed by Canetti et el. [52, 53]
in the context of “perfectly one-way” hash functions, which can be viewed
as obfuscators for point functions (a.k.a. oracle indicators or delta functions).
Dodis and Smith [78] recently showed how to construct noise-tolerant “per-
fectly one-way” hash functions. which they used to obfuscate proximity queries
with “entropic security.” It is not clear how to apply techniques of [78] in our
setting. In section 5.6, we present strong evidence that our privacy definitions
may not be realizable if queries other than equality tests are permitted.
Lynn et al. [170] construct obfuscators for point functions (and simple
extensions, such as public regular expressions with point functions as symbols)
in the random oracle model. The main advantage of [170] is that it allows
the adversary partial information about the preimage of the hash function,
i.e., secrets do not need to have high entropy. This feature is essential in
our constructions, too, thus we also use the random oracle model. Wee [256]
proposed a construction for a weaker notion of point function obfuscation,
along with the impossibility result for uniformly black-box obfuscation. This
impossibility result suggests that the use of random oracles in our proofs (in
particular, the simulator’s ability to choose the random oracle) is essential.
Many ad-hoc obfuscation schemes have been proposed in the litera-
ture [21, 61, 60, 65, 66, 64]. Typically, these schemes contain neither a cryp-
tographic definition of security, nor proofs, except for theoretical work on
software protection with hardware restrictions on the adversary [115, 138].
Forcing the adversary to pay some computational cost for accessing a
resource is a well-known technique for preventing malicious resource exhaus-
tion (a.k.a. denial of service attacks). This approach, usually in the form of
presenting a puzzle to the adversary and forcing him to solve it, has been
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proposed for combating junk email [84], website metering [101], prevention of
TCP SYN flooding attacks [142], protecting Web protocols [73], and many
other applications. Puzzles based on hash reversal, where the adversary must
discover the preimage of a given hash value where he already knows some of
the bits, are an especially popular technique [142, 73, 255], albeit without any
proof of security. Our techniques are similar, but our task is substantially
harder in the context of non-interactive obfuscation.
The obfuscation problem is superficially similar to the problem of pri-
vate information retrieval [29, 59, 112] and keyword search on encrypted data [232,
39]. These techniques are concerned, however, with retrieving data from an
untrusted server, whereas we are concerned with encrypting the data and then
giving them away, while preserving some control over what users can do with
them.
A paper by Chawla et al. [56] also considers database privacy in a
non-interactive setting, but their objective is complementary to ours. Their
definitions aim to capture privacy of data, while ours aim to make access to
the database indistinguishable from access to a certain ideal functionality.
5.3 Directed-access databases
As a warm-up example, we show how to construct directed-access databases
in which every record is indistinguishable from a lookup function. The con-
structions and theorems in this section are mainly intended to illustrate the
ideas.
Let X be a set of tuples −→x , Y a set of tuples −→y , and Y∗ = Y ∪ {⊥}.
Let D ⊆ X × Y be the database. We want to obfuscate each record of D so
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that the only operation that a user can perform on it is to retrieve −→y if he
knows −→x .
We use the standard approach in secure multi-party computation, and
formally define this privacy policy in terms of an ideal functionality. The ideal
functionality is an (imaginary) trusted third party that permits only policy-
compliant database accesses. An obfuscation algorithm is secure if any access
to the obfuscated database can be efficiently simulated with access only to the
ideal functionality. This means that the user can extract no more information
from the obfuscated database than he would be able to extract had all of his
accesses been filtered by the trusted third party.
Definition 1 (Directed-access privacy policy) For database D, define
the corresponding directed-access functionality DAD as the function that, for
any input −→x ∈ X such that 〈−→x ,−→y1〉, . . . , 〈−→x ,−→ym〉 ∈ D, outputs {−→y1 , . . . ,−→ym}.
Intuitively, a directed-access database is indistinguishable from a lookup
function. Given the query attributes of an individual record (−→x ), it is easy to
learn the data attributes (−→y ), but the database cannot be feasibly accessed
in any other way. In particular, it is not feasible to discover the value of −→y
without first discovering a corresponding −→x . Moreover, it is not feasible to
harvest all −→y values from the database without first discovering all values of
−→x .
This definition does not say that, if set X is small, it is infeasible to
efficiently enumerate all possible values of −→x and stage a dictionary attack
on the obfuscated database. It does guarantee that even for this attack, the
attacker is unable to evaluate any query forbidden by the privacy policy. In
applications where X cannot be efficiently enumerated (e.g., X is a set of
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secret keywords known only to some users of the obfuscated database), nothing
can be retrieved from the obfuscated database by users who don’t know the
keywords. Observe that −→x can contain multiple attributes, and thus multiple
keywords may be required for access to −→y in the obfuscated database.
Directed-access databases are easy to construct in the random oracle
model, since lookup functionality is essentially a point function on query at-
tributes, and random oracles naturally provide an obfuscation for point func-
tions [170]. The obfuscation algorithm OBda takes D and replaces every record
〈−→xi ,−→yi 〉 ∈ D with
〈hash(ri1||−→xi ), hash(ri2||−→xi )⊕−→yi , ri1 , ri2〉
where ri1,2 are random numbers, || is concatenation, and hash is a hash function
implementing the random oracle.
Theorem 1 (Directed-access obfuscation is “virtual black-box”)
Let OBda be as described above. For any probabilistic polynomial-time ad-
versarial algorithm A, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator
algorithm S and a negligible function ν of the security parameter k such that
for any database D:
|P(A(OBda(D)) = 1)−P(SDAD(1|D|) = 1)| ≤ ν(k)
where probability P is taken over random oracles (implemented as hash func-
tions), as well as the the randomness ofA and S. Intuitively, this theorem holds
because retrieving −→yi requires finding the (partial) pre-image of hash(ri2 ,−→xi ).
The standard definition of obfuscation in [27] also requires that there
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exist an efficient retrieval algorithm that, given some −→x ∗, extracts the corre-
sponding −→y from the obfuscation OBda(D). Clearly, our construction has this
property. Someone who knows −→x ∗ simply finds the record(s) in which the first
value is equal to hash(ri1||−→x ∗), computes hash(ri2||−→x ∗) and uses it as the key
to decrypt −→y .
5.4 Group-exponential databases
For the purposes of this section, we restrict our attention to queries P that
are conjunctions of equality tests over attributes (in section 5.5, we show how
this extends to arbitrary boolean circuits over equality tests). For this class of
queries, we show how to obfuscate the database so that evaluation of the query
is exponential in the size of the answer to the query. Intuitively, this means
that only precise query predicates, i.e., those that are satisfied by a small num-
ber of records, can be efficiently computed. “Mass harvesting” queries, i.e.,
predicates that are satisfied by a large number of records, are computationally
infeasible.
Recall that our goal is to restrict how the database can be accessed.
For some databases, it may be possible to efficiently enumerate all possible
combinations of query attributes and learn the entire database by querying it
on every combination. For databases where the values of query attributes are
drawn from a large set, our construction prevents the retriever from extracting
any records that he cannot describe precisely. In either case, we guarantee
that the database can be accessed only through the interface permitted by the
privacy policy, without any trust assumptions about the retriever’s computing
environment.
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In our construction, each data attribute is encrypted with a key derived
from a randomly generated secret. We use a different secret for each record.
The secret itself is split into several (unequal) shares, one per each query
attribute. Each share is then encrypted itself, using a key derived from the
output of the hash function on the value of the corresponding query attribute.
If the retriever knows the correct value only for some query attribute a, he
must guess the missing shares. The size of the revealed share in bits is inversely
related to the number of other records in the database that have the same value
of attribute a. This provides protection against queries on frequently occurring
attribute values.
5.4.1 Group privacy policy
We define the privacy policy in terms of an ideal functionality, which consists of
two parts. When given an index of a particular query attribute and a candidate
value, it responds whether the guess is correct, i.e., whether this value indeed
appears in the corresponding attribute of the original database. When given a
predicate, it evaluates this predicate on every record in the database. For each
record on which the predicate is true, it returns this record’s data attributes
with probability 2−q, where q is the total number of records in the database
that satisfy the predicate. if no more information can be extracted this ideal
functionality.
Definition 2 (Group privacy policy) Let X be a set and Y a set of tuples.
Let D be the database 〈ρ1, ρ2, . . . ρN〉 where ρi = {xi1, xi2, . . . , xim,−→yi } ∈ Xm×
Y. Let P : Xm → {0, 1} be a predicate of the form Xj1 = xj1 ∧ Xj2 =
xj2 ∧ . . . ∧ Xjt = xjt. Let D[P] = {ρi ∈ D | P(xi1, xi2, . . . , xim) = 1} be the
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subset of records on which P is true.
The group-exponential functionality GPD consists of two functions:
- CD(x, i, j) is 1 if x = xij and 0 otherwise, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
- RD(P) =
⋃
1≤i≤N{〈i, γi〉}, where
γi =

−→yi with probability 2−|D[P]| if P(ρi)
⊥ with probability 1− 2−|D[P]| if P(ρi)
⊥ if ¬P(ρi)
Probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of GPD.
Informally, function C answers whether the jth attribute of the ith record is
equal to x, while function R returns all records that satisfy some predicate P ,
but only with probability inversely exponential in the number of such records.
It may appear that function C is unnecessary. Moreover, it leaks addi-
tional information, making our privacy policy weaker than it might have been.
In section 5.6, we argue that it cannot be simply eliminated, because the re-
sulting functionality would be unrealizable. Of course, there may exist policies
that permit some function C ′ which leaks less information than C, but it is
unclear what C ′ might be. We discuss several alternatives to our definition in
section 5.6.
We note that data attributes are drawn from a set of tuples Y because
there may be multiple data attributes that need to be obfuscated. Also observe
that we have no restrictions on the values of query attributes, i.e., the same
m-tuple of query attributes may appear in multiple records, with different or
identical data attributes.
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5.4.2 Obfuscating the database
We now present the algorithmOBgp, which, given any database D, produces its
obfuscation. For notational convenience, we use a set of random hash functions
Hα : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k. Given any hash function H, these can be implemented
simply as H(α||x). To convert the k-bit hash function output into a key as
long as the plaintext to which it is applied, we use a set of pseudo-random
number generators prgα,β : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}∞ (this implements random oracles
with unbounded output length).
Let N be the number of records in the database. For each row ρi,
1 ≤ i ≤ N , generate a random N -bit secret ri = ri1||ri2|| . . . ||riN , where
rij ∈R {0, 1}. This secret will be used to protect the data attribute −→yi of this
record. Note that there is 1 bit in ri for each record of the database.
Next, split ri into m shares corresponding to query attributes. If the
retriever can supply the correct value of the jth attribute, he will learn the
jth share (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Denote the share corresponding to the jth attribute
as sij. Shares are also N bits long, i.e., sij = sij1|| . . . ||sijN .
Each of the N bits of sij has a corresponding bit in ri, which in its
turn corresponds to one of the N records in the database. For each p s.t.
1 ≤ p ≤ N , set sijp = rip if xij 6= xpj, and set sijp = 0 otherwise. In other
words, the jth share sij consists of all bits of ri except those corresponding to
the records where the value of the jth attribute is the same. An example can
be found in section 5.4.4.
The result of this construction is that shares corresponding to com-
monly occurring attribute values will be missing many bits of ri, while a share
corresponding to an attribute that uniquely identifies one record will contain
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all bits of ri except one. Intuitively, this guarantees group privacy. If the re-
triever can supply query attribute values that uniquely identify a single record
or a small subset of records, he will learn the shares that reveal all bits of the
secret ri except for a few, which he can easily guess. If the retriever cannot
describe precisely what he is looking for and supplies attribute values that are
common in the database, many of the bits of ri will be missing in the shares
that he learns, and guessing all of them will be computationally infeasible.
Shares corresponding to different query attributes may overlap. For
example, suppose that we are obfuscating a database in which two records
have the same value of attribute X1 if and only if they have the same value of
attribute X2. In this case, for any record in the database, the share revealed
if the retriever supplies the correct value of X1 will be exactly the same as
the share revealed if the retriever supplies the value of X2. The retriver gains
nothing by supplying X2 in conjunction with X1 because this does not help
him narrow the set of records that match his query.
To construct the obfuscated database, we encrypt each share with a
pseudo-random key derived from the value of the corresponding query at-
tribute, and encrypt the data attribute with a key derived from the secret ri.
More precisely, we replace each record 〈ρi = xi1, . . . , xim,−→yi 〉 of the original
database with the obfuscated record
〈vi1, wi1, vi2, wi2, . . . , vim, wim, ui, zi〉
where
• vij = H1,i,j(xij). This enables the retriever to verify that he supplied the
correct value for the jth query attribute.
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• wij = prg1,i,j(H2,i,j(xij)) ⊕ sij. This is the jth share of the secret ri,
encrypted with a key derived from the value of the jth query attribute.
• ui = H3,i(ri). This enables the retriever to verify that he computed the
correct secret ri.
• zi = prg2,i(H4,i(ri)) ⊕ −→yi . This is the data attribute −→yi , encrypted with
a key derived from the secret ri.
Clearly, algorithm OBgp runs in time polynomial in N (the size of the
database). The size of the resulting obfuscation is N2 · m. Even though it
is within a polynomial factor of N (and thus satisfies the definition of [27]),
quadratic blowup means that our technique is impractical for large databases.
This issue is discussed further in section 5.4.5.
We claim that OBgp produces a secure obfuscation of D, i.e., it is not
feasible to extract any more information from OBgp(D) than permitted by the
privacy policy GPD.
Theorem 2 (Group-exponential obfuscation is “virtual black-box”)
For any probabilistic polynomial-time (adversarial) algorithm A, there exists a
probabilistic polynomial-time simulator algorithm S and a negligible function
ν of the security parameter k s.t. for any database D:
|P(A(OBgp(D)) = 1)−P(SGPD(1|D|) = 1)| ≤ ν(k)
Remark. An improper implementation of the random oracles in the above
construction could violate privacy under composition of obfuscation, i.e., when
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more than one database is obfuscated and published. For instance, if the hash
of some attribute is the same in two databases, then the adversary learns that
the attributes are equal without having to guess their value. To prevent this,
the same hash function may not be used more than once. One way to achieve
this is to pick Hi(.) = H(ri||.) where ri ∈R {0, 1}k, and publish ri along with
the obfuscation. This is an example of the pitfalls inherent in the random
oracle model.
5.4.3 Accessing the obfuscated database
We now explain how the retriever can efficiently evaluate queries on the ob-
fuscated database. Recall that the privacy policy restricts the retriever to
queries consisting of conjunctions of equality tests on query attributes, i.e.,
every query predicate P has the form Xj1 = xj1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xjt = xjt , where
j1, . . . , jt are some indices between 1 and m.
The retriever processes the obfuscated database record by record. The
ith record of the obfuscated database (1 ≤ i ≤ N) has the form 〈vi1, wi1, vi2, wi2, . . . , vim, wim, ui, zi〉.
The retriever’s goal is to compute the N -bit secret ri so that he can decrypt
the ciphertext zi and recover the value of
−→yi .
First, the retriever recovers as many shares as he can from the ith
record. Recall from the construction of section 5.4.2 that each wij is a ci-
phertext of some share, but the only way to decrypt it is to supply the
corresponding query attribute value xij. Let ` range over the indices of at-
tributes supplied by the retriever as part of the query, i.e., ` ∈ {j1, . . . , jt}.
For each `, if H1,i,`(x`) = vi`, then the retriever extracts the corresponding
share si` = prg1,i,`(H2,i,`(x`)) ⊕ wi`. If H1,i,`(x`) 6= vi`, this means that the
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retriever supplied the wrong attribute value, and he learns nothing about the
corresponding share. Let S be the set of recovered shares.
Each recovered share s` ∈ S reveals only some bits of ri, and, as men-
tioned before, bits revealed by different shares may overlap. For each p s.t.
1 ≤ p ≤ N , the retriever sets the corresponding bit rip of the candidate secret
ri as follows:
rip =
 s`p if ∃s` ∈ S s.t. vp` 6= H1,1,`(x`)random otherwise
Informally, if at least one of recovered shares s` contains the pth bit of ri (this
can be verified by checking that the value of `th attribute is not the same in
the pth record of the database — see construction in section 5.4.2), then this
bit is indeed to the pth bit of the secret ri. Otherwise, the retriever must guess
the pth bit randomly.
Once a candidate ri is constructed, the retriever checks whetherH3,i(ri) =
ui. If not, the missing bits must have been guessed incorrectly, and the re-
triever has to try another choice for these bits. If H3,i(ri) = ui, then the
retriever decrypts the data attribute −→yi = prg2,i(H4,i(ri))⊕ zi.
The obfuscation algorithm of section 5.4.2 guarantees that the number
of missing bits is exactly equal to the number of records satisfied by the query
P . This provides the desired group privacy property. If the retriever supplies
a query which is satisfied by a single record, then he will only have to guess
one bit to decrypt the data attributes. If a query is satisfied by two records,
then two bits must be guessed, and so on. For queries satisfied by a large
number of records, the number of bits to guess will be infeasible large.
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5.4.4 Example
Consider a toy airline passenger database with 4 records, where the query
attributes are “Last name” and “Flight,” and the data attribute (in bold) is
“Purchase details.”
Last name Flight Purchase details
Smith 88 Acme Travel, Visa 4390XXXX
Brown 500 Airline counter, cash
Jones 88 Nonrevenue
Smith 1492 Travel.com, AmEx 3735XXXX
Because N = 4, we need to create a 4-bit secret to protect each data
attribute. (4-bit secrets can be easily guessed, of course. We assume that
in real applications N would be sufficiently large, and use 4 records in this
example only to simplify the explanations.) Let α = α1α2α3α4 be the secret
for the first data attribute, and β, γ, δ the secrets for the other data attributes,
respectively.
For simplicity, we use a special symbol “?” to indicate the missing bits
that the retriever must guess. In the actual construction, each of these bits
is equal to 0, but the retriever knows that he must guess the ith bit of the
jth share if the value of the jth attribute in the current record is equal to the
value of the jth attribute in the ith record.
Consider the first record. Each of the two query attributes, “Last name”
and “Flight,” encrypts a 4-bit share. The share encrypted with the value of the
“Last name” attribute (i.e., “Smith”) is missing the 1st and 4th bits because
the 1st and 4th records in the database have the same value of this attribute.
(Obviously, all shares associated the ith record have the ith bit missing). The
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share encrypted with the value of the “Flight” attribute is missing the 1st and
3rd bits.
H111(“Smith”), prg1,1,1(H211(“Smith”))⊕ (?α2α3?),
H112(“88”), prg1,1,2(H212(“88”))⊕ (?α2?α4),
H31(α1α2α3α4), prg2,1(H41(α1α2α3α4))⊕ (“Acme. . . ”)
H121(“Brown”), prg1,2,1(H221(“Brown”))⊕ (β1?β3β4),
H122(“500”), prg1,2,2(H222(“500”))⊕ (β1?β3β4),
H32(β1β2β3β4), prg2,2(H42(β1β2β3β4))⊕ (“Airline. . . ”)
H131(“Jones”), prg1,3,1(H231(“Jones”))⊕ (γ1γ2?γ4),
H132(“88”), prg1,3,2(H232(“88”))⊕ (?γ2?γ4),
H33(γ1γ2γ3γ4), prg2,3(H43(γ1γ2γ3γ4))⊕ (“Nonrev. . . ”)
H141(“Smith”), prg1,4,1(H241(“Smith”))⊕ (?δ2δ3?),
H142(“1492”), prg1,4,2(H242(“1492”))⊕ (δ1δ2?δ4),
H34(δ1δ2δ3δ4), prg2,4(H44(δ1δ2δ3δ4))⊕ (“Travel.com. . . ”)
Suppose the retriever knows only that the flight number is 88. There are
2 records in the database that match this predicate. From the first obfuscated
record, he recovers ?α2?α4 and from the third obfuscated record, ?γ2?γ4. The
retriever learns which bits he must guess by computing H2i2(“88”) for 1 ≤
i ≤ 4, and checking whether the result is equal to vi2 from the ith obfuscated
record. In both cases, the retriever learns that he must guess 2 bits (1st and
3rd) in order to reconstruct the secret and decrypt the data attribute.
Now suppose the retriever knows that the flight number is 88 and the
last name is Smith. There is only 1 record in the database that satisfies this
predicate. From the first part of the first obfuscated record, the retriever
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can recover ?α2α3?, and from the second part ?α2?α4 (note how the shares
overlap). Combining them, he learns ?α2α3α4, so he needs to guess only 1 bit
to decrypt the data attribute.
It may appear that this toy example is potentially vulnerable to a dic-
tionary attack, since it is conceivable that all combinations of last names and
flight numbers can be efficiently enumerated with enough computing power.
Note, however, that this “attack” does not violate the definition of secure ob-
fuscation because the retriever must supply the name-flight pair before he can
recover the purchase details. Therefore, the obfuscated database is only ac-
cessed via queries permitted by the privacy policy. In databases where values
are drawn from a large set, even this “attack” is infeasible.
5.4.5 Efficiency
The algorithm of section 5.4.2 produces obfuscations which are a factor of Ω(N)
larger than original databases. Thus, while our results establish feasibility of
database obfuscation and group privacy, they are not directly applicable to
real-world databases. This appears to be a recurring problem in the field of
database privacy: the cryptography community has very strict definitions of
security but loose notions of efficiency (typically polynomial time and space),
whereas the database community has very strict efficiency requirements but
loose security (typically heuristic or statistical). As a result, many proposed
schemes are either too inefficient, or too insecure for practical use.
A possible compromise might be to start with a provably secure but
inefficient construction and employ heuristic techniques to improve its effi-
ciency. In this spirit, we now propose some modifications to reduce the size of
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the obfuscated database without providing a security proof.
The obfuscation algorithm is modified as follows. For each record i, we
split ri into
N
k
“blocks” of k bits each, padding the last block if necessary (k
is the security parameter). Instead of generating the bits randomly, we create
a binary tree of depth log N
k
. A key of length k is associated with each node
of the tree, with the property the two “children” keys are derived from the
“parent” key (e.g., using a size-doubling pseudo-random generator). This is
similar to a Merkle tree in which keys are derived in the reverse direction. The
edge of the tree (minus the padding of the last block) is ri.
Let us denote the jth attribute of the ith record by 〈i, j〉. Say that 〈i, j〉
is entitled to the secret bit ri′j if xij 6= xi′j, and 〈i, j〉 is entitled to an entire
block B if it is entitled to each secret bit ri′j in that block. Intuitively, if an
entire block is entitled, then we encode it efficiently using the “reverse Merkle”
tree described above; if it is partially entitled, then we fall back on our original
construction. Thus, let Nij be the minimal set of nodes in the tree which are
sufficient for reconstructing all entitled blocks (i.e., every entitled block has
among its parents an element of Nij), and only these blocks. Then the share
sij consists of (a suitable encoding of) Nij together with the remaining bits
ri′j to which 〈i, j〉 is entitled. These are the entitled bits from any block which
also includes non-entitled bits.
In the worst case, this algorithm does not decrease the blowup in the
size of the obfuscated database. This occurs when for every query attribute j
of every record i, there are Ω(N) records i′ for which the value of the query
attribute is the same, i.e., xij = xi′j. If we assume a less pathological database,
however, we can get a better upper bound. If there is a threshold t such that
for any (i, j) there are at most t records i′ for which xij = xi′j, then the size
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of the key material (which causes the blowup in the size of the obfuscated
database) is O(mNt(k log N
k
)) bits (recall that m is the number of attributes).
This bound is tight only for small values of t, and the new algorithm does no
worse than the original one even when t = Ω(N). When we consider that each
of the mN entries of the original database is several bits long, the size of the
obfuscated database could be acceptably small for practical use.
It must be noted that this obfuscation reveals the size of the share,
and thus, for a given attribute of a given record, it leaks information about
the number of other records whose attribute value is the same (but not which
records they are). This opens two research questions:
• Is there a provably secure database obfuscation algorithm that produces
obfuscations that are smaller than O(N2).
• Can the heuristic described in this section be improved to obtain accept-
able lower bounds in the worst case?
5.5 Arbitrary predicates over equalities on at-
tributes
We now consider queries formed by taking an arbitrary predicate P over m
boolean variables b1, b2 . . . bm, and substituting (Xj = xj) for bj, where Xj is
a query attribute, and xj ∈ X ∪ {∗} is a candidate value for this attribute,
drawn from the domain X of query attribute values. The special value ∗
denotes that the value of the Xj attribute is ignored when evaluating the
predicate. The class of queries considered in section 5.4 is a partial case of this
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definition, where P = ∧1≤j≤m bj. The group-exponential property is similar
to definition 2 except for the domain of P .
Let C be a boolean circuit computing P . We assume that C is a mono-
tone circuit, i.e., a poly-size directed acyclic graph where each node is an
AND, OR or FANOUT gate. AND and OR gates have two inputs and one
output each, while FANOUT gates have one input and two outputs. Circuit C
has m inputs, one per each query attribute. Below, we show how to generalize
our obfuscation technique to non-monotone circuits.
Obfuscation algorithm. The algorithm is similar to the one in section 5.4,
and consists of generating a random secret to encrypt each data attribute,
splitting this secret into (unequal) shares, and encrypting these shares under
the keys derived from the values of query attributes.
As before, let Hα : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k be a set of random hash functions
and prgα,β : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}∞ a set of pseudo-random generators.
For each record ρi in the database, do the following:
• Generate a block of uniformly random bits {rilEt}, where 1 ≤ l ≤ N ,
E ranges over all edges of the circuit C, and 1 ≤ t ≤ k, where k is the
length of the hash functions’ output. Denote
riEt = ri1Et||ri2Et|| . . . ||riNEt
−→rilE = rilE1||rilE2|| . . . ||rilEk
• Then, for each query attribute Xj:
– Output vij = H1,i,j(xij)
– Let Ej be the input edge in the circuit C whose input is the Xj = xj
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test. Define the bits of the corresponding share siljt = rilEjt if
xij 6= xlj, and 0 otherwise. Encrypt the resulting share using a key
derived from xij, i.e., output
wij = prg1,i,j(H2,i,j(xij))⊕ (−→si1j||−→si2j|| . . . ||−−→siNj).
• Let Eout be the output edge in the circuit C. Output ui = H3,i(riEout0)
• Output zi = prg2,i(H4,i(riEout0))⊕−→yi .
• The previous procedure obfuscated only the output edge of C. Repeat
the following step recursively for each gate G ∈ C, whose output edge (or
both of whose output edges, for a FANOUT gate) have been obfuscated.
Stop when all edges have been obfuscated:
– If G is an AND gate, let E0 and E1 be the input edges and E the
output edge. For each l, set −−→rilE0 = −−→rilE1 = −→rilE.
– If G is an OR gate, then, for each l, generate random−−→rilE0 ∈R {0, 1}k
and set −−→rilE1 = −−→rilE0 ⊕−→rilE.
– If G is a FANOUT gate, let E0 and E1 be the output edges and E
the input edge. For each l, generate random −−→rilE0 ,−−→rilE1 ∈R {0, 1}k
and output
ζilE0 = H5,i,l,E0(
−→rilE)⊕−−→rilE0
and
ζilE1 = H5,i,l,E1(
−→rilE)⊕−−→rilE1
Retrieval algorithm. Let Q be the query predicate in which specific values
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of xj or ∗ have been plugged into all Xj = xj expressions in the leaves of the
circuit C.
The retrieval algorithm consists of two functions:
Cob(OBgp(D), x, i, j), which enables the retriever to check whether the jth
query attribute of the ith record is equal to x, and Rob(OBgp(D),Q, i), which
attempts to retrieve the value of the obfuscated data attribute in the ith record.
Define Cob(OBgp(D), x, i, j) = 1 if H1,i,j(x) = vij and 0 otherwise.
• Evaluate Q(ρi) using Cob. If ¬QOBgp(ρi), then
Rob(OBgp(D),Q, i) =⊥.
• For each l and each circuit edge E, set −→rilE =?? . . .? (i.e., none of the
bits of the secret are initially known).
• For each query attribute j, let Ej be the input edge of the circuit associ-
ated with the equality test for this attribute. If Q contains this test, i.e.,
if Q contains Xj = xj for some candidate value xj (rather than Xj = ∗),
then set (−→si1j|| . . . ||−−→siNj) = wij ⊕ prg1,i,j(H2,i,j(xij)), i.e., decrypt the se-
cret bits with the key derived from the value of the jth attribute.
For each l, if Cob(xij, l, j) = 0, then set
−−→rilEj = −→silj, i.e., use only those
of the decrypted bits that are true bits of the secret −→rilE.
• So far, only the input gates of the circuit have been visited. Find a gate
all of whose input edges have been visited, and repeat the following step
for every gate until the output edge Eout has been visited.
– If E is the output of an AND gate with inputs E0 and E1, then, for
each l, if −−→rilE0 6=?, set −→rilE = −−→rilE0 ; if −−→rilE1 6=?, set −→rilE = −−→rilE1 .
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– E is the output of an OR gate with inputs E0 and E1. For each l,
if −−→rilE0 6=? and −−→rilE1 6=?, set −→rilE = −−→rilE0 ⊕−−→rilE1 .
– E is the output of a FANOUT gate with input E0. For each l, if
−−→rilE0 6=?, set rilE = ζilE0 ⊕H5,i,l,E0(−−→rilE0).
• For each l, if rilEout0 =?, this means that the corresponding secret bit
must be guessed. Choose random rilEout0 ∈R {0, 1}.
• If H3,i(riEout0) = ui, this means that the retriever successfully recon-
structed the secret. In this case, defineRob(OBgp(D),Q, i) = prg2,i(H4,i(riEout0))⊕
zi. Otherwise, define Rob(OBgp(D),Q, i) =⊥.
Theorem 3 The obfuscation algorithm for arbitrary predicates over equalities
on attributes satisfies the virtual black-box property.
5.5.1 Obfuscating non-monotone circuits
Given a non-monotone circuit C, let C be the monotone circuit whose leaves
are literals and negated literals formed by “pushing down” all the NOT gates.
Observe that C has at most twice as many gates as C. Also, C can be consid-
ered a monotone circuit over the 2m predicates X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xm =
xm, X1 6= x1, X2 6= x2, . . . Xm 6= xm. Observe that a predicate of the form
Xj 6= xj is meaningful only when xj = xij for some record i. This is because
if xj 6= xij for any record i, then Xj 6= xj matches all the records. Hence
there exists a circuit C ′ (obtained by setting the leaf in C corresponding to the
predicate Xj 6= xj to true) that evaluates to the same value as C for every
record in the database.
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Given that xj = xij for some record i, the predicate Xj 6= xj is
equivalent to the predicate Xj = xij for some value of i. C can thus be
viewed as a monotone circuit over the m + mN attribute equality predicates
X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xm = xm, and Xj = xij for each i and j. It follows
that a database D with N records and m columns can be transformed into a
database D′ with N records and m + mN columns such that obfuscating D
over the circuit C is equivalent to obfuscating D over the monotone circuit C.
5.6 Alternative privacy policies
In general, a privacy policy can be any computable, possibly randomized, joint
function of the database and the query. Clearly, it may be useful to consider
generalizations of our privacy policies in several directions.
First, we discuss alternatives to Definition 2 that may be used to model
the requirement that accessing individual records should be easy, but mass
harvesting of records should be hard. To motivate this discussion, let us con-
sider a small database with, say, 10 or 20 records. For such a database, the
group-exponential property is meaningless. Even if all records match the ad-
versary’s query, he can easily try all 210 or 220 possibilities for the random bits
rik because database accesses are noninteractive.
This does not in any way violate our definition of privacy. Exactly the
same attack is possible against the ideal functionality, therefore, the simula-
tion argument goes through, showing that the obfuscated database leaks no
more information than the ideal functionality. It is thus natural to seek an
alternative privacy definition that will make the above attack infeasible when
N is small (especially when N < k, the security parameter).
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Our construction can be easily modified to support a wide variety of
(monotonically decreasing) functions capturing the dependence between the
probability of the ideal functionality returning the protected attributes and the
number of records matching the query. For example, the following threshold
ideal functionality can be implemented using a threshold (n-t)-out-of-n secret
sharing scheme [227].
- CD(x, i, j) is 1 if x = xij and 0 otherwise, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
- RD(P) =
⋃
1≤i≤N{〈i, γi〉}, where
γi =

−→yi 2−|D[P]| if P(ρi) and |D[P]| ≤ t
⊥ if P(ρi) and |D[P]| > t
⊥ if ¬P(ρi)
The adversary can evaluate the query if there are at most t matching
records, but learns nothing otherwise. The details of the construction are
deferred to the full version.
We may also consider which query language should be permitted by the
privacy policy. We demonstrated how to obfuscate databases in accordance
with any privacy policy that permits evaluation of some predicate consisting
of equality tests over database attributes. Such queries can be considered a
generalization of “partial match” searches [219], which is a common query
model in the database literature. Also, our algorithms can be easily modified
to support policies that forbid some attributes from having ∗ as a legal value,
i.e., policies that require the retriever to supply the correct value for one or
more designated attributes before he can extract anything from the obfuscated
database.
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It is worth asking if we can allow predicates over primitives looser than
exact attribute equality (e.g., proximity queries of [78] are an interesting class).
We present strong evidence that this is impossible with our privacy definitions.
In fact, even using ideal functionalities (IF) that are more restrictive than the
one we have used does not seem to help. Recall that the IF considered in
section 5.4 consists of two functions: CD (it tells the retriever whether his
guess of a particular query attribute value is correct) and RD (it evaluates
the query with the inverse-exponential probability). We will call this IF the
permissive IF.
We define two more IFs. The strict IF is like the permissive IF except
that it doesn’t have the function C. The semi-permissive IF falls in between
the two. It, too, doesn’t have the function C, but its retrieval function R leaks
slightly more information. Instead of the same symbol ⊥, function R of the
semi-permissive IF gives different responses depending on whether it failed
to evaluate the query because it matches no records (no-matches) or because
it matches too many records, and the probability came out to the retriever’s
disadvantage (too-many-matches).
Define RD(P) as
⋃
1≤i≤N R
∗(P , i), where R∗ is as follows:
• If ¬P(ρi), then R∗(P , i) = φ.
• If P(ρi), then R∗(P , i) = −→yi with probability 2−|D[P]| and ⊥ with proba-
bility 1− 2−|D[P]|.
Observe that if, for any privacy policy allowing single-attribute equality
tests, i.e., if all queries of the form Xj = xj are permitted, then the semi-
permissive IF can simulate the permissive IF. Of course, the permissive IF can
always simulate the semi-permissive IF.
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We say that a privacy policy leaks query attributes if all xij can be com-
puted (with overwhelming probability) simply by accessing the corresponding
ideal functionality ID, i.e., there exists a probabilistic poly-time oracle algo-
rithm A s.t., for any database D, P(AID,O(i, j) = xij) ≥ 1 − ν(k). Note that
the order of quantifiers has been changed: the algorithm A is now independent
of the database. This captures the idea that A has no knowledge of the specific
query attributes, yet successfully retrieves them with access only to the ideal
functionality. Such a policy, even if securely realized, provides no meaningful
privacy.
We have the following results (proofs omitted):
• If X = {1, 2, . . .M} and queries consisting of conjunctions over inequalities
are allowed, then the semi-permissive IF leaks query attributes. Each of
the xij can be separately computed by binary search using queries of the
form Xj ≥ xlow ∧Xj ≤ xhigh.
• If arbitrary (pptime-computable) queries are allowed, then even the strict
IF leaks query attributes.
Note that a policy does not have to leak all query attributes to be
intuitively useless or vacuous. For instance, a policy which allows the retriever
to evaluate conjunctions of inequalities on the first m−1 query attributes, and
allows no queries involving the last attribute, is vacuous for the semi-permissive
IF. Therefore, we give a stronger criterion for vacuousness, which formalizes
the notion that “all information contained in the IF can be extracted without
knowing anything about the query attributes”. Note that the definition below
applies to arbitrary privacy policies, for it makes no reference to query or data
attributes.
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Definition 3 (Vacuous privacy policy) We say that an ideal functional-
ity ID is vacuous if there exists an efficient extractor Ext such that for any
pptime algorithm A there exists a simulator S so that for any database D:
|P(AID(1k) = 1)−P(S(ExtID(1k))) = 1)| = ν(k)
In other words, we first extract all useful information from ID without
any specific knowledge of the database, throw away ID, and use the extracted
information to simulate ID against an arbitrary adversary. As a special case,
if Ext can recover the entire database D from ID, then the functionality can
be simulated, because the privacy policy is required to be computable and
the simulator is not required to be computationally bounded (if we consider
only privacy policies which are computable in probabilistic polynomial time,
then we can define vacuousness with a PPT simulator as well). At the other
extreme, the ideal functionality that permits no queries is also simulatable:
Ext simply outputs nothing. The reader may verify that the IF in the all-but-
one-query-attribute example above is also vacuous.
Theorem 4 The strict ideal functionality that permits arbitrary queries is
vacuous.
Finally, we consider what happens if we use the strict IF but don’t
increase the power of the query language. We conjecture the existence of
very simple languages, including a language that contains only conjunctions
of equality tests on attributes, which are unrealizable even for single-record
databases in the sense that there is no efficient obfuscation algorithm that
would make the database indistinguishable from the corresponding IF. This
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can be seen as justification for the choice of the permissive, rather than strict
IF for our constructions.
Conjecture 1 The strict IF for the following query language cannot be real-
ized even for single-record databases:
∧2k
i=1(X2i−1 = x2i−1 ∨ X2i = x2i) where
∀i xi ∈ {0, 1}.
Note that the only constraint on the database is that its size should be
polynomial in the security parameter k, and therefore we are allowed to have
2k query attributes.
We expect that a proof of this conjecture will also yield a proof of the
following conjecture:
Conjecture 2 The strict IF for a query language consisting of conjunction
of equality tests on k query attributes is unrealizable even for single-record
databases.
These conjectures are interesting from another perspective. They can
be interpreted as statements about the impossibility of circuit obfuscation in
the random oracle model. They also motivate the question: given a query lan-
guage, it is possible to achieve the group-exponential property with the strict
IF provided there exists an obfuscation algorithm for this query language on
a single record? In other words, given a class of predicates over single records
and an efficient obfuscator for the corresponding circuit class, does there exist
an obfuscator for the entire database that realizes the group-exponential ideal
functionality for that query language? We defer a discussion of this question.
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5.7 Summary
We introduced a new concept of database privacy in the offline or non-interactive
setting, which is based on permitted queries rather than secrecy of individual
records, and realized it using provably secure obfuscation techniques. The
lesson from our result is that surprisingly strong privacy protection may be
possible even in the non-interactive setting if the desired functionality of the
database can be precisely described.
While our constructions are secure in the “virtual black-box” model for
obfuscation, the blow-up in the size of the obfuscated database may render our
techniques impractical for large databases. Our query language permits any
predicate over equalities on database attributes, but other query languages
may also be realizable. We define group privacy in terms of a particular
ideal functionality, but there may be other functionalities that better capture
intuitive security against “mass harvesting” queries. In general, investigating
which ideal functionalities for database privacy can be securely realized is an
important topic of future research.
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Chapter 6
Robust De-anonymization of
Large Sparse Datasets
6.1 Introduction
Datasets containing micro-data, that is, information about specific individuals,
are increasingly becoming public in response to “open government” laws and
to support data mining research. Some datasets include legally protected
information such as health histories; others contain individual preferences and
transactions, which many people may view as private or sensitive.
Privacy risks of publishing micro-data are well-known. Even if iden-
tifiers such as names and Social Security numbers have been removed, the
adversary can use background knowledge and cross-correlation with other
databases to re-identify individual data records. Famous attacks include de-
anonymization of a Massachusetts hospital discharge database by joining it
with a public voter database [239] and privacy breaches caused by (ostensibly
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anonymized) AOL search data [129].
Micro-data is characterized by high dimensionality and sparsity. Each
record contains many attributes (i.e., columns in a database schema), which
can be viewed as dimensions. Sparsity means that a pair of random records
are located far apart in the multi-dimensional space defined by the attributes.
This sparsity is empirically well-established [46, 16, 159] and related to the
“fat tail” phenomenon: individual transaction and preference records tend to
include statistically rare attributes.
Our contributions. Our first contribution is a formal model for privacy
breaches in anonymized micro-data (Section 6.3). We present two definitions,
one based on the probability of successful de-anonymization, the other on the
amount of information recovered about the target. Unlike previous work [239],
we do not assume a priori that the adversary’s knowledge is limited to a
fixed set of “quasi-identifier” attributes. Our model thus encompasses a much
broader class of de-anonymization attacks than simple cross-database correla-
tion.
Our second contribution is a very general class of de-anonymization
algorithms, demonstrating the fundamental limits of privacy in public micro-
data (section 6.4). Under very mild assumptions about the distribution from
which the records are drawn, the adversary with a small amount of background
knowledge about an individual can use it to identify, with high probability, this
individual’s record in the anonymized dataset and to learn all anonymously
released information about him or her, including sensitive attributes. For
sparse datasets, such as most real-world datasets of individual transactions,
preferences, and recommendations, very little background knowledge is needed
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(as few as 5-10 attributes in our case study). Our de-anonymization algorithm
is robust to the imprecision of the adversary’s background knowledge and to
perturbation that may have been applied to the data prior to release. It works
even if only a subset of the original dataset has been published.
Our third contribution is a practical analysis of the Netflix Prize dataset,
containing anonymized movie ratings of 500,000 Netflix subscribers (section 6.5).
Netflix—the world’s largest online DVD rental service—published this dataset
to support the Netflix Prize data mining contest. We demonstrate that an
adversary who knows a little bit about some subscriber can easily identify her
record if it is present in the dataset, or, at the very least, identify a small set
of records which include the subscriber’s record. The adversary’s background
knowledge need not be precise, e.g., the dates may only be known to the ad-
versary with a 14-day error, the ratings may be known only approximately,
and some of the ratings and dates may even be completely wrong. Because our
algorithm is robust, if it uniquely identifies a record in the published dataset,
with high probability this identification is not a false positive.
6.2 Related work
Unlike statistical databases [6, 13, 35], micro-data include actual records of
individuals even after anonymization. A popular approach to micro-data
privacy is k-anonymity [241, 62]. The data publisher decides in advance
which of the attributes may be available to the adversary (these are called
“quasi-identifiers”), and which are the sensitive attributes to be protected.
k-anonymization ensures that each quasi-identifier tuple occurs in at least k
records in the anonymized database. This does not guarantee any privacy, be-
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cause the values of sensitive attributes associated with a given quasi-identifier
may not be sufficiently diverse [172, 173] or the adversary may know more than
just the quasi-identifiers [172]. Furthermore, k-anonymization completely fails
on high-dimensional datasets [10], such as the Netflix Prize dataset and most
real-world datasets of individual recommendations and purchases.
The de-anonymization algorithm presented in this paper does not as-
sume that the attributes are divided a priori into quasi-identifiers and sensitive
attributes. Examples include anonymized transaction records (if the adversary
knows a few of the individual’s purchases, can he learn all of her purchases?),
recommendations and ratings (if the adversary knows a few movies that the
individual watched, can he learn all movies she watched?), Web browsing and
search histories, and so on. In such datasets, it is hard to tell in advance which
attributes might be available to the adversary; the adversary’s background
knowledge may even vary from individual to individual. Unlike [239, 174, 102],
our algorithm is robust. It works even if the published records have been per-
turbed, if only a subset of the original dataset has been published, and if there
are mistakes in the adversary’s background knowledge.
Our definition of privacy breach is somewhat similar to that of Chawla et
al. [56]. We discuss the differences in section 6.3. There is theoretical evidence
that for any (sanitized) database with meaningful utility, there is always some
auxiliary or background information that results in a privacy breach [81]. In
this paper, we aim to quantify the amount of auxiliary information required
and its relationship to the percentage of records which would experience a
significant privacy loss.
We are aware of only one previous paper that considered privacy of
movie ratings. In collaboration with the MovieLens recommendation service,
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Frankowski et al. correlated public mentions of movies in the MovieLens dis-
cussion forum with the users’ movie rating histories in the internal MovieLens
dataset [102]. The algorithm uses the entire public record as the background
knowledge (29 ratings per user, on average), and is not robust if this knowl-
edge is imprecise, e.g., if the user publicly mentioned movies which he did not
rate.
While our algorithm follows the same basic scoring paradigm as [102],
our scoring function is more complex and our selection criterion is nontrivial
and an important innovation in its own right. Furthermore, our case study
is based solely on public data and does not involve cross-correlating internal
Netflix datasets (to which we do not have access) with public forums. It
requires much less background knowledge (2-8 ratings per user), which need
not be precise. Furthermore, our analysis has privacy implications for 500,000
Netflix subscribers whose records have been published; by contrast, the largest
public MovieLens datasets contains only 6,000 records.
6.3 Model
Database. Define database D to be an N ×M matrix where each row is a
record associated with some individual, and the columns are attributes. We
are interested in databases containing individual preferences or transactions.
The number of columns thus reflects the total number of items in the space we
are considering, ranging from a few thousand for movies to millions for (say)
the amazon.com catalog.
Each attribute (column) can be thought of as a dimension, and each
individual record as a point in the multidimensional attribute space. To keep
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our analysis general, we will not fix the space X from which attributes are
drawn. They may be boolean (e.g., has this book been rated?), integer (e.g.,
the book’s rating on a 1-10 scale), date, or a tuple such as a (rating, date)
pair.
A typical reason to publish anonymized micro-data is “collaborative
filtering,” i.e., predicting a consumer’s future choices from his past behavior
using the knowledge of what similar consumers did. Technically, the goal is to
predict the value of some attributes using a combination of other attributes.
This is used in shopping recommender systems, aggressive caching in Web
browsers, and other applications [245].
Sparsity and similarity. Preference databases with thousands of attributes
are necessarily sparse, i.e., each individual record contains values only for a
small fraction of attributes. For example, the shopping history of even the
most profligate Amazon shopper contains only a tiny fraction of all available
items. We call these attributes non-null ; the set of non-null attributes is the
support of a record (denoted supp(r)). Null attributes are denoted ⊥. The
support of a column is defined analogously. Even though points corresponding
to database records are very sparse in the attribute space, each record may
have dozens or hundreds of non-null attributes, making the database truly
high-dimensional.
The distribution of per-attribute support sizes is typically heavy- or
long-tailed, roughly following the power law [46, 16]. This means that although
the supports of the columns corresponding to “unpopular” items are small,
these items are so numerous that they make up the bulk of the non-null entries
in the database. Thus, any attempt to approximate the database by projecting
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it down to the most common columns is bound to failure.1
Unlike “quasi-identifiers” [241, 62], there are no attributes that can be
used directly for de-anonymization. In a large database, for any except the
rarest attributes, there are hundreds of records with the same value of this
attribute. Therefore, it is not a quasi-identifier. At the same time, knowledge
that a particular individual has a certain attribute value does reveal some in-
formation, since attribute values and even the mere fact that a given attribute
is non-null vary from record to record.
The similarity measure Sim is a function that maps a pair of attributes
(or more generally, a pair of records) to the interval [0, 1]. It captures the
intuitive notion of two values being “similar.” Typically, Sim on attributes
will behave like an indicator function. For example, in our analysis of the
Netflix Prize dataset, Sim outputs 1 on a pair of movies rated by different
subscribers if and only if both the ratings and the dates are within a certain
threshold of each other; it outputs 0 otherwise.
We define Sim over two records r1, r2 by generalizing the similarity mea-
sure from individual attributes to vectors of attributes:
Sim(r1, r2) =
∑
Sim(r1i, r2i)
|supp(r1) ∪ supp(r2)|
Definition 4 (Sparsity) A database D is (, δ)-sparse w.r.t. the similarity
measure Sim if
Pr
r
[Sim(r, r′) >  ∀r′ 6= r] ≤ δ
As a real-world example, in fig. 6.1 we show that the Netflix Prize
dataset is overwhelmingly sparse. For the vast majority of records, there
1The same effect causes k-anonymization to fail on high-dimensional databases [10].
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isn’t a single record with similarity score over 0.5 in the entire 500,000-record
dataset, even if we consider only the sets of movies rated without taking into
account numerical ratings or dates.
Sanitization and sampling. Database sanitization methods include gener-
alization and suppression [240, 62], as well as perturbation. The data publisher
may only release a (possibly non-uniform) sample of the database. Our algo-
rithm is designed to work against data that have been both anonymized and
sanitized.
If the database is published for collaborative filtering or similar data
mining purposes (as in the case of the Netflix Prize dataset), the “error”
introduced by sanitization cannot be large, otherwise data utility will be lost.
We make this precise in our analysis. Our definition of privacy breach allows
the adversary to identify not just his target record, but any record as long
as it is sufficiently similar (via Sim) to the target and can thus be used to
determine its attributes with high probability.
From the viewpoint of our de-anonymization algorithm, there is no dif-
ference between the perturbation of the published records and the imprecision
of the adversary’s knowledge about his target. In either case, there is a small
discrepancy between the attribute value(s) in the anonymous record and the
same value(s) as known to the adversary. In the rest of the paper, we treat per-
turbation simply as imprecision of the adversary’s knowledge. The algorithm
is designed to be robust to the latter.
Adversary model. We sample record r randomly from database D and give
auxiliary information or background knowledge related to r to the adversary.
It is restricted to a subset of (possibly imprecise, perturbed, or simply incor-
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Figure 6.1: X-axis (x) is the similarity to the “neighbor” with the highest
similarity score; Y-axis is the fraction of subscribers whose nearest-neighbor
similarity is at least x.
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rect) values of r’s attributes, modeled as an arbitrary probabilistic function
Aux : XM → XM . The attributes given to the adversary may be chosen uni-
formly from the support of r, or according to some other rule.2 Given this
auxiliary information and an anonymized sample Dˆ of D, the adversary’s goal
is to reconstruct attribute values of the entire record r. Note that there is no
artificial distinction between quasi-identifiers and sensitive attributes.
If the published records are sanitized by adding random noise ZS, and
the noise used in generating Aux is ZA, then the adversary’s task is equivalent
to the scenario where the data is not perturbed but noise ZS + ZA is used in
generating Aux. This makes perturbation equivalent to imprecision of Aux.
Privacy breach: formal definitions. What does it mean to de-anonymize
a record r? The naive answer is to find the “right” anonymized record in the
public sample Dˆ. This is hard to capture formally, however, because it requires
assumptions about the data publishing process (e.g., what if Dˆ contains two
copies of every original record?). Fundamentally, the adversary’s objective is is
to learn as much as he can about r’s attributes that he doesn’t already know.
We give two different (but related) formal definitions, because there are two
distinct scenarios for privacy breaches in large databases.
The first scenario is automated large-scale de-anonymization. For every
record r about which he has some information, the adversary must produce a
single “prediction” for all attributes of r. An example is the attack that in-
spired k-anonymity [239]: taking the demographic data from a voter database
as auxiliary information, the adversary joins it with the anonymized hospital
2For example, in the Netflix Prize case study we also pick uniformly from among the
attributes whose supports are below a certain threshold, e.g., movies that are outside the
most popular 100 or 500 movies.
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discharge database and uses the resulting combination to determine the values
of medical attributes for each person who appears in both databases.
Definition 5 A database D can be (θ, ω)-deanonymized w.r.t. auxiliary in-
formation Aux if there exists an algorithm A which, on inputs D and Aux(r)
where r ← D outputs r′ such that
Pr[Sim(r, r′) ≥ θ] ≥ ω
Definition 5 can be interpreted as an amplification of background knowl-
edge: the adversary starts with aux = Aux(r) which is close to r on a small
subset of attributes, and uses this to compute r′ which is close to r on the
entire set of attributes. This captures the adversary’s ability to gain in-
formation about his target record. As long he finds some record which is
guaranteed to be very similar to the target record, i.e., contains the same or
similar attribute values, privacy breach has occurred.
If operating on a sample Dˆ, the de-anonymization algorithm must also
detect whether the target record is part of the sample, or has not been released
at all. In the following, the probability is taken over the randomness of the
sampling of r from Dˆ, Aux and A itself.
Definition 6 (De-anonymization) An arbitrary subset Dˆ of a database D
can be (θ, ω)-deanonymized w.r.t. auxiliary information Aux if there exists an
algorithm A which, on inputs Dˆ and Aux(r) where r ← D
• If r ∈ Dˆ, outputs r′ s.t. Pr[Sim(r, r′) ≥ θ] ≥ ω
• if r /∈ Dˆ, outputs ⊥ with probability at least ω
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The same error threshold (1 − ω) is used for both false positives and
false negatives because the parameters of the algorithm can be adjusted so
that both rates are equal; this is the “equal error rate.”
In the second privacy breach scenario, the adversary produces a set or
“lineup” of candidate records that include his target record r, either because
there is not enough auxiliary information to identify r in the lineup or because
he expects to perform additional analysis to complete de-anonymization. This
is similar to communication anonymity in mix networks [226].
The number of candidate records is not a good metric, because some of
the records may be much likelier candidates than others. Instead, we consider
the probability distribution over the candidate records, and use as the metric
the conditional entropy of r given aux. In the absence of an “oracle” to identify
the target record r in the lineup, the entropy of the distribution itself can be
used as a metric [226, 76]. If the adversary has such an “oracle” (this is a
technical device used to measure the adversary’s success; in the real world,
the adversary may not have an oracle telling him whether de-anonymization
succeeded), then privacy breach can be quantified as follows: how many bits
of additional information does the adversary need in order to output a record
which is similar to his target record?
Thus, suppose that after executing the de-anonymization algorithm,
the adversary outputs records r′1, . . . r
′
k and the corresponding probabilities
p1, . . . pk. The latter can be viewed as an entropy encoding of the candidate
records. According to Shannon’s source coding theorem, the optimal code
length for record r′i is (− log pi). We denote by HS(Π, x) this Shannon en-
tropy of a record x w.r.t. a probability distribution Π. In the following, the
expectation is taken over the coin tosses of A, the sampling of r and Aux.
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Definition 7 (Entropic de-anonymization) A database D can be (θ,H)-
deanonymized w.r.t. auxiliary information Aux if there exists an algorithm A
which, on inputs D and Aux(r) where r ← D outputs a set of candidate records
D′ and probability distribution Π such that
E[minr′∈D′,Sim(r,r′)≥θHS(Π, r′)] ≤ H
This definition measures the minimum Shannon entropy of the candi-
date set of records which are similar to the target record. As we will show, in
sparse databases this set is likely to contain a single record, thus taking the
minimum is but a syntactic requirement.
When the minimum is taken over an empty set, we define it to be
H0 = log2N , the a priori entropy of the target record. This models out-
putting a random record from the entire database when the adversary cannot
compute a lineup of plausible candidates. Formally, the adversary’s algorithm
A can be converted into an algorithm A′, which outputs the mean of two dis-
tributions: one is the output of A, the other is the uniform distribution over
D. Observe that for A′, the minimum is always taken over a non-empty set,
and the expectation for A′ differs from that for A by at most 1 bit.
Chawla et al. [56] give a definition of privacy breach via isolation which
is similar to ours, but requires a metric on attributes, whereas our general
similarity measure does not naturally lead to a metric (there is no feasible
way to derive a distance function from it that satisfies the triangle inequality).
This appears to be essential for achieving robustness to completely erroneous
attributes in the adversary’s auxiliary information.
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6.4 De-anonymization algorithm
We start by describing an algorithm template or meta-algorithm. The inputs
are a sample Dˆ of database D and auxiliary information aux = Aux(r), r ←
D. The output is either a record r′ ∈ Dˆ, or a set of candidate records and
a probability distribution over those records (following Definitions 6 and 7,
respectively).
The three main components of the algorithm are the scoring function,
matching criterion, and record selection. The scoring function Score assigns
a numerical score to each record in Dˆ based on how well it matches the adver-
sary’s auxiliary information Aux. The matching criterion is the algorithm
applied by the adversary to the set of scores to determine if there is a match.
Finally, record selection selects one “best-guess” record or a probability
distribution, if needed.
1. Compute Score(aux, r′) for each r′ ∈ Dˆ.
2. Apply the matching criterion to the resulting set of scores and compute
the matching set; if the matching set is empty, output ⊥ and exit.
3. If a “best guess” is required (de-anonymization according to Defs. 5
and 6), output r′ ∈ Dˆ with the highest score. If a probability distribu-
tion over candidate records is required (de-anonymization according to
Def. 7), compute and output some non-decreasing distribution based on
the scores.
Algorithm Scoreboard. The following simple instantiation of the above tem-
plate is sufficiently tractable to be formally analyzed in the rest of this section.
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• Score(aux, r′) = mini∈supp(aux)Sim(auxi, r′i), i.e., the score of a candidate
record is determined by the least similar attribute between it and the
adversary’s auxiliary information.
• The matching set D′ = {r′ ∈ Dˆ : Score(aux, r′) > α} for some fixed
constant α. The matching criterion is that D′ be nonempty.
• Probability distribution is uniform on D′.
Algorithm Scoreboard-RH. Algorithm Scoreboard is not sufficiently robust
for some applications; in particular, it fails if any of the attributes in the
adversary’s auxiliary information are completely incorrect.
The following algorithm incorporates several heuristics which have proved
useful in practical analysis (see section 6.5). First, the scoring function gives
higher weight to statistically rare attributes. Intuitively, if the auxiliary in-
formation tells the adversary that his target has a certain rare attribute, this
helps de-anonymization much more than the knowledge of a common attribute
(e.g., it is more useful to know that the target has purchased “The Dedalus
Book of French Horror” than the fact that she purchased a Harry Potter book).
Second, to improve robustness, the matching criterion requires that the
top score be significantly above the second-best score. This measures how
much the identified record “stands out” from other candidate records.
• Score(aux, r′)=∑i∈supp(aux) wt(i)Sim(auxi, r′i) where wt(i) = 1log |supp(i)| . 3
• If a “best guess” is required, compute max = max(S),max2 = max2(S)
and σ = σ(S) where S = {Score(aux, r′) : r′ ∈ Dˆ}, i.e., the highest
3Without loss of generality, we assume ∀i |supp(i)| > 0.
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and second-highest scores and the standard deviation of the scores. If
max−max2
σ
< φ, where φ is a fixed parameter called the eccentricity, then
there is no match; otherwise, the matching set consists of the record with
the highest score.4
• If entropic de-anonymization is required, output distribution Π(r′) =
c ·e Score(aux,r
′)
σ for each r′, where c is a constant that makes the distribution
sum up to 1. This weighs each matching record in inverse proportion to
the likelihood that the match in question is a statistical fluke.
Note that there are two ways in which this algorithm can fail to find the
correct record. First, an incorrect record may be assigned the highest score.
Second, the correct record may not have a score which is significantly higher
than the second-highest score.
6.4.1 Analysis: general case
We now quantify the amount of auxiliary information needed to de-anonymize
an arbitrary dataset using Algorithm Scoreboard. The smaller the required
information (i.e., the fewer attribute values the adversary needs to know about
his target), the easier the attack.
We start with the worst-case analysis and calculate how much auxiliary
information is needed without any assumptions about the distribution from
which the data is drawn. In section 6.4.2, we will show that much less auxiliary
information is needed to de-anonymize records drawn from sparse distributions
(real-world transaction and recommendation datasets are all sparse).
4Increasing φ increases the false negative rate, i.e., the chance of erroneously dismissing
a correct match, and decreases the false positive rate; φ may be chosen so that the two rates
are equal.
110
Let aux be the auxiliary information about some record r; aux consists
of m (non-null) attribute values, which are close to the corresponding values
of attributes in r, that is, |aux| = m and Sim(auxi, ri) ≥ 1−  ∀i ∈ supp(aux),
where auxi (respectively, ri) is the ith attribute of aux (respectively, r).
Theorem 5 Let 0 < , δ < 1 and let D be the database. Let Aux be such that
aux = Aux(r) consists of at least m ≥ logN−log − log(1−δ) randomly selected attribute
values of the target record r, where ∀i ∈ supp(aux) Sim(auxi, ri) ≥ 1−. Then
D can be (1− − δ, 1− )-deanonymized w.r.t. Aux.
Proof. Use Algorithm Scoreboard with α = 1−  to compute the set of
all records in Dˆ that match aux, then output a record r′ at random from the
matching set. It is sufficient to prove that this randomly chosen r′ must be
very similar to the target record r. (This satisfies our definition of a privacy
breach because it gives the adversary almost everything he may want to learn
about r.)
Record r′ is a false match if Sim(r, r′) ≤ 1−−δ (i.e., the likelihood that
r′ is similar to the target r is below the threshold). We first show that, with
high probability, there are no false matches in the matching set.
Lemma 1 If r′ is a false match, then Pri∈supp(r)[Sim(ri, r′i) ≥ 1− ] < 1− δ
Lemma 1 holds, because the contrary implies Sim(r, r′) ≥ (1−)(1−δ) ≥
(1 −  − δ), contradicting the assumption that r′ is a false match. Therefore,
the probability that the false match r′ belongs to the matching set is at most
(1 − δ)m. By a union bound, the probability that the matching set contains
even a single false match is at most N(1 − δ)m. If m = log N
log 1
1−δ
, then the
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probability that the matching set contains any false matches is no more than
.
Therefore, with probability 1− , there are no false matches. Thus for
every record r′ in the matching set, Sim(r, r′) ≥ 1− − δ, i.e., any r′ must be
similar to the true record r. To complete the proof, observe that the matching
set contains at least one record, r itself.
When δ is small, m = logN−log 
δ
. This depends logarithmically on  and
linearly on δ: the chance that the algorithm fails completely is very small even
if attribute-wise accuracy is not very high. Also note that the matching set
need not be small. Even if the algorithm returns many records, with high
probability they are all similar to the target record r, and thus any one of
them can be used to learn the unknown attributes of r.
6.4.2 Analysis: sparse datasets
Most real-world datasets containing individual transactions, preferences, and
so on are sparse. Sparsity increases the probability that de-anonymization
succeeds, decreases the amount of auxiliary information needed, and improves
robustness to both perturbation in the data and mistakes in the auxiliary
information.
Our assumptions about data sparsity are very mild. We only assume
(1− − δ, . . .) sparsity, i.e., we assume that the average record does not have
extremely similar peers in the dataset (real-world records tend not to have
even approximately similar peers—see fig. 6.1).
Theorem 6 Let , δ, and aux be as in Theorem 5. If the database D is
(1− − δ, )-sparse, then D can be (1, 1− )-deanonymized. 
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The proof is essentially the same as for Theorem 5, but in this case any
r′ 6= r from the matching set must be a false match. Because with probability
1−, Scoreboard outputs no false matches, the matching set consists of exactly
one record: the true target record r.
De-anonymization in the sense of Definition 7 requires even less aux-
iliary information. Recall that in this kind of privacy breach, the adversary
outputs a “lineup” of k suspect records, one of which is the true record. This
k-deanonymization is equivalent to (1, 1
k
)-deanonymization in our framework.
Theorem 7 Let D be (1 −  − δ, )-sparse and aux be as in Theorem 5 with
m =
log N
k−1
log 1
1−δ
. Then
• D can be (1, 1
k
)-deanonymized.
• D can be (1, log k)-deanonymized (entropically).
By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 5, if the adversary
knows m =
log N
k−1
log 1
1−δ
attributes, then the expected number of false matches in
the matching set is at most k − 1. Let X be the random variable represent-
ing this number. A random record from the matching set is a false match
with probability of at least 1
X
. Since 1
x
is a convex function, apply Jensen’s
inequality [140] to obtain E[ 1
X
] ≥ 1
E(X)
≥ 1
k
.
Similarly, if the adversary outputs the uniform distribution over the
matching set, its entropy is logX. Since log x is a concave function, by Jensen’s
inequality E[logX] ≤ logE(X) ≤ log k.
Neither claim follows directly from the other. 
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6.4.3 De-anonymization from a sample
We now consider the scenario in which the released database Dˆ ( D is a
sample of the original database D, i.e., only some of the anonymized records
are available to the adversary. This is the case, for example, for the Netflix
Prize dataset (the subject of our case study in section 6.5), where the publicly
available anonymized sample contains less than 1
10
of the original data.
In this scenario, even though the original database D contains the ad-
versary’s target record r, this record may not appear in Dˆ even in anonymized
form. The adversary can still apply Scoreboard, but the matching set may be
empty, in which case the adversary outputs⊥ (indicating that de-anonymization
fails). If the matching set is not empty, he proceeds as before: picks a random
record r′ and learn the attributes of r on the basis of r′. We now demonstrate
the equivalent of Theorem 5: de-anonymization succeeds as long as r is in the
public sample; otherwise, the adversary can detect, with high probability, that
r is not in the public sample.
Theorem 8 Let , δ, D, and aux be as in Theorem 5, and Dˆ ⊂ D. Then Dˆ
can be (1− − δ, 1− )-deanonymized w.r.t. aux. 
The bound on the probability of a false match given in the proof of
Theorem 5 still holds, and the adversary is guaranteed at least one match as
long as his target record r is in Dˆ. Therefore, if r /∈ Dˆ, the adversary outputs
⊥ with probability at least 1− . If r ∈ Dˆ, then again the adversary succeeds
with probability at least 1− .
Theorems 6 and 7 do not translate directly. For each record in the
public sample Dˆ, there could be any number of similar records in D \ Dˆ, the
part of the database that is not available to the adversary.
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Fortunately, if D is sparse, then theorems 6 and 7 still hold, and de-
anonymization succeeds with a very small amount of auxiliary information.
We now show that if the random sample Dˆ is sparse, then the entire database
D must also be sparse. Therefore, the adversary can simply apply the de-
anonymization algorithm to the sample. If he finds the target record r, then
with high probability this is not a false positive.
Theorem 9 If database D is not (, δ)-sparse, then a random 1
λ
-subset Dˆ is
not (, δγ
λ
)-sparse with probability at least 1− γ. 
For each r ∈ Dˆ, the “nearest neighbor” r′ of r in D has a probability 1
λ
of being included in Dˆ. Therefore, the expected probability that the similarity
with the nearest neighbor is at least 1− is at least δ
λ
. (Here the expectation is
over the set of all possible samples and the probability is over the choice of the
record in Dˆ.) Applying Markov’s inequality, the probability, taken over the
choice Dˆ, that Dˆ is sparse, i.e., that the similarity with the nearest neighbor
is δγ
λ
, is no more than γ. 
The above bound is quite pessimistic. Intuitively, for any “reasonable”
dataset, the sparsity of a random sample will be about the same as that of the
original dataset.
Theorem 9 can be interpreted as follows. Consider the adversary who
has access to a sparse sample Dˆ, but not the entire database D. Theorem 9
says that either a very-low-probability event has occurred, or D itself is sparse.
Note that it is meaningless to try to bound the probability that D is sparse
because we do not have a probability distribution on how D itself is created.
Intuitively, this says that unless the sample is specially tailored, sparsity
of the sample implies sparsity of the entire database. The alternative is that
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the similarity between a random record in the sample and its nearest neighbor
is very different from the corresponding distribution in the full database. In
practice, most, if not all anonymized datasets are published to support research
on data mining and collaborative filtering. Tailoring the published sample
in such a way that its nearest-neighbor similarity is radically different from
that of the original data would completely destroy utility of the sample for
learning new collaborative filters, which are often based on the set of nearest
neighbors. Therefore, in real-world anonymous data publishing scenarios—
including, for example, the Netflix Prize dataset—sparsity of the sample should
imply sparsity of the original dataset.
6.5 Case study: Netflix Prize dataset
On October 2, 2006, Netflix, the world’s largest online DVD rental service,
announced the $1-million Netflix Prize for improving their movie recommen-
dation service [126]. To aid contestants, Netflix publicly released a dataset
containing 100, 480, 507 movie ratings, created by 480, 189 Netflix subscribers
between December 1999 and December 2005. At the end of 2005, Netflix had
approximately 4 million subscribers, so almost 1
8
of them had their records
published.
Among the Frequently Asked Questions about the Netflix Prize [197],
there is the following question: “Is there any customer information in the
dataset that should be kept private?” The answer is as follows:
“No, all customer identifying information has been removed; all
that remains are ratings and dates. This follows our privacy policy
[. . . ] Even if, for example, you knew all your own ratings and
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their dates you probably couldn’t identify them reliably in the data
because only a small sample was included (less than one-tenth of
our complete dataset) and that data was subject to perturbation.
Of course, since you know all your own ratings that really isn’t a
privacy problem is it?”
Removing identifying information is not sufficient for anonymity. An
adversary may have auxiliary information about a subscriber’s movie prefer-
ences: the titles of a few of the movies that this subscriber watched, whether
she liked them or not, maybe even approximate dates when she watched them.
We emphasize that even if it is hard to collect such information for a large
number of subscribers, targeted de-anonymization—for example, a boss using
the Netflix Prize dataset to find an employee’s entire movie viewing history
after a casual conversation—still presents a serious threat to privacy.
We investigate the following question: How much does the adversary
need to know about a Netflix subscriber in order to identify her record if it
is present in the dataset, and thus learn her complete movie viewing history?
Formally, we study the relationship between the size of aux and (1, ω)- and
(1, H)-deanonymization.
Does privacy of Netflix ratings matter? The issue is not “Does the aver-
age Netflix subscriber care about the privacy of his movie viewing history?,”
but “Are there any Netflix subscribers whose privacy can be compromised by
analyzing the Netflix Prize dataset?” As shown by our experiments below, it
is possible to learn sensitive non-public information about a person from his or
her movie viewing history. We assert that even if the vast majority of Netflix
subscribers did not care about the privacy of their movie ratings (which is not
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obvious by any means), our analysis would still indicate serious privacy issues
with the Netflix Prize dataset.
Moreover, the linkage between an individual and her movie viewing
history has implications for her future privacy. In network security, “forward
secrecy” is important: even if the attacker manages to compromise a session
key, this should not help him much in compromising the keys of future sessions.
Similarly, one may state the “forward privacy” property: if someone’s privacy
is breached (e.g., her anonymous online records have been linked to her real
identity), future privacy breaches should not become easier. Consider a Netflix
subscriber Alice whose entire movie viewing history has been revealed. Even if
in the future Alice creates a brand-new virtual identity (call her Ecila), Ecila
will never be able to disclose any non-trivial information about the movies that
she had rated within Netflix because any such information can be traced back
to her real identity via the Netflix Prize dataset. In general, once any piece of
data has been linked to a person’s real identity, any association between this
data and a virtual identity breaks anonymity of the latter.
Finally, the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 [87] lays down strong
provisions against disclosure of personally identifiable rental records of “prere-
corded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual material.” While the Netflix
Prize dataset does not explicitly include personally identifiable information,
the issue of whether the implicit disclosure demonstrated by our analysis runs
afoul of the law or not is a legal question to be considered.
How did Netflix release and sanitize the data? Figs. 6.2 and 6.3 plot
the number of ratings X against the number of subscribers in the released
dataset who have at least X ratings. The tail is surprisingly thick: thousands
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of subscribers have rated more than a thousand movies. Netflix claims that
the subscribers in the released dataset have been “randomly chosen.” What-
ever the selection algorithm was, it was not uniformly random. Common sense
suggests that with uniform subscriber selection, the curve would be monotoni-
cally decreasing (as most people rate very few movies or none at all), and that
there would be no sharp discontinuities.
We conjecture that some fraction of subscribers with more than 20
ratings were sampled, and the points on the graph to the left of X = 20 are
the result of some movies being deleted after sampling.
We requested the rating history as presented on the Netflix website from
some of our acquaintances, and based on this data (which is effectively drawn
from Netflix’s original, non-anonymous dataset, since we know the names as-
sociated with these records), located two of them in the Netflix Prize dataset.
Netflix’s claim that the data was perturbed does not appear to be borne out.
One of the subscribers had 1 of 306 ratings altered, and the other had 5
of 229 altered. (These are upper bounds, because the subscribers may have
changed their ratings after Netflix took the 2005 snapshot that was released.)
In any case, the level of noise is far too small to affect our de-anonymization
algorithm, which has been specifically designed to withstand this kind of im-
precision. We have no way of determining how many dates were altered and
how many ratings were deleted, but we conjecture that very little perturbation
has been applied.
It is important that the Netflix Prize dataset has been released to sup-
port development of better recommendation algorithms. A significant pertur-
bation of individual attributes would have affected cross-attribute correlations
and significantly decreased the dataset’s utility for creating new recommenda-
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tion algorithms, defeating the entire purpose of the Netflix Prize competition.
Note that the Netflix Prize dataset clearly has not been k-anonymized
for any value of k > 1.
Figure 6.2: For each k ≤ 100, the number of subscribers with k ratings in the
released dataset.
De-anonymizing the Netflix Prize dataset. We apply Algorithm Scoreboard-
RH from section 6.4. The similarity measure Sim on attributes is a threshold
function: Sim returns 1 if and only if the two attribute values are within a
certain threshold of each other. For movie ratings, which in the case of Netflix
are on the 1-5 scale, we consider the thresholds of 0 (corresponding to exact
match) and 1, and for the rating dates, 3 days, 14 days, or ∞. The latter
means that the adversary has no information about the date when the movie
was rated.
We allow some of the attribute values in the attacker’s auxiliary infor-
mation to be completely wrong. Thus, we say that aux of a record r consists
of m movies out of m′ if |aux| = m′ and ∑ Sim(auxi, ri) ≥ m. We instantiate
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Figure 6.3: For each k ≤ 1000, the number of subscribers with k ratings in
the released dataset.
Figure 6.4: Adversary knows exact ratings and approximate dates.
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the scoring function as follows:
Score(aux, r′) =
∑
i∈supp(aux)
wt(i)(e
ρi−ρ′i
ρ0 + e
di−d′i
d0 )
where wt(i) = 1
log |supp(i)| (|supp(i)| is the number of subscribers who have rated
movie i), ρi and di are the rating and date, respectively, of movie i in the
auxiliary information, and ρ′i and d
′
i are the rating and date in the candidate
record r′.5 As explained in section 6.4, this scoring function was chosen to
favor statistically unlikely matches and thus minimize accidental false posi-
tives. The parameters ρ0 and d0 are 1.5 and 30 days, respectively. These were
chosen heuristically, as they gave the best results in our experiments,6 and
used throughout, regardless of the amount of noise in Aux. The eccentricity
parameter was set to φ = 1.5, i.e., the algorithm declares there is no match if
and only if the difference between the highest and the second highest scores is
no more than 1.5 times the standard deviation. (A constant value of φ does
not always give the equal error rate, but it is a close enough approximation.)
Didn’t Netflix publish only a sample of the data? Because Netflix
published less than 1
10
of its 2005 database, we need to be concerned about
false positives. What if the adversary finds a record matching his aux in the
published sample, but this is a false match and the real record has not been
released at all?
Algorithm Scoreboard-RH is specifically designed to detect when the
5wt(i) is undefined when |supp(i)| = 0, but this is not a concern since every movie is
rated by at least 4 subscribers.
6It may seem that tuning the parameters to the specific dataset may have unfairly im-
proved our results, but an actual adversary would have performed the same tuning. We
do not claim that these numerical parameters should be used for other instances of our
algorithm; they must be derived by trial and error for each target dataset.
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Figure 6.5: Same parameters as Fig. 6.4, but the adversary must also detect
when the target record is not in the sample.
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record corresponding to aux is not in the sample. We ran the following ex-
periment. First, we gave aux from a random record to the algorithm and ran
it on the dataset. Then we removed this record from the dataset and re-ran
the algorithm. In the former case, the algorithm should find the record; in the
latter, declare that it is not in the dataset. As shown in Fig. 6.5, the algorithm
succeeds with high probability in both cases.
It is possible, although extremely unlikely, that the original Netflix
dataset is not as sparse as the published sample, i.e., it contains clusters
of records which are close to each other, but only one representative of each
cluster has been released in the Prize dataset. A dataset with such a structure
would be exceptionally unusual and theoretically problematic (see Theorem 8).
If the amount of auxiliary information available to the adversary is less
than shown in Fig. 6.5, the absence of false positives cannot be guaranteed a
priori, but there is a lot of additional information in the dataset that can be
used to eliminate them. For example, if the start date and the total number
of movies in a record are part of the auxiliary information (e.g., the adversary
knows approximately when his target first joined Netflix), they can be used to
eliminate candidate records.
Results of de-anonymization. We carried out the experiments summarized
in Table 6.1.
Our conclusion is that very little auxiliary information is needed for
de-anonymize an average subscriber record from the Netflix Prize dataset.
With 8 movie ratings (of which 2 may be completely wrong) and dates that
may have a 14-day error, 99% of records can be uniquely identified in the
dataset. For 68%, two ratings and dates (with a 3-day error) are sufficient
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Figure 6.6: Entropic de-anonymization: same parameters as in Fig. 6.4.
Table 6.1: Summary of results
Fig Ratings Dates Type Aux selection
6.4 Exact ±3/±14 Best-guess Uniform
6.5 Exact ±3/±14 Best-guess Uniform
6.6 Exact ±3/±14 Entropic Uniform
6.8 Exact No info. Best-guess Not 100/500
6.9 ±1 ±14 Best-guess Uniform
6.10 ±1 ±14 Best-guess Uniform
6.11 Exact No info. Entropic Not 100/500
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(Fig. 6.4). Even for the other 32%, the number of possible candidates is
brought down dramatically. In terms of entropy, the additional information
required for complete de-anonymization is around 3 bits in the latter case
(with no auxiliary information, this number is 19 bits). When the adversary
knows 6 movies correctly and 2 incorrectly, the extra information he needs for
complete de-anonymization is a fraction of a bit (Fig. 6.6).
Even without any dates, a substantial privacy breach occurs, especially
when the auxiliary information consists of movies that are not blockbusters.
In Fig. 6.7, we demonstrate how much information the adversary gains about
his target just from the knowledge that the target watched a particular movie
as a function of the rank of the movie.7 Because there are correlations between
the lists of subscribers who watched various movies, we cannot simply multiply
the information gain per movie by the number of movies. Therefore, Fig. 6.7
cannot be used to infer how many movies the adversary needs to know for
successful de-anonymization.
As shown in Fig. 6.8, two movies are no longer sufficient for de-anonymization,
but 84% of subscribers present in the dataset can be uniquely identified if the
adversary knows 6 out of 8 moves outside the top 500.
To show that this is not a significant limitation, consider that most
subscribers rate fairly rare movies (Table 6.2).
Fig. 6.9 shows that the effect of relative popularity of movies known to
the adversary is not dramatic.
In Fig. 6.10, we isolate the effect of adding more noise to the auxiliary
information.
7We measure the rank of a movie by the number of subscribers who have rated it.
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Figure 6.7: Entropy of movie by rank
Table 6.2: Subscribers rate rare movies
Not in X most rated % of subscribers who rated . . .
≥ 1 movie ≥ 5 ≥ 10
X = 100 100% 97% 93%
X = 500 99% 90% 80%
X = 1000 97% 83% 70%
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Figure 6.8: Adversary knows exact ratings but does not know dates at all.
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Figure 6.9: Effect of knowing less popular movies rated by victim. Adversary
knows approximate ratings (±1) and dates (14-day error).
Fig. 6.11 shows that even when the adversary’s probability to correctly
learn the attributes of the target record is low, he gains a lot of information
about the target record. Even in the worst scenario, the additional information
needed to to complete the de-anonymization has been reduced to less than half
of its original value.
Fig. 6.12 shows why even partial de-anonymization can be very danger-
ous. There are many things the adversary might know about his target that are
not captured by our formal model, such as the approximate number of movies
rated, the date when they joined Netflix and so on. Once a candidate set of
records is available, further automated analysis or human inspection might
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Figure 6.10: Effect of increasing error in Aux.
be sufficient to complete the de-anonymization. Fig. 6.12 shows that in some
cases, knowing the number of movies the target has rated (even with a 50%
error!) can more than double the probability of complete de-anonymization.
Obtaining the auxiliary information and IMDb cross-correlation.
Given how little auxiliary information is needed to de-anonymize the aver-
age subscriber record from the Netflix Prize dataset, a determined adversary
who targets a specific individual may not find it difficult to obtain such infor-
mation, especially since it need not be precise. We emphasize that massive
collection of data on thousands of subscribers is not the only or even the
most important threat. A water-cooler conversation with an office colleague
about her cinematographic likes and dislikes may yield enough information,
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Figure 6.11: Entropic de-anonymization: same parameters as in Fig. 6.6.
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Figure 6.12: Effect of knowing approximate number of movies rated by victim
(±50%). Adversary knows approximate ratings (±1) and dates (14-day error).
especially if at least a few of the movies mentioned are outside the top 100
most rated Netflix movies. This information can also be gleaned from personal
blogs, Google searches, and so on.
One possible source of a large number of personal movie ratings is the
Internet Movie Database (IMDb) [137]. We expect that for Netflix subscribers
who use IMDb, there is a strong correlation between their private Netflix
ratings and their public IMDb ratings.8 Our attack does not require that all
movies rated by the subscriber in the Netflix system be also rated in IMDb,
or vice versa. In many cases, even a handful of movies that are rated by a
8We are not claiming that a large fraction of Netflix subscribers use IMDb, or that many
IMDb users use Netflix.
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subscriber in both services would be sufficient to identify his or her record in
the Netflix Prize dataset (if present among the released records) with enough
statistical confidence to rule out the possibility of a false match except for a
negligible probability.
Due to the restrictions on crawling IMDb imposed by IMDb’s terms of
service (of course, a real adversary may not comply with these restrictions),
we worked with a very small sample of around 50 IMDb users. Our results
should thus be viewed as a proof of concept. They do not imply anything
about the percentage of IMDb users who can be identified in the Netflix Prize
dataset.
The auxiliary information obtained from IMDb is quite noisy. First, a
significant fraction of the movies rated on IMDb are not in Netflix, and vice
versa, e.g., movies that have not been released in the US. Second, some of
the ratings on IMDb are missing (i.e., the user entered only a comment, not
a numerical rating). Such data is still useful for de-anonymization because
an average user has rated only a tiny fraction of all movies, so the mere fact
that a person has watched a given movie tremendously reduces the number of
anonymous Netflix records that could possibly belong to that user. Finally,
IMDb users among Netflix subscribers fall into a continuum of categories with
respect to rating dates, separated by two extremes: some meticulously rate
movies on both IMDb and Netflix at the same time, and others rate them
whenever they have free time (which means the dates may not be correlated
at all). Somewhat offsetting these disadvantages is the fact that we can use
all of the user’s ratings publicly available on IMDb.
Because we have no “oracle” to tell us whether the record our algorithm
has found in the Netflix Prize dataset based on the ratings of some IMDb user
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indeed belongs to that user, we need to guarantee a very low false positive
rate. Given our small sample of IMDb users, our algorithm identified the
records of two users in the Netflix Prize dataset with eccentricities of around
28 and 15, respectively. These are exceptionally strong matches, which are
highly unlikely to be false positives: the records in questions are 28 standard
deviations (respectively, 15 standard deviations) away from the second-best
candidate. Interestingly, the first user was de-anonymized mainly from the
ratings and the second mainly from the dates. For nearly all the other IMDb
users we tested, the eccentricity was no more than 2.
Let us summarize what our algorithm achieves. Given a user’s public
IMDb ratings, which the user posted voluntarily to reveal some of his (or
her; but we’ll use the male pronoun without loss of generality) movie likes
and dislikes, we discover all ratings that he entered privately into the Netflix
system. Why would someone who rates movies on IMDb—often under his
or her real name—care about privacy of his Netflix ratings? Consider the
information that we have been able to deduce by locating one of these users’
entire movie viewing history in the Netflix Prize dataset and that cannot be
deduced from his public IMDb ratings.
First, his political orientation may be revealed by his strong opinions
about “Power and Terror: Noam Chomsky in Our Times” and “Fahrenheit
9/11,” and his religious views by his ratings on “Jesus of Nazareth” and “The
Gospel of John.” Even though one should not make inferences solely from
someone’s movie preferences, in many workplaces and social settings opinions
about movies with predominantly gay themes such as “Bent” and “Queer
as folk” (both present and rated in this person’s Netflix record) would be
considered sensitive. In any case, it should be for the individual and not for
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Netflix to decide whether to reveal them publicly.
6.6 Summary
We have presented a de-anonymization methodology for sparse micro-data,
and demonstrated its practical applicability by showing how to de-anonymize
movie viewing records released in the Netflix Prize dataset. Our de-anonymization
algorithm Scoreboard-RH works under very general assumptions about the dis-
tribution from which the data is drawn, and is robust to data perturbation and
mistakes in the adversary’s knowledge. Therefore, we expect that it can be
successfully used against any dataset containing anonymous multi-dimensional
records such as individual transactions, preferences, and so on.
We conjecture that the amount of perturbation that must be applied
to the data to defeat our algorithm will completely destroy their utility for
collaborative filtering. Sanitization techniques from the k-anonymity litera-
ture such as generalization and suppression do not provide meaningful privacy
guarantees, and in any case fail on high-dimensional data. Furthermore, for
most records simply knowing which columns are non-null reveals as much in-
formation as knowing the specific values of these columns. Therefore, any
sanitization which leaves sensitive attributes untouched, as is the case for sup-
pression and generalization [241, 62, 172], does not help.
Other possible countermeasures include interactive mechanisms for privacy-
protecting data mining such as [35, 83], as well as more recent non-interactive
techniques [36]. Both support only limited classes of computations such as
statistical queries and learning halfspaces. By contrast, in scenarios such as
the Netflix Prize, the purpose of the data release is precisely to foster compu-
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tations on the data that have not even been foreseen at the time of release 9,
and are vastly more sophisticated than the computations that we know how
to perform in a privacy-preserving manner.
An intriguing possibility was suggested by Matthew Wright via personal
communication: to release the records without the column identifiers (i.e.,
movie names in the case of the Netflix Prize dataset). It is not clear how much
worse the current data mining algorithms would perform under this restriction.
Furthermore, this does not appear to make de-anonymization impossible, but
merely harder. Nevertheless, it is an interesting countermeasure to investigate.
McSherry and Mironov have recently developed a technique for provid-
ing provable privacy guarantees in collaborative filtering based on a relaxed
definition of differential privacy [178]. While not perfect, it is a way to protect
privacy without relying on anonymity. Depending on the context, the best de-
fense against de-anonymization algorithms might be to sidestep the anonymity
question altogether.
9As of the current writing, the best algorithm in the Netflix Prize competition is a
combination of 107 different techniques.
136
Chapter 7
De-anonymizing Social
Networks
7.1 Introduction
Social networks have been studied for a century [229] and are a staple of
research in disciplines such as epidemiology [24], sociology [248, 119, 37], eco-
nomics [120], and many others [80, 26, 127]. The recent proliferation of online
social networks such as MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, and so on has attracted
attention of computer scientists, as well [152].
Even in the few online networks that are completely open, there is a
disconnect between users’ willingness to share information and their reaction to
unintended parties viewing or using this information [55]. Most operators thus
provide at least some privacy controls. Many online and virtually all offline
networks (e.g., telephone calls, email and instant messages, etc.) restrict access
to the information about individual members and their relationships.
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Network owners often share this information with advertising partners
and other third parties. Such sharing is the foundation of the business case for
many online social-network operators. Some networks are even published for
research purposes. To alleviate privacy concerns, the networks are anonymized,
i.e., names and demographic information associated with individual nodes are
suppressed. Such suppression is often misinterpreted as removal of “person-
ally identifiable information” (PII), even though PII may include much more
than names and identifiers (see the discussion in Section 7.3.4). For example,
the EU privacy directive defines “personal data” as “any information relating
to an identified or identifiable natural person [. . . ]; an identifiable person is
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to
an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity” [88].
Anonymity has been unquestioningly interpreted as equivalent to pri-
vacy in several high-profile cases of data sharing. After a New York court
ruling ordering Google to hand over viewing data of over 100 million YouTube
users to Viacom and the subsequent protests from privacy advocates, a revised
agreement was struck under which Google would anonymize the data before
handing it over [242]. The CEO of NebuAd, a U.S. company that offers tar-
geted advertising based on browsing histories gathered from ISPs, dismissed
privacy concerns by saying that “We don’t have any raw data on the iden-
tifiable individual. Everything is anonymous” [63]. Phorm, a U.K. company
with a similar business model, aims to collect the data on Web-surfing habits
of 70% of British broadband users; the only privacy protection is that user
identities are mapped to random identifiers [235]. In social networks, too,
user anonymity has been used as the answer to all privacy concerns (see Sec-
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tion 7.2).
Our contributions. This is the first work to demonstrate feasibility of large-
scale, passive de-anonymization of real-world social networks.
First, we survey the current state of data sharing in social networks,
the intended purpose of each type of sharing, the resulting privacy risks, and
the wide availability of auxiliary information which can aid the attacker in
de-anonymization.
Second, we formally define privacy in social networks and relate it to
node anonymity. We identify several categories of attacks, differentiated by
attackers’ resources and auxiliary information. We also give a methodology
for measuring the extent of privacy breaches in social networks, which is an
interesting problem in its own right.
Third, we develop a generic re-identification algorithm for anonymized
social networks. The algorithm uses only the network structure, does not
make any a priori assumptions about membership overlap between multiple
networks, and defeats all known defenses.
Fourth, we give a concrete demonstration of how our de-anonymization
algorithm works by applying it to Flickr and Twitter, two large, real-world
online social networks. We show that a third of the users who are verifiable
members of both Flickr and Twitter1 can be recognized in the completely
anonymous Twitter graph with only 12% error rate, even though the overlap
in the relationships for these members is less than 15%!
Sharing of anonymized social-network data is widespread and the aux-
iliary information needed for our attack is commonly available. We argue that
our work calls for a substantial re-evaluation of business practices surrounding
1At the time of our crawl; details are in Section 7.6.
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the sharing of social-network data.
7.2 State of the Union
The attacks described in this work target anonymized, sanitized versions of
social networks, using partial auxiliary information about a subset of their
members. To show that both anonymized networks and auxiliary information
are widely available, we survey real-world examples of social-network data
sharing, most of which involve releasing more information than needed for our
attack.
Academic and government data-mining. Social networks used for pub-
lished data-mining research include the mobile-phone call graphs of, respec-
tively, 7 million [202], 3 million [190], and 2.5 million [157] customers, as well
as the land-line phone graph of 2.1 million Hungarian users [154]. Corpora-
tions like AT&T, whose own database of 1.9 trillion phone calls goes back
decades [133], have in-house research facilities, but smaller operators must
share their graphs with external researchers. Phone-call networks are also com-
monly used to detect illicit activity such as calling fraud [260] and for national
security purposes, such as identifying the command-and-control structures of
terrorist cells by their idiosyncratic sub-network topologies [133]. A number
of companies sell data-mining solutions to governments for this purpose [231].
Sociologists, epidemiologists, and health-care professionals collect data
about geographic, friendship, family, and sexual networks to study disease
propagation and risk. For example, the Add Health dataset includes the
sexual-relationship network of almost 1,000 students of an anonymous Mid-
western high school as part of a detailed survey on adolescent health [8]. While
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the Add Health project takes a relatively enlightened stance on privacy [7],
this graph has been published in an anonymized form [28].
For online social networks, the data can be collected by crawling either
via an API, or “screen-scraping” (e.g., Mislove et al. crawled Flickr, YouTube,
LiveJournal, and Orkut [184]; anonymized graphs are available by request
only). We stress that even when obtained from public websites, this kind of
information—if publicly released—still presents privacy risks because it helps
attackers who lack resources for massive crawls. In some online networks,
such as LiveJournal and the Experience Project, user profiles and relationship
data are public, but many users maintain pseudonymous profiles. From the
attacker’s perspective, this is the same as publishing the anonymized network.
Advertising. With the emergence of concrete evidence that social-network
data makes commerce much more profitable [218, 238], network operators are
increasingly sharing their graphs with advertising partners to enable better
social targeting of advertisements. For example, Facebook explicitly says that
users’ profiles may be shared for the purpose of personalizing advertisements
and promotions, as long as the individual is not explicitly identified [90]. Both
Facebook and MySpace allow advertisers to use friends’ profile data for ad
targeting [70]. Social-network-driven advertising has been pursued by many
startups [85, 189] and even Google [221], typically relying on anonymity to
prevent privacy breaches [18, 86, 201].
Third-party applications. The number of third-party applications on Face-
book alone is in the tens of thousands and rapidly growing [222]. The data
from multiple applications can be aggregated and used for targeted advertis-
ing (e.g., as done by SocialMedia [217]). As the notion of social networking
141
as a feature rather than destination takes hold [17], many other networks are
trying to attract application developers; on the Ning platform, which claims
over 275,000 networks, each network can be considered a third-party applica-
tion. The data given to third-party applications is usually not anonymized,
even though most applications would be able to function on anonymized pro-
files [94].
Third-party applications have a poor track record of respecting pri-
vacy policies. For example, a security hole in a Facebook application devel-
oped by Slide, Inc. “exposed the birthdays, gender, and relationship status of
strangers, including Facebook executives, [and] the wife of Google co-founder
Larry Page” [183]. WidgetLaboratory, one of the most popular developers
for the Ning platform, was banned permanently after “gathering credentials
from users and otherwise creating havoc on Ning networks” [20]. Therefore,
it is important to understand what a malicious third-party application can
learn about members of a social network, even if it obtains the data in an
anonymized form.
Aggregation. Aggregation of information from multiple social networks, fa-
cilitated by projects such as OpenID [3], DataPortability [71], the “social
graph” project [97], and various microformats [2], potentially presents a greater
threat to individual privacy than one-time data releases. Existing aggregators
include FriendFeed, MyBlogLog, Jaiku (recently acquired by Google), and
Plaxo; the latter even provides an open-source “social graph crawler” [211].
Aggregated networks are an excellent source of auxiliary information for our
attacks.
Other data-release scenarios. WellNet is a health-care co-ordination ser-
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vice which enables employers to monitor the social network in real time in
order to track employees’ medical and pharmacy activity [180]. The data is
anonymized.
In “friend-to-friend networking,” a peer-to-peer file-sharing network is
overlaid on social links [213] in order to defeat censor nodes such as the RIAA.
Nodes are pseudonymous and communication is encrypted. Since traffic is
typically not anonymized at the network level, the logs that can be obtained,
for example, by subpoenaing the ISP are essentially anonymized social-network
graphs.
Finally, consider photographs published online without identifying in-
formation. The accuracy of face recognition can be improved substantially by
exploiting the fact that users who appear together in photographs are likely
to be neighbors in the social network [234]. Since most online photographs
appear in a social-network context, they effectively represent an anonymized
graph, and techniques developed in this work can help in large-scale facial
re-identification.
7.3 Background and related Work
7.3.1 Privacy properties.
A social network consists of nodes, edges, and information associated with each
node and edge. The existence of an edge between two nodes can be sensitive:
for instance, in a sexual-relationship network with gender information attached
to nodes [28] it can reveal sexual orientation. Edge privacy was considered
in [151, 23]. In most online social networks, however, edges are public by
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default, and few users change the default settings [123].
While the mere presence of an edge may not be sensitive, edge attributes
may reveal more information (e.g., a single phone call vs. a pattern of calls
indicative of a business or romantic relationship). For example, phone-call
patterns of the disgraced NBA referee Tom Donaghy have been used in the
investigation [261]. In online networks such as LiveJournal, there is much
variability in the semantics of edge relationships [98].
The attributes attached to nodes, such as the user’s interests, are usually
far more sensitive. Social Security numbers can be predicted from Facebook
profiles with higher accuracy than random guessing [123]; see [57] for other
privacy breaches based on profile data. Even implicit attributes such as node
degree can be highly sensitive, e.g., in a sexual network [28]. Existing defenses
focus on names and other identifiers, but basic de-anonymization only reveals
that someone belongs to the network, which is hardly sensitive. As we show in
the rest of this chapter, however, it can be used as a vehicle for more serious
attacks on privacy, including disclosure of sensitive attributes.
7.3.2 De-anonymization attacks.
Backstrom et al. present two active attacks on edge privacy in anonymized
social networks [23]. These active attacks fundamentally assume that the
adversary is able to modify the network prior to its release: “an adversary
chooses an arbitrary set of users whose privacy it wishes to violate, creates
a small number of new user accounts with edges to these targeted users, and
creates a pattern of links among the new accounts with the goal of making it
stand out in the anonymized graph structure.” Both attacks involve creating
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O(logN) new “sybil” nodes (N is the total number of nodes), whose outgoing
edges help re-identify quadratically as many existing nodes.
Active attacks are difficult to stage on a large scale. First, they are
restricted to online social networks (OSNs); creating thousands of fake nodes
in a phone-call or real-life network is prohibitively expensive or impossible.
Even in OSNs, many operators (e.g., Facebook) check the uniqueness of email
addresses and deploy other methods for verifying accuracy of supplied infor-
mation, making creation of a large number of dummy nodes relatively difficult.
Second, the attacker has little control over the edges incoming to the
nodes he creates. Because most legitimate users will have no reason to link
back to the sybil nodes, a subgraph with no incoming edges but many out-
going edges will stand out. As we show below, this may enable the network
operator to recognize that the network has been compromised by a sybil at-
tack. There are also other techniques for identifying sybil attacks in social
networks [267], including methods for spammer detection deployed by OSNs
that allow unidirectional edges [225].
We carried out an experiment to verify the claim that identification
of subgraphs consisting primarily of sybil nodes is difficult in real-world social
networks. The data for this experiment was the graph of LiveJournal obtained
from Mislove et al. [184], crawled in late 2006. It is a directed graph with 5.3
million nodes and 77 million edges. Except for the time of the crawl, this
graph is similar to that used in [23].
The cut-based attack of [23] creates 7-node subgraphs containing a
Hamiltonian path. In contrast to the observation in [23] that every possi-
ble 7-node subgraph containing a Hamiltonian path occurs in the LiveJournal
graph, there are no subgraphs in the LiveJournal graph that have these two
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properties and, furthermore, do not have any incoming edges. We conclude
that active attacks are easy to detect if real users never link back to sybil
nodes. More sophisticated sybil-detection techniques may work as long as
only a small percentage of real users link back to sybil nodes.
The third limitation of active attacks is the fact that many OSNs require
a link to be mutual before the information is made available in any form.
Therefore, assuming that real users do not link back to dummy users, the
links from fake nodes to real ones do not show up in the network.
We conclude that large-scale active attacks requiring creation of tens of
thousands of sybil nodes are unlikely to be feasible. Active attacks can still
be useful in identifying or creating a small set of “seeds” to serve as a starting
point for large-scale, passive privacy breaches. We develop such an attack in
Section 7.5.2.
Backstrom et al. also describe passive attacks, in which a small coali-
tion of users discover their location in the anonymized graph by utilizing the
knowledge of the network structure around them. This attack is realistic, but
again, only works on a small scale: the colluding users can only compromise
the privacy of some of the users who are already their friends.
By contrast, our attack does not require creation of a large number
of sybil nodes, and—as shown by our experiments on real-world online social
networks—can be successfully deployed on a very large scale.
7.3.3 Defenses.
Existing privacy protection mechanisms for social networks are only effective
against very restricted adversaries and have been evaluated on small, simulated
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networks whose characteristics are different from real social networks. For
example, Zheleva and Getoor give several strategies for preventing link re-
identification [268], but the model ignores auxiliary information that may be
available to the attacker.
An unusual attempt to prevent network operators from capitalizing on
user-provided data appears in [125]. It involves scrambling the profiles when
they are sent to the server and client-side unscrambling when a friend’s profile
is viewed. Building and running such a system involves constant reverse-
engineering of communication between the client and the server. Further, all
of a user’s friends need to use the system, flatly contradicting the claim of
incremental deployability. A similar idea appears in [168], with a more sound
architecture based on a server-side Facebook application. Both approaches
severely cripple social-network functionality because almost any non-trivial
action other than viewing another user’s profile or messages requires the server
to manipulate the data in a way which is not possible under encryption.
Anonymity is a popular approach to protecting privacy. Felt and Evans
propose a system where applications see randomized tokens representing users
instead of actual identifiers [94]. Frikken and Golle show how to compute
an anonymous graph from pieces held by different participants in order to
perform privacy-preserving social-network analysis [105]. Kerschbaum and
Schaad additionally enable participants to track their position in the anony-
mous graph [148].
Several papers proposed variants of k-anonymity for social networks.
For example, Hay et al.[132] analyze “k-candidate anonymity” under sanitiza-
tion through random edge perturbation of the edges. Anonymity is achieved
only against severely restricted adversaries: in one model, the attacker only has
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information about degree sequences around his target node; in another, partial
knowledge of the structure in the vicinity of the target. The technique appears
to work only if the average degree is low, ruling out most online social networks.
A follow-up paper [131] considers “graph generalization” which clusters nodes
into “super-nodes.” While this technique protects against re-identification,
it appears to render the graph useless for the applications considered in the
previous subsection.
Liu and Terzi consider node re-identification assuming that the adver-
sary’s auxiliary information consists only of node degrees [167]. There is no
clear motivation for this restriction. Campan and Truta propose metrics for the
information loss caused by edge addition and deletion and apply k-anonymity
to node attributes as well as neighborhood structure [51]. Zhou and Pei assume
that the adversary knows the exact 1-neighborhood of the target node [269].
The anonymization algorithm attempts to make this 1-neighborhood isomor-
phic to k − 1 other 1-neighborhoods via edge addition. The experiments are
performed on an undirected network with average degree 4 (an order of mag-
nitude lower than that in real social networks) and already require increasing
the number of edges by 6%. The number of edges to be added and the com-
putational effort are likely to rise sharply with the average degree.
The fundamental problem with k-anonymity is that it is a syntactic
property which may not provide any privacy even when satisfied (e.g., if all k
isomorphic neighborhoods have the same value of some sensitive attributes).
Crucially, all of these defenses impose arbitrary restrictions on the information
available to the adversary and make arbitrary assumptions about the proper-
ties of the social network.
We argue that the auxiliary information which is likely to be available
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to the attacker is global in nature (e.g., another social network with partially
overlapping membership) and not restricted to the neighborhood of a single
node. In the rest of this chapter, we show how this information, even if very
noisy, can be used for large-scale re-identification. Existing models fail to
capture self-reinforcing, feedback-based attacks, in which re-identification of
some nodes provides the attacker with more auxiliary information, which is
then used for further re-identification. Development of a model for such attacks
is our primary contribution.
7.3.4 On “Personally Identifiable Information”
“Personally identifiable information” is a legal term used in two related but
distinct contexts. The first context is a series of breach-disclosure laws enacted
in recent years in response to security breaches involving customer data that
could enable identity theft.
California Senate Bill 1386 [49] is a representative example. It defines
“personal information” as follows:
[An] individual’s first name or first initial and last name in combi-
nation with any one or more of the following data elements, when
either the name or the data elements are not encrypted:
• Social security number.
• Driver’s license number or California Identification Card num-
ber.
• Account number, credit or debit card number, in combination
with any required security code, access code, or password that
would permit access to an individual’s financial account.
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Two points are worthy of note. First, the spirit of the terminology is to
capture the types of information that are commonly used for authenticating an
individual. This reflects the bill’s intent to deter identity theft. Consequently,
data such as email addresses and telephone numbers do not fall under the
scope of this law. Second, it is the personal information itself that is sensitive,
rather than the fact that it is possible to associate sensitive information with
an identity.
The second context in which the term “personally identifiable informa-
tion” appears is the privacy law. In the United States, the Privacy Act of 1974
[249] regulates the collection of personal information by government agencies,
but there is no overarching law regulating private entities. At least three such
acts introduced in 2005 failed to pass: the Privacy Act of 2005 [254], the Con-
sumer Privacy Protection Act of 2005 [252], and the Online Privacy Protection
Act of 2005 [253]. However, there do exist laws for specific types of data such
as the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) [87] and the Health Insurance
Privacy and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
The language from the HIPAA Privacy Rule [250] is representative:
Individually identifiable health information is information
[. . . ]
1. That identifies the individual; or
2. With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe
the information can be used to identify the individual.
The spirit of the law clearly encompasses deductive disclosure, and the
term “reasonable basis” leaves the defining line open to interpretation by case
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law. We are not aware of any court decisions that define identifiability.
Individual U.S. states do have privacy protection laws that apply to
any operator, such as California’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 [50].
Some countries other than the United States have similar generic laws, such
as Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA) [206]. The European Union is notorious for the broad scope and
strict enforcement of its privacy laws—the EU privacy directive defines “per-
sonal data” as follows [88]:
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural per-
son [. . . ]; an identifiable person is one who can be identified, di-
rectly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physio-
logical, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.
It is clear from the above that privacy law, as opposed to breach-
disclosure law, in general interprets personally identifiable information broadly,
in a way that is not covered by syntactic anonymization. This distinction ap-
pears to be almost universally lost on companies that collect and share personal
information, as illustrated by the following Senate Committee testimony by
Chris Kelly, Chief Privacy Officer of Facebook [144]:
The critical distinction that we embrace in our policies and prac-
tices, and that we want our users to understand, is between the use
of personal information for advertisements in personally-identifiable
form, and the use, dissemination, or sharing of information with
advertisers in non-personally-identifiable form. Ad targeting that
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shares or sells personal information to advertisers (name, email,
other contact oriented information) without user control is funda-
mentally different from targeting that only gives advertisers the
ability to present their ads based on aggregate data.
Finally, it is important to understand that the term “personally identi-
fiable information” has no particular technical meaning. Algorithms that can
identify a user in an anonymized dataset are agnostic to the semantics of the
data elements. While some data elements may be uniquely identifying on their
own, any element can be identifying in combination with others. The feasibil-
ity of such re-identification has been amply demonstrated by the AOL privacy
fiasco [129], de-anonymization of the Netflix Prize dataset [194], and the work
presented in this paper. It is regrettable that the mistaken dichotomy between
personally identifying and non-personally identifying attributes has crept into
the technical literature in phrases such as “quasi-identifier.”
7.4 Model and Definitions
7.4.1 Social network
A social network S consists of (1) a directed graph G = (V,E), and (2) a set of
attributes X for each node in V (for instance, name, telephone number, etc.)
and a set of attributes Y for each edge in E (for instance, type of relationship).
The model is agnostic as to whether attributes accurately reflect real-world
identities or not (see below). We treat attributes as atomic values from a
discrete domain; this is important for our formal definition of privacy breach
(Definition 10 below). Real-valued attributes must be discretized. Where
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specified, we will also represent edges as attributes in Y taking values in {0, 1}.
In addition to the explicit attributes, some privacy policies may be con-
cerned with implicit attributes, i.e., properties of a node or an edge that are
based purely on the graph structure. For example, node degree can be a sen-
sitive implicit attribute. Implicit attributes may be leaked without disclosing
any explicit attributes. For example, if the adversary re-identifies a subset of
nodes in an anonymized graph, none of which are adjacent, he learns the de-
grees of these nodes without breaking edge privacy. Which implicit attributes
should be protected depends on the specific network.
7.4.2 “Identity” in social networks
The correspondence between accounts or profiles (i.e., network nodes) and
real-world identities varies greatly from social network to social network. A
wired telephone may be shared by a family or an office, while mobile phones
are much more likely to belong to a single person. Some online social networks
such as Facebook attempt to ensure that accounts accurately reflect real-world
information [244], while others such as MySpace are notoriously lax [171]. Fake
MySpace profiles have been created for pets and celebrities, and a user may
create multiple profiles with contradictory or fake information.
In this paper, we eschew an explicit notion of identity and focus instead
on entities, which are simply sources of social-network profile information that
are consistent across different networks and service providers. In most cases,
an entity is associated with a real-world person, but does not have to be (e.g.,
consider a political campaign which has a YouTube account and a Twitter
account). The concept of entities also allows us to capture information which
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is characteristic of a user across multiple networks—for example, an unusual
username—but is not related to anything in the real world.
In our model, nodes are purely collections of their attributes, and to
identify a node simply means to learn the entity to which the node belongs,
whether this entity is a single person, a group, or an organization. We assume
that correctly associating a node with the corresponding entity constitutes a
breach of anonymity. The question of whether the entity is a single individual
or not is extraneous to our model.
7.4.3 Data release
Our model of the data release process focuses on what types of data are released
and how the data is sanitized (if at all), and abstracts away from the procedural
distinctions such as whether the data is available in bulk or obtained by crawl-
ing the network. As discussed in Section 7.2, social-network data are routinely
released to advertisers, application developers, and researchers. Advertisers
are often given access to the entire graph in a (presumably) anonymized form
and a limited number of relevant attributes for each node. Application de-
velopers, in current practice, get access to a subgraph via user opt-in and
most or all of the attributes within this subgraph. This typically includes
the identifying attributes, even if they are not essential for the application’s
functionality [94]. Researchers may receive the entire graph or a subgraph (up
to the discretion of the network owner) and a limited set of non-identifying
attributes.
“Anonymization” is modeled by publishing only a subset of attributes.
Unlike na¨ıve approaches such as k-anonymity, we do not distinguish identifying
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and non-identifying attributes (any attribute can be identifying if it happens to
be known to the adversary as part of his auxiliary information). Suppressed
attributes are not limited to the demographic quasi-identifiers a priori ; we
simply assume that the published attributes by themselves are insufficient for
re-identification. In Section 7.4.5, we explain the (indirect) connection between
preventing node re-identification and intuitive “privacy.” In terms of entropy,
most of the information in the released graph resides in the edges, and this is
what our de-anonymization algorithm will exploit.
The data release process may involve perturbation or sanitization that
changes the graph structure in some way to make re-identification attacks
harder. As we argued in Section 7.3, deterministic methods that attempt to
make different nodes look identical do not work on realistic networks. Other
defenses are based on injecting random noise into the graph structure. The
most promising one is link prediction [162], which produces plausible fake
edges by exploiting the fact that edges in social-network graphs have a high
clustering coefficient. (We stress that link prediction is far beyond the existing
sanitization techniques, which mostly rely on simple removal of identifiers.)
The experiments in Section 7.6.2 show that our algorithm is robust to injected
noise, whether resulting from link prediction or not. In Appendix D, we discuss
how to measure the amount of noise introduced by perturbation.
We model the data sanitization and release process as follows. First,
select a subset of nodes, Vsan ⊂ V , and subsets Xsan ⊆ X ,Ysan ⊆ Y of node
and edge attributes to be released. Second, compute the induced subgraph on
Vsan. For simplicity, we do not model more complex criteria for releasing edge,
e.g., based on edge attributes. Third, remove some edges and add fake edges.
Release Ssan = (Vsan, Esan, {X(v)∀v ∈ Vsan, X ∈ Xsan}, {Y (e)∀e ∈ Esan, Y ∈
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Ysan}), i.e., a sanitized subset of nodes and edges with the corresponding
attributes.
7.4.4 Threat model
As described in Section 7.2, network owners release anonymized and possibly
sanitized network graphs to commercial partners and academic researchers.
Therefore, we take it for granted that the attacker will have access to such
data. The main question we answer in the rest of this chapter is: can sensitive
information about specific individuals be extracted from anonymized
social-network graphs?
Attack scenarios. Attackers fall into different categories depending on their
capabilities and goals. The strongest adversary is a government-level agency
interested in global surveillance. Such an adversary can be assumed to already
have access to a large auxiliary network Saux (see below). His objective is large-
scale collection of detailed information about as many individuals as possible.
This involves aggregating the anonymous network Ssan with Saux by recognizing
nodes that correspond to the same individuals.
Another attack scenario involves abusive marketing. A commercial en-
terprise, especially one specializing in behavioral ad targeting [247, 266], can
easily obtain an anonymized social-network graph from the network operator
for advertising purposes. As described in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, anonymity is
often misinterpreted as privacy. If an unethical company were able to de-
anonymize the graph using publicly available data, it could engage in abusive
marketing aimed at specific individuals. Phishing and spamming also gain
from social-network de-anonymization. Using detailed information about the
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victim gleaned from his or her de-anonymized social-network profile, a phisher
or a spammer will be able to craft a highly individualized, believable message
(cf. [139]).
Yet another category of attacks involves targeted de-anonymization of
specific individuals by stalkers, investigators, nosy colleagues, employers, or
neighbors. In this scenario, the attacker has detailed contextual information
about a single individual, which may include some of her attributes, a few of
her social relationships, membership in other networks, and so on. The objec-
tive is to use this information to recognize the victim’s node in the anonymized
network and to learn sensitive information about her, including all of her social
relationships in that network.
Modeling the attacker. We assume that in addition to the anonymized,
sanitized target network Ssan, the attacker also has access to a different net-
work Saux whose membership partially overlaps with S. The assumption that
the attacker possesses such an auxiliary network is very realistic. First, it may
be possible to extract Saux directly from S: for example, parts of some online
networks can be automatically crawled, or a malicious third-party application
can provide information about the subgraph of users who installed it. Second,
the attacker may collude with an operator of a different network whose mem-
bership overlaps with S. Third, the attacker may take advantage of several
ongoing aggregation projects (see Section 7.2). The intent of these projects is
benign, but they facilitate the creation of a global auxiliary network combining
bits and pieces of public information about individuals and their relationships
from multiple sources. Fourth, government-level aggregators, such as intel-
ligence and law enforcement agencies, can collect data via surveillance and
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court-authorized searches. Depending on the type of the attacker, the nodes
of his auxiliary network may be a subset, a superset, or overlap with those of
the target network.
We emphasize that even with access to a substantial auxiliary network
Saux, de-anonymizing the target network Ssan is a highly non-trivial task. First,
the overlap between the two networks may not be large. For the entities who
are members of both Saux and S, some social relationships may be preserved,
i.e., if two nodes are connected in Saux, the corresponding nodes in S are also
connected with a non-negligible probability, but many of the relationships in
each network are unique to that network. Even if the same entity belongs
to both networks, it is not immediately clear how to recognize that a certain
anonymous node from Ssan corresponds to the same entity as a given node from
Saux. Therefore, easy availability of auxiliary information does not directly
imply that anonymized social networks are vulnerable to privacy breaches.
Our formal model of the attacker includes both aggregate auxiliary in-
formation (large-scale information from other data sources and social networks
whose membership overlaps with the target network) and individual auxil-
iary information (identifiable details about a small number of individuals from
the target network and possibly relationships between them). In the model,
we consider edge relationship to be a binary attribute in Y and all edge at-
tributes Y ∈ Y to be defined over V 2 instead of E. If (u, v) /∈ E, then
Y [u, v] =⊥ ∀Y ∈ Y .
Aggregate auxiliary information. It is essential that the attacker’s aux-
iliary information may include relationships between entities. Therefore, we
model Saux as a graph Gaux = {Vaux, Eaux} and a set of probability distribu-
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tions AuxX and AuxY , one for each attribute of every node in Vaux and each
attribute of every edge in Eaux. These distributions represent the adversary’s
(imperfect) knowledge of the corresponding attribute value. For example, the
adversary may be 80% certain that an edge between two nodes is a “friend-
ship” and 20% that it is a mere “contact.” Since we treat edges themselves
as attributes, this also captures the attacker’s uncertain knowledge about the
existence of individual edges. This model works well in practice, although
it does not capture some types of auxiliary information, such as “node v1 is
connected to either node v2, or node v3.”
For an attribute X of a node v (respectively, attribute Y of an edge
e), we represent by Aux[X, v] (resp., Aux[Y, e]) the attacker’s prior probability
distribution (i.e., distribution given by his auxiliary information) of the at-
tribute’s value. The set AuxX (resp., AuxY ) can be thought of as a union of
Aux[X, v] (resp., Aux[Y, e]) over all attributes and nodes (resp., edges).
Aggregate auxiliary information is used in the the “propagation” stage
of our de-anonymization algorithm (Section 7.5).
Individual auxiliary information (information about seeds). We also
assume that the attacker possesses detailed information about a very small2
number of members of the target network S. We assume that the attacker
can determine if these members are also present in his auxiliary network Saux
(e.g., by matching usernames and other contextual information). The privacy
question is whether this information about a handful of members of S can
be used, in combination with Saux, to learn sensitive information about other
members of S.
2Negligible relative to the size of S. For example, in our experiments, we find that
between 30 and 150 seeds are sufficient for networks with 105 to 106 members.
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It is not difficult to collect such data about a small number of nodes. If
the attacker is already a user of S, he knows all details about his own node and
its neighbors [151, 234]. Some networks permit manual access to profiles even if
large-scale crawling is restricted (e.g., Facebook allows viewing of information
about “friends” of any member by default.) Some users may make their details
public even in networks that keep them private by default. The attacker
may even pay a handful of users for information about themselves and their
friends [160], or learn it from compromised computers or stolen mobile phones.
For example, the stored log of phone calls provides auxiliary information for
de-anonymizing the phone-call graph. With an active attack (e.g., [23]), the
attacker may create fake nodes and edges in S with features that will be easy to
recognize in the anonymized version of S, such as a clique or an almost-clique.
Since large-scale active attacks are unlikely to be feasible (see Section 7.3.2), we
restrict their role to collecting individual auxiliary information as a precursor
to the main, passive attack.
Individual auxiliary information is used in the the “seed identification”
stage of our de-anonymization algorithm (Section 7.5).
7.4.5 Breaching privacy
The fact that we are dealing with non-relational data makes it difficult to come
up with a comprehensive definition of privacy in social networks. In general,
one would like to say that properties of individual nodes should be privacy-
sensitive and thus difficult to learn from the sanitized network, while aggregate
properties should be learnable. But what counts as a ”property of an individual
node?” A natural candidate is any property about a k-neighborhood for some
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small k (for instance, a property that a user has 3 different paths of length
2 to a known Al-Qaeda operative). Unfortunately, there does not seem to be
an elegant way of choosing k because social-network graphs have a very small
diameter due to the “six degrees of separation” phenomenon [248].
A related approach is differential privacy [81], which in the social-
network context would require that the graph look roughly the same if any
single node is removed. It is not obvious how to define node removal, and
far from clear how to achieve differential privacy on graph-structured data,
because aggregate properties of a graph can change substantially with the
removal of a single node.
Even when the privacy policy is defined as a simple labeling of at-
tributes (as we do below), the policy can be global or granular. With a global
policy, the same privacy label applies to a given attribute in every node (e.g.,
email addresses are either public for all members, or private for all members).
Similarly, the edges in the network are either all public, or all private. With
granular policies, the privacy setting can be different for each edge and each
attribute of each node.
A global policy is sufficient most of the time. In most contexts, the
network operator promises users that none of their data will be released in a
personally identifiable way, implying a privacy policy where all edges and all
attributes are private. In other contexts, some attributes might be intuitively
understood to be public (e.g., node degree) and others private.
Many online social-network services such as Facebook allow users to
configure their individual privacy policy with a high level of granularity. This
might become a common practice in the future, but so far it appears that the
vast majority of users do not change their default settings [123, 153]. There is
161
also some ambiguity in modeling user preferences as formal privacy policies:
for instance, an edge may be considered public by one endpoint and private
by the other.
To keep the model simple and tractable, we do not use richer formalisms
which may be suitable for some situations. For example, a multi-graph is a
better model for social networks representing phone calls between individuals.
We ignore the complex structure of node and edge attributes that may be
relevant to privacy, such as “X knows Y through Z.” We only use “public”
and “private” as privacy labels, even though some networks allow more levels
such as “viewable by friends,” or even friends of friends.
The notion of what should be considered private varies from network to
network and even from individual to individual within the network. To keep
our model independent of the semantics of a particular network, we treat the
privacy policy as a syntactic, exogenous labeling that specifies for every node
attribute, edge, and edge attribute whether it should be public or private.
Formally, it is a function PP : X ∪ Y × E → {pub, priv}.
We take an “operational” approach by focusing solely on node re-
identification. First, it is unclear how to give a meaningful definition of
social-network privacy that does not make some assumptions about the at-
tacker’s strategy and yet yields meaningful results on real-world data. Second,
all currently known privacy-breaching and privacy-protection algorithms fo-
cus on node re-identification. Even edge inference, in order to be considered
a meaningful privacy breach, must include learning some identifying informa-
tion about the endpoints and thus implies node re-identification. Third, while
anonymity is by no means sufficient for privacy3, it is clearly necessary. A
3For example, suppose that the attacker can map a node in Vaux to a small set of nodes
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re-identification algorithm that breaks anonymity is thus guaranteed to vio-
late any reasonable definition of privacy, as long as there are any sensitive
attributes at all attached to the nodes, since the algorithm re-labels the sen-
sitive attributes with identifying information.
We define ground truth to be a mapping µG between the nodes Vaux
of the attacker’s auxiliary network and the nodes Vsan of the target network.
Intuitively, a pair of nodes are mapped to each other if they belong to the
same “entity” (see Section 7.4.2). If µG(v) takes the special value ⊥, then
there is no mapping for node v (e.g., if v was not released as part of Vsan).
Further, µG need not map every node in Vsan. This is important because the
overlap between Vsan and Vaux may be relatively small. We do assume that
the mapping is 1-1, i.e., an entity has at most one node in each network, as
discussed in Section 7.4.2.
Node re-identification or re-labeling refers to finding a mapping µ be-
tween a node in Vaux and a node in Vsan. Intuitively, Gaux is a labeled graph
and Gsan is unlabeled. Node re-identification succeeds on a node vaux ∈ Vaux if
µ(v) = µG(v), and fails otherwise. The latter includes the case that µ(v) =⊥
, µG(v) 6=⊥ and vice versa. Informally, re-identification is recognizing correctly
that a given node in the anonymized network belongs to the same entity as a
node in the attacker’s auxiliary network.
Definition 8 (Re-identification algorithm) A node re-identification algo-
rithm takes as input Ssan and Saux and produces a probabilistic mapping µ˜ : Vsan×
(Vaux ∪ {⊥}) → [0, 1], where µ˜(vaux, vsan) is the probability that vaux maps to
in Vsan which all have the same value for some sensitive attribute. Anonymity is preserved
(he does not know which of the nodes corresponds to the target node), yet he still learns
the value of his target’s sensitive attribute.
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vsan.
We give such an algorithm in Section 7.5. Observe that the algorithm
outputs, for each node in Vaux, a set of candidate nodes in Vsan and a probability
distribution over those nodes reflecting the attacker’s imperfect knowledge of
the re-identification mapping.
We now define the class of adversaries who attempt to breach privacy via
re-identification. After constructing the mapping, the adversary updates his
knowledge of the attributes of Saux using the attribute values in Ssan. Specifi-
cally, he can use the probability distribution over the candidate nodes to derive
a distribution over the attribute values associated with these nodes. His suc-
cess is measured by the precision of his posterior knowledge of the attributes.
Definition 9 (Mapping adversary) A mapping adversary corresponding to
a probabilistic mapping µ˜ outputs a probability distribution calculated as fol-
lows:
Adv[X, vaux, x] =
∑
v∈Vsan,X[v]=x µ(vaux, v)∑
v∈Vsan,X[v]6=⊥ µ(vaux, v)
Adv[Y, uaux, vaux, y] =P
u,v∈Vsan,Y [u,v]=y µ˜(uaux,u)µ˜(vaux,v)P
u,v∈Vsan,Y [u,v] 6=⊥ µ˜(uaux,u)µ˜(vaux,v)
Because the auxiliary graph need not be a subgraph of the target graph,
the mapping may not be complete, and the mapping adversary’s posterior
knowledge Adv of an attribute value is only defined for nodes vaux that have
actually been mapped to nodes in the target graph, at least one of which has
a non-null value for this attribute. Formally, Adv is defined if there is a non-
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zero number of nodes v ∈ Vsan such that µ˜(vaux, v) > 0 and X[v] 6=⊥. Edge
attributes are treated similarly.
The probability of a given node having a particular attribute value can
be computed in other ways, e.g., by looking only at the most likely mapping.
This does not make a significant difference in practice.
We say that privacy of vsan is compromised if, for some attribute X
which takes value x in Ssan and is designated as “private” by the privacy policy,
the adversary’s belief that X[vaux] = x increases by more than δ, which is a
pre-specified privacy parameter. For simplicity, we assume that the privacy
policy PP is global, i.e., the attribute is either public, or private for all nodes
(respectively, edges).
Definition 10 (Privacy breach) For nodes uaux, vaux ∈ Vaux, let µG(uaux) =
usan and µG(vaux) = vsan. We say that the privacy of vsan is breached w.r.t.
adversary Adv and privacy parameter δ if
(a) for some attribute X such that PP[X] = priv, Adv[X, vaux, x]−Aux[X, vaux, x] >
δ where x = X[vaux], or
(b) for some attribute Y such that PP[Y ] = priv, Adv[Y, uaux, vaux, y] − Aux[Y,
uaux, vaux, y] > δ where y = Y [uaux, vaux].
Definition 10 should be viewed as a meta-definition or a template, and
must be carefully adapted to each instance of the re-identification attack and
each concrete attribute. This involves subjective judgment. For example, did
a privacy breach occur if the the attacker’s confidence increased for some at-
tributes and decreased for others? Learning common-sense knowledge from
the sanitized network (for example, that all nodes have fewer than 1000 neigh-
bors) does not intuitively constitute a privacy breach, even though it satisfies
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Definition 10 for the “node degree” attribute. Such common-sense knowledge
must be included in the attacker’s Aux. Then learning it from the sanitized
graph does not constitute a privacy breach.
7.4.6 Measuring success of an attack
While it is tempting to quantify de-anonymization of social networks in terms
of the fraction of nodes affected, this results in a fairly meaningless metric.
Consider the following thought experiment. Given a network G = (V,E),
imagine the network G′ consisting of G augmented with |V | singleton nodes.
Re-identification fails on the singletons because there is no edge information
associated with them, and, therefore, the na¨ıve metric returns half the value
on G′ as it does on G. Intuitively, however, the presence of singletons should
not affect the performance of any de-anonymization algorithm.
This is not merely hypothetical. In many online networks, the ma-
jority of nodes show little or no observable activity after account creation.
Restricting one’s attention to the giant connected component does not solve
the problem, either, because extraneous nodes with degree 1 instead of 0 would
have essentially the same (false) impact on na¨ıvely measured performance.
Instead, we assign a weight to each affected node in proportion to its
importance in the network. Importance is a subjective notion, but can be
approximated by node centrality, which is a well-studied concept in sociology
that only recently came to the attention of computer scientists [135, 68, 175,
15, 152].
There are three groups of centrality measures: local, eigenvalue-based
and distance-based. Local methods such as degree centrality consider only
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the neighbors of the node. Eigenvalue methods also consider the centrality
of each neighbor, resulting in a convergent recursive computation. Distance-
based measures consider path lengths from a node to different points in the
network. A well-known eigenvalue-based measure was proposed by Bonacich
in [37], while [128] presents a textbook treatment of centrality.
We find that the decision to use a centrality measure at all, as opposed
to a na¨ıve metric such as the raw fraction of nodes de-anonymized, is much
more important than the actual choice of the measure. We therefore use the
simplest possible measure, degree centrality, where each node is weighted in
proportion to its degree. In a directed graph, we use the sum of in-degree and
out-degree.
There is an additional methodological issue. For a mapped pair of
nodes, should we use the centrality score from the target graph or the auxiliary
graph? It is helpful to go back to the pathological example that we used to
demonstrate the inadequacy of fraction-based metrics. If either of the nodes in
the mapped pair is a singleton, then the de-anonymization algorithm clearly
has no hope of finding that pair. Therefore, we compute the centrality in both
graphs and take the minimum of the two. We believe that this formulation
captures most closely the spirit of the main question we are answering in this
work: “what proportion of entities that are active in a social network and for
which non-trivial auxiliary information is available can be re-identified?”
Given a probabilistic mapping µ˜, we say that a (concrete) mapping is
sampled from µ˜ if for each u, µ(u) is sampled according to µ˜(u, .).
Definition 11 (Success of de-anonymization) Let Vmapped = {v ∈ Vaux :
µG(v) 6=⊥}. The success rate of a de-anonymization algorithm outputting a
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probabilistic mapping µ˜, w.r.t. a centrality measure ν, is the probability that µ
sampled from µ˜ maps a node v to µG(v) if v is selected according to ν:∑
v∈Vmapped P[µ(v) = µG(v)]ν(v)∑
v∈Vmapped ν(v)
The error rate is the probability that µ maps a node v to any node other
than µG(v): ∑
v∈Vmapped P[µ(v) 6=⊥ ∧µ(v) 6= µG(v)]ν(v)∑
v∈Vmapped ν(v)
The probability is taken over the inherent randomness of the de-anonymization
algorithm as well as the sampling of µ from µ˜. Note that the error rate includes
the possibility that µG(v) =⊥ and µ(v) 6=⊥.
The above measure only gives a lower bound on privacy breach be-
cause privacy can be violated without complete de-anonymization. Therefore,
if the goal is to protect privacy, it is not enough to show that this measure
is low. It is also necessary to show that Definition 10 is not satisfied. Ob-
serve, for example, that simply creating k copies of the graph technically pre-
vents de-anonymization and even satisfies na¨ıve syntactic definitions such as
k-anonymity, while completely violating any reasonable definition of privacy.
In the other direction, however, breaking Definition 11 for a large frac-
tion of nodes—as our algorithm of Section 7.5 does—is sufficient to break
privacy via Definition 10, as long some trivial conditions are met: at least one
private attribute is released as part of Xsan, and the adversary possesses little
or no auxiliary information about this attribute.
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7.5 De-anonymization
Our re-identification algorithm runs in two stages. First, the attacker identifies
a small number of “seed” nodes which are present both in the anonymous
target graph and the attacker’s auxiliary graph, and maps them to each other.
The main, propagation stage is a self-reinforcing process in which the seed
mapping is extended to new nodes using only the topology of the network,
and the new mapping is fed back to the algorithm. The eventual result is a
large mapping between subgraphs of the auxiliary and target networks which
re-identifies all mapped nodes in the latter.
7.5.1 Seed identification
While algorithms for seed identification are not our primary technical con-
tribution, they are a key step in enabling our overall algorithm to succeed.
Here we describe one possible seed identification algorithm. The attacks in
[23] can also be considered seed identification algorithms. We briefly discuss
alternatives at the end of Section 7.6.1.
We assume that the attacker’s individual auxiliary information (see Sec-
tion 7.4.4) consists of a clique of k nodes which are present both in the auxiliary
and the target graphs. It is sufficient to know the degree of each of these nodes
and the number of common neighbors for each pair of nodes.
The seed-finding algorithm takes as inputs (1) the target graph, (2) k
seed nodes in the auxiliary graph, (3) k node-degree values, (4)
(
k
2
)
pairs of
common-neighbor counts, and (5) error parameter . The algorithm searches
the target graph for a unique k-clique with matching (within a factor of 1± )
node degrees and common-neighbor counts. If found, the algorithm maps
169
the nodes in the clique to the corresponding nodes in the auxiliary graph;
otherwise, failure is reported.
While this brute-force search is exponential in k, in practice this turns
out not to be a problem. First, if the degree is bounded by d, then the
complexity is O(ndk−1). Second, the running time is heavily input-dependent,
and the inputs with high running time turn out to produce a large number of
matches. Terminating the algorithm as soon as more than one match is found
greatly decreases the running time.
7.5.2 Propagation
The propagation algorithm takes as input two graphs G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 =
(V2, E2) and a partial “seed” mapping µS between the two. It outputs a
mapping µ. One may consider probabilistic mappings, but we found it simpler
to focus on deterministic 1-1 mappings µ : V1 → V2.
Intuitively, the algorithm finds new mappings using the topological
structure of the network and the feedback from previously constructed map-
pings. It is robust to mild modifications of the topology such as those in-
troduced by sanitization. At each iteration, the algorithm starts with the
accumulated list of mapped pairs between V1 and V2. It picks an arbitrary un-
mapped node u in V1 and computes a score for each unmapped node v in V2,
equal to the number of neighbors of u that have been mapped to neighbors of
v. If the strength of the match (see below) is above a threshold, the mapping
between u and v is added to the list, and the next iteration starts. There are
a few additional details and heuristics that we describe below.
Eccentricity. Eccentricity is a heuristic defined in [194] in the context
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of de-anonymizing databases. It measures how much an item in a setX “stands
out” from the rest, and is defined as
max(X)−max2(X)
σ(X)
where max and max2 denote the highest and second highest values, respectively,
and σ denotes the standard deviation.
Our algorithm measures the eccentricity of the set of mapping scores
(between a single node in v1 and each unmapped node in v2) and rejects the
match if the eccentricity score is below a threshold.
Edge directionality. Recall that we are dealing with directed graphs.
To compute the mapping score between a pair of nodes u and v, the algorithm
computes two scores–the first based only on the incoming edges of u and v, and
the second based only on the outgoing edges. These scores are then summed.
Node degrees. The mapping scores as described above are biased in
favor of nodes with high degrees. To compensate for this bias, the score of
each node is divided by the square root of its degree. The resemblance to
cosine similarity4 is not superficial: the rationale is the same.
Revisiting nodes. At the early stages of the algorithm, there are
few mappings to work with, and therefore the algorithm makes more errors.
As the algorithm progresses, the number of mapped nodes increases and the
error rate goes down. Thus the need to revisit already mapped nodes: the
mapping computed when revisiting a node may be different because of the
new mappings that have become available.
4The cosine similarity measure between two sets X and Y is defined when neither is
empty: cos(X,Y ) = |X∩Y |√|X||Y | .
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Reverse match. The algorithm is completely agnostic about the se-
mantics of the two graphs. It does not matter whether G1 is the target graph
and G2 is the auxiliary graph, or vice versa. Each time a node u maps to v,
the mapping scores are computed with the input graphs switched. If v gets
mapped back to u, the mapping is retained; otherwise, it is rejected.
The following pseudocode describes the algorithm in detail. theta is a
parameter that controls the tradeoff between the yield and the accuracy.
function propagationStep(lgraph, rgraph, mapping)
for lnode in lgraph.nodes:
scores[lnode] = matchScores(lgraph, rgraph, mapping, lnode)
if eccentricity(scores[lnode]) < theta: continue
rnode = (pick node from rgraph.nodes where
scores[lnode][node] = max(scores[lnode]))
scores[rnode] = matchScores(rgraph, lgraph, invert(mapping), rnode)
if eccentricity(scores[rnode]) < theta: continue
reverse_match = (pick node from lgraph.nodes where
scores[rnode][node] = max(scores[rnode]))
if reverse_match != lnode:
continue
mapping[lnode] = rnode
function matchScores(lgraph, rgraph, mapping, lnode)
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initialize scores = [0 for rnode in rgraph.nodes]
for (lnbr, lnode) in lgraph.edges:
if lnbr not in mapping: continue
rnbr = mapping[lnbr]
for (rnbr, rnode) in rgraph.edges:
if rnode in mapping.image: continue
scores[rnode] += 1 / rnode.in_degree ^ 0.5
for (lnode, lnbr) in lgraph.edges:
if lnbr not in mapping: continue
rnbr = mapping[lnbr]
for (rnode, rnbr) in rgraph.edges:
if rnode in mapping.image: continue
scores[rnode] += 1 / rnode.out_degree ^ 0.5
return scores
function eccentricity(items)
return (max(items) - max2(items)) / std_dev(items)
until convergence do:
propagationStep(lgraph, rgraph, seed_mapping)
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Complexity. Ignoring revisiting nodes and reverse matches, the complexity
of the algorithm is O(|E1|d2), where d2 is a bound on the degree of the nodes
in V2. To see this, let µpart be the partial mapping computed at any stage
of the algorithm. For each u ∈ V1 and each v adjacent to u such that v ∈
domain(µpart), the algorithm examines each of the neighbors of µpart(v), giving
an upper bound of |E1|d2.
Assuming that a node is revisited only if the number of already-mapped
neighbors of the node has increased by at least 1, we get a bound ofO(|E1|d1d2),
where d1 is a bound on the degree of the nodes in V1. Finally, taking reverse
mappings into account, we get O((|E1|+ |E2|)d1d2).
7.6 Experiments
We used data from three large online social networks in our experiments. The
first graph is the “follow” relationships on the Twitter microblogging service,
which we crawled in late 2007. The second graph is the “contact” relationships
on Flickr, a photo-sharing service, which we crawled in late 2007/early 2008.
Both services have APIs that expose a mandatory username field, and optional
fields name and location. The latter is represented as free-form text. The final
graph is the “friend” relationships on the LiveJournal blogging service; we
obtained it from the authors of [184].
Typically, a network crawl can only recover the giant connected compo-
nent. Both Twitter and Flickr allow to query only forward links. Therefore,
we can expect to recover the strongly-connected component (SCC) fully and
the weakly connected component (WCC) incompletely.
We crawled the entire SCC of Twitter, subject to the caveat that the
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Table 7.1: Graphs used
Network Nodes Edges Av. Deg
Twitter 224K 8.5M 37.7
Flickr 3.3M 53M 32.2
LiveJournal 5.3M 77M 29.3
Twitter API for discovering relationships is indirect; in particular, we cannot
discover users whose activity on the website is “protected,” i.e., viewable by
friends only. Interestingly, the size of the Twitter user population, at least
as reflected in the connected component of regular users, turned out to be
much smaller than was being reported in the media at the time of our crawl.
It is also worth noting that since then Twitter has introduced crippling rate
limitations on its API, which make a large-scale crawl infeasible.
We could not crawl the entire SCC of the Flickr graph due to its size.
We crawled it in a priority-queue fashion, giving the highest priority to the
nodes with the highest number of incoming edges from the already crawled
nodes. Comparing our numbers with [184], we conclude that we have, in fact,
recovered most of the SCC.
Finally, the authors of [184], who kindly provided with us with the
LiveJournal data, report that their crawl covers the vast majority of the users
in LiveJournal’s WCC.
The parameters of the three graphs are summarized in Table 7.1. In
computing the average degree, the degree of a node is counted as the sum of
its in- and out-degrees.
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7.6.1 Seed identification
To demonstrate feasibility of seed identification, we ran the algorithm of Sec-
tion 7.5.1 with the LiveJournal graph as its target. Recall from Section 7.4.4
that the auxiliary information needed to create seed mappings comes from
the users of the target network. Therefore, we can evaluate feasibility of seed
identification simply by measuring how much auxiliary information is needed
to identify a unique node in the target graph. We emphasize that our main
de-anonymization algorithm needs only a handful of such nodes.
For simplicity, we assume that the attacker only has access to the undi-
rected graph, where an edge is included only if it is symmetrical in the original
graph. This underestimates the re-identification rate, because the attacker
would have more information if directionality of edges were considered.
We synthetically generate auxiliary information for seed identification
starting from randomly sampled cliques. To sample a clique of size k, we
start from a random node and, at every stage, randomly pick a node which is
adjacent to all the nodes picked so far. If there is no such node, we start over.
This method does not sample uniformly from all the cliques in the
graph; the distribution of selected nodes is much more equitable. If we sample
a k-clique uniformly, it is susceptible to anomalies in the graph that make
the result meaningless. If the graph has a large clique, or even a large dense
subgraph, then almost every k-clique sampled will belong to this large clique
or subgraph.
Given a clique (specifically, a 4-clique), we assume that the attacker
knows the degrees of these 4 nodes as well as the number of common neighbors
of each of the 6 pairs. The auxiliary information may be imprecise, and the
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Figure 7.1: Seed identification
search algorithm treats a 4-clique in the target graph as a match as long as
each degree and common-neighbor count matches within a factor of 1 ± ,
where  is the error parameter (intuitively, the higher the error, the noisier
the auxiliary information and the lower the re-identification rate). Figure 7.1
shows how re-identification rate decreases with noise. Recall that we allow
at most one match, and so the attacker never makes an error as long as his
assumptions about the imprecision of his auxiliary information are correct.
This experiment establishes that seed identification is feasible in prac-
tice. If anything, it underestimates how easy this is to do in the real world,
where the attacker can use auxiliary information other than degrees and common-
neighbor counts. Searching based on the structure of the target users’ graph
neighborhoods allows re-identification with just two or even a single node,
although this is algorithmically complex.
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7.6.2 Propagation
Robustness against perturbation and seed selection
The most remarkable feature of our propagation algorithm is that it achieves
“viral,” self-reinforcing, large-scale re-identification regardless of the number of
seeds, as long as the latter is above a (low) threshold. To study this behavior,
we carried out an experiments on pairs of subgraphs, over 100,000 nodes each,
of a real-world social network. In each experiment, one of the subgraphs
was used as the auxiliary information, the other as the target. The graphs
were artificially perturbed by adding different levels of noise to achieve various
degrees of edge overlap.
Perturbation strategy. Given a real network graph G = (V,E), our
goal is to sample subsets V1, V2 of V such that V1 and V2 have an overlap
of αV . Overlap is measured in terms of the Jaccard Coefficient, which is
defined for two sets X and Y if one of them is non-empty: JC(X, Y ) = |X∩Y ||X∪Y | .
Thus, if each of two sets shares half its members with the other, the overlap
is 1
3
. We simply partition V randomly into three subsets VA, VB, VC of size
1−αV
2
|V |, αV |V |, 1−αV2 |V |, respectively, and set V1 = VA∪VB and V2 = VB∪VC .
We use one subgraph as the auxiliary information and the other as
the anonymous target graph. As mentioned in Section 7.2, we believe that
introducing noise via edge deletions and additions is the only realistic method
of perturbing the edges. Our goal is to simulate the effect of perturbation on
the target graph as follows (Procedure A):
• Derive E ′ from E by adding edges.
• Derive E ′′ from E ′ by randomly deleting edges.
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• Project E and E ′′ on V1 and V2, respectively, to obtain E1 and E2.
The best way to add edges is to use link prediction, which will result in
plausible fake edges. Instead of choosing a specific link prediction algorithm,
we perform the following (Procedure B):
• Make two copies of E and independently delete edges at random from
each copy.
• Project the copies on V1 and V2, respectively, to get E1 and E2.
It should be clear that Procedure B produces more plausible edges than
even the best concrete link prediction algorithm. If the link prediction algo-
rithm is perfect, i.e., if the edge additions accomplish the reverse of random
edge deletion, then the two procedures are more or less equivalent (E ′ in Proce-
dure A corresponds to E in Procedure B; E and E ′′ in Procedure A correspond
to the two perturbed copies in Procedure B). If the link prediction is not per-
fect, then Procedure B is better in the sense that it leads to more realistic
noise, and thus makes the task of our de-anonymization algorithm harder.
This leaves the question of what fraction β of edges to remove to get
an edge overlap of αE. The fraction of common edges is (1 − β)2, while the
fraction of edges left in at least one of the copies is 1−β2, giving (1−β)2
1−β2 = αE,
which yields β = 1−αE
1+αE
as the only valid solution. Note that the edge overlap
is calculated for the subgraphs formed by the overlapping nodes. The overlap
between E1 and E2 is much lower.
Results. We investigated the impact that the number of seeds has on
the ability of the propagation algorithm to achieve large-scale re-identification,
and also its robustness to perturbation.
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Figure 7.2 shows that the selection of seeds determines whether propa-
gation step dies out or not (cf. phase transition [257]), but whenever large-scale
propagation has been achieved, the re-identification rate stays remarkably con-
stant. We find that when the algorithm dies out, it re-identifies no more than
a few dozen nodes correctly.
Figure 7.2: The fraction of nodes re-identified depends sharply on the number
of seeds. Node overlap: 25%; Edge overlap: 50%
We performed a further experiment to study the phase transition better.
A run is classified as successful if it re-identifies at least 1,000 nodes. Figure
7.3 shows the resulting probabilities of large-scale propagation. The phase
transition is somewhat less sharp than might appear from Figure 7.2, although
the window is almost completely in the range [15,45].
It must be noted that the number of seeds required to trigger propaga-
tion depends heavily on the parameters of the graph and the algorithm used
for seed selection. We therefore caution against reading too much into the
numbers. What this experiment shows is that a phase transition does happen
and that it is strongly dependent on the number of seeds. Therefore, the ad-
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Figure 7.3: The phase transition in more detail. Node overlap: 25%; Edge
overlap: 50%
versary can collect seed mappings incrementally until he has enough mappings
to carry out large-scale re-identification.
Figure 7.4 shows that imprecision of the auxiliary information decreases
the percentage of nodes re-identified, but cannot prevent large-scale re-identification.
Mapping between two real-world social networks
As our main experiment, we ran our propagation algorithm with the graph
of Flickr as the auxiliary information and the anonymous graph of Twitter as
the target.
Ground truth. To verify our results, we had to determine the ground
truth, i.e., the true mapping between the two graphs. We produced ground-
truth mappings based on exact matches in either the username, or name field.
Once a match is found, we compute a score based on a variety of heuristics on
all three fields (username, name and location). If the score is too low, we reject
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Figure 7.4: Effect of noise. Node overlap: 25%; Number of seeds: 50
the match as spurious.
• For usernames, we use the length to measure the likelihood that a user-
name match is spurious. The rationale is that a username such as
“tamedfalcon213” is more likely to be identifying than “joe”.
• For names, we use the length of the names, as well as the frequency of
occurrence of the first and last names. Rarer names indicate a stronger
match.
• For locations, we use heuristics such as two-letter state abbreviations.
This resulted in around 27,000 mappings, which we will call µ(G). Since
these mappings were computed with a completely different information than
used by the de-anonymization algorithm, errors in the ground truth can only
degrade the reported performance of our de-anonymization algorithm. We
picked a random sample of the mappings and verified by human inspection
that the error rate is well under 5%.
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Of course, some of those who use both Flickr and Twitter may use
completely different usernames and names on the two services and are thus
not included in our ground-truth mappings. This has no effect on the reported
performance of our algorithm. When it does recognize two nodes as belonging
to the same user, it is rarely wrong, and, furthermore, it can successfully
re-identify thousands of users.
It is possible that our algorithm has a better performance on the nodes
where the ground truth is known than on other nodes. For example, users
who acquire distinctive usernames on both websites might be habitual early
adopters of web services. Thus, the numbers below must be interpreted with
caution.
Our seed mapping consisted of 150 pairs of nodes selected randomly
from µ(G), with the constraint that the degree of each mapped node in the
auxiliary graph is at least 80. More opportunistic seed selection can lower the
number of seeds required.
The accuracy of our algorithm on µ(G) (weighted by centrality—see
Section 7.4.6) is summarized below:
• 30.8% of the mappings were re-identified correctly, 12.1% were identified
incorrectly, and 57% were not identified.
• 41% of the incorrectly identified mappings (5% overall) were mapped to
nodes which are at a distance 1 from the true mapping. It appears likely
that human intelligence can be used to complete the de-anonymization
in many of these cases.
• 55% of the incorrectly identified mappings (6.7% overall) were mapped
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to nodes where the same geographic location was reported.5 Thus, even
when re-identification does not succeed, the algorithm can often identify
a node as belonging to a cluster of similar nodes, which might reveal
sensitive information (recall the discussion in Section 7.4.5).
• The above two categories overlap; of all the incorrect mappings, only 27%
(or 3.3% overall) fall into neither category and are completely erroneous.
7.7 Summary
The main lesson of this chapter is that anonymity is not sufficient for privacy
when dealing with social networks. We developed a generic re-identification
algorithm and showed that it can successfully de-anonymize several thousand
users in the anonymous graph of a popular microblogging service (Twitter),
using a completely different social network (Flickr) as the source of auxiliary
information.
Our experiments underestimate the extent of the privacy risks of anonymized
social networks. The overlap between Twitter and Flickr membership at the
time of our data collection was relatively small. Considering only the users
who supplied their names (about a third in either network), 24% of the names
associated with Twitter accounts occur in Flickr, while 5% of the names as-
sociated with Flickr accounts occur in Twitter. Since human names are not
unique, this overestimates the overlap in membership. By contrast, 64% of
Facebook users are also present on MySpace [208]. As social networks grow
5This was measured by sampling 200 of the erroneous mappings and using human anal-
ysis. We consider the geographical location to be the same if it is either the same non-U.S.
country, or the same U.S. state.
184
larger and include a greater fraction of the population along with their rela-
tionships, the overlap increases. Therefore, we expect that our algorithm can
achieve an even greater re-identification rate on larger networks.
We demonstrated feasibility of successful re-identification based solely
on the network topology and assuming that the target graph is completely
anonymized. In reality, anonymized graphs are usually released with at least
some attributes in their nodes and edges, making de-anonymization even eas-
ier. Furthermore, any of the thousands of third-party application developers
for popular online social networks, the dozens of advertising companies, gov-
ernments who have access to telephone call logs, and anyone who can compile
aggregated graphs of the form described in Section 7.2 have access to auxiliary
information which is much richer than what we used in our experiments. At
the same time, an ever growing number of third parties get access to sensi-
tive social-network data in anonymized form. These two trends appear to be
headed for a collision resulting in major privacy breaches, and any potential
solution would appear to necessitate a fundamental shift in business models
and practices and clearer privacy laws on the subject of Personally Identifiable
Information (see Section 7.3.4).
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Chapter 8
Privacy Risks of Collaborative
Filtering
8.1 Introduction
Recommender systems have become ubiquitous on major e-commerce sites.
When you buy products from Amazon, rent movies on Netflix, find friends
on Facebook, or perform myriad other tasks online, Web-based recommender
systems suggest options to you based on your choices and behavior. These
suggestions are often a product of patterns learned from past customers: for
example, the system may inform you that users who bought item X (as you
just did) often buy item Y .1 Your own purchases and/or ratings are used
to generate recommendations for other customers and to refine the system’s
model of your own behavior. Such recommender systems are particularly useful
1For clarity, we often use terminology appropriate for an online retailer, like “customers”
and “purchases,” throughout this chapter. Our analysis is equally applicable, however, to
other sites employing recommender systems.
186
for spotting both expected and unexpected trends quickly and automatically,
even given a massive quantity of real-time transaction data. This can benefit
both retailers and consumers. Section 8.2 describes recommender systems in
greater detail.
Our objective in this work is to investigate the privacy risk of recom-
mender systems, i.e., the risk that the output of the recommendation algorithm
may expose sensitive details of an individual user’s behavior without his or her
knowledge or consent.
At first glance, this risk does not appear significant. Datasets underly-
ing typical recommender systems on popular websites are large and elaborate,
involving tens of thousands to millions of users with dozens of actions each.
Without access to the dataset (which is usually not revealed to the customers
of the service), making inferences about transactions of specific users does not
appear feasible. Furthermore, in many cases the recommendations are only
indirectly related to the behavior of individual users. For example, recom-
mendations on Amazon.com and many other online retailers (Section 8.2.1)
are computed based on similarities between pairs of items rather than pairs of
users. While item similarity lists are shown to the customer, these merely re-
veal items whose purchases tend to be correlated, without linking these items
to specific users who purchased them.
Our first contribution is to develop a set of practical algorithms that
allow accurate inference of (partial) individual behavior from the aggregate
output of a typical recommender system. As a warm-up exercise, we present a
simple active attack, in which the attacker creates sybil users whose behavior
is similar to what the attacker knows about the target user’s behavior. The
attacker infers the target’s hidden actions using the recommendations made
187
by the system to these sybils.
Our main attack is purely passive. The attacker need not create fake
users, make any purchases or enter ratings into the system. He passively
watches the item similarity lists produced by the system, and uses the observed
changes in the items’ relative rank, along with his knowledge of some of the
target user’s purchases (acquired from public ratings, blog posts, and so on), to
infer other purchases made by this user. The items we purchase, news stories
we read, videos we watch, and other choices that we make reveal details about
who we are. These details may be as innocuous as our favorite sports teams
or as sensitive as health concerns. The fact that they can be unintentionally
revealed by a recommender system presents a significant risk to individual
privacy.
This attack demonstrates that recommender systems that update their
suggestions frequently can reveal user behavior at a fine level of granularity.
Our algorithms exploit the fact that online retailers tend to offer vast catalogs
of items, including a large number of less popular items that are purchased
relatively infrequently. A purchase of such an item is likely to result in observ-
able changes in the item similarity lists, allowing the attacker to make accurate
inferences. It is worth mentioning that the abundance of relatively unpopu-
lar items in online catalogs, sometimes referred to as the “Long Tail” phe-
nomenon [16], was previously exploited to de-anonymize movie-rating records
of the Netflix Prize dataset [194]. Our focus in this work is very different:
instead of de-anonymizing a dataset, we aim to infer its contents from the
output of a sophisticated recommender system.
Our second contribution is to evaluate our techniques on a large, real-
world recommender system used by Amazon. With the same access to the
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Amazon website as available to any customer, an attacker can use our method
to make predictions about purchases of individual customers. In Section 8.5,
we perform a limited analysis of Amazon’s recommendations and consider sev-
eral Amazon customers that appear to purchase products from Amazon with
some regularity, as reflected by their public reviews on the Amazon website.
When our algorithm observed that another item entered or climbed in the list
of top 10 most similar items for several products already purchased by the
customer, it inferred that the customer likely purchased the item. For the
customers discussed, freely available sales rank data helped strengthen our
belief that the predicted purchases occurred. Our predictions were validated
when the customers posted public reviews of the predicted items at a later
date. Based on simulating our technique on the Netflix Prize dataset (see be-
low), we expect that our predictions have a fairly high accuracy: for example,
predictions supported by 9 related items are expected to have 50% accuracy.
Below, we explain how this accuracy was estimated; short of cooperating with
Amazon, however, there is no general method for verifying our predictions of
Amazon purchases which have not been voluntarily revealed by the user. This
presents an interesting methodological challenge.
Our third contribution is to develop a method for measuring the accu-
racy of recommendation-based inferences. We re-implemented an Amazon-like
recommender system from the publicly available details. Instead of applying
it to the actual Amazon transactions (to which we do not have access), we ap-
plied it to the publicly available Netflix Prize dataset; the differences between
the datasets are discussed in Section 8.4. The Netflix dataset contains dated
movie ratings of 500,000 subscribers of the Netflix DVD rental service [196].
It serves as the “ground-truth oracle” for verifying predictions made by our
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algorithm. Whenever it infers, given the output of a recommender system (but
not the dataset itself!), that customer X must have rated movie Y on date D,
we can verify the inference by consulting the customer’s actual transactions
in the dataset. It also allows us to evaluate the tradeoff between the num-
ber of predictions and their accuracy. For example, with 10,000 customers,
each of whom has publicly rated 100 items, the algorithm makes around 500
predictions per month, of which 200 are correct.
We believe this work is the first to develop a generic passive method for
inferring individual customer information from the output of a recommender
system, and to empirically analyze and quantify privacy risks of real-world,
deployed systems.
8.2 Recommender systems
Recommender systems have become a vital business tool in attracting and
keeping users on e-commerce websites. The business case for recommender
systems is presented in [107]. Virtually every major Web destination where
users purchase, rent, or view items out of a catalog has a feature to recommend
new items to returning users based on their past behavior. This includes the
market leaders in books (Amazon), music (pandora, last.fm), movies (Net-
flix), videos (YouTube), news aggregation (Google News) and blogs (Google
Reader).
A technical survey of the literature can be found in Adomavicius and
Tuzhilin [9]. The task of a recommender system can be abstractly described as
follows. There is a matrix whose rows are users and whose columns are items;
this matrix represents transactions: purchases, ratings, etc., depending on the
190
application. Furthermore, there is some “profile” information associated with
each user (such as demographics) and “metadata” associated with each item
(such as price and category). The matrix is incomplete, and in fact “sparse:”
only a small fraction of entries are filled in. The goal of a recommender system
is to extrapolate the unknown entries of the matrix in a way that most closely
matches their “true” values.
Recommender systems can be classified as content-based, collaborative,
and hybrid. Content-based systems work by identifying relationships between
items based on metadata and recommending items that are similar to the user’s
past transactions. Collaborative recommendation is much more robust and
domain-agnostic, and hence very popular; it works by identifying relationships
between items based on the ratings of other users, ignoring metadata. Hybrid
systems use a mix of the two techniques.
Content-based recommender systems have no privacy drawbacks, since
the system does not consider any other user’s transactions in making recom-
mendations for a given user. Collaborative systems, however, are by far the
most popular variety and will be our focus of the rest of this chapter.
Traditionally, collaborative filtering methods were user-based. For a
given user, the system finds other users who have a similar transaction history
and recommends new items based on the past transactions of these users. The
alternative is item-based collaborative filtering, which we now discuss.
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8.2.1 Item-to-item recommendations and a broader def-
inition
Item-based collaborative filtering was first described in a paper by Sarwar et
al [224]. Linden et al. pioneered the use of item-based recommendations at
Amazon.com. Their work is described in a U.S. patent [166] and a technical
paper [165]. The key idea is to compute similarity scores for each pair of items
based on the likelihood of the items being purchased by the same customer.
There are two uses for these scores:
• To compute item similarity lists which are used to suggest other items
related to a given item;
• To make recommendations to users by selecting items that are similar
to the user’s previously purchased items.
Item-based collaborative filtering has since become popular [30]. In ad-
dition, it has become the standard practice for Web destinations to provide
users with item similarity lists.2 On Amazon.com, this is seen as the “cus-
tomers who bought this item also bought . . . ” feature. Similar features are
found on most e-commerce websites, including all listed above. Item sim-
ilarity lists appear on many sites that do not have traditional user-to-item
recommendations, such as IMDb and news sites such as CNN and the New
York Times. Even on sites that have both, such as YouTube, the item-to-item
recommendation feature is much more prominent.3
2A survey of algorithms can be found in [75].
3Our use of the term item-to-item recommendation is slightly different from Linden et
al. [165]. We summarize our terminology in Appendix E.
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The reason for this phenomenon is that item-to-item recommendations
serve a dual purpose: not only do they drive sales or rentals, they are also a
navigational aid that increases user retention on the site. Of course, where the
revenue model is based on monetizing user attention through advertisements,
these two incentives converge.
In the offline world, such as supermarkets, item-item similarity analysis
is frequently deployed in order to optimize the store layout [42]. The point-of-
sale system records customer purchases, and items that are purchased together
are considered similar. This is used to optimize the physical layout of the
inventory by placing similar items adjacent to each other.
Finally, user-to-user recommendations can be seen on last.fm and li-
brarything.com, where they are based on similarities in tastes and transac-
tions, on various dating websites such as eharmony.com, where they are based
on explicitly specified user preferences and match constraints, and on social
networking sites such as Facebook (“people you might know”) where they are
based on the structure of the network itself, i.e., existing user-user links.
In recognition of this business reality, we propose that recommender
systems be redefined to include all three categories of recommendations: the
traditional notion of user-to-item recommendations, as well as item-to-item
and user-to-user recommendations. Item-to-item recommendations, in partic-
ular, are very relevant to our privacy analysis, as will become clear in the next
section.
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8.3 Privacy Risks in Recommender Systems
By design, recommender systems are intended to provide advice to users based
on the information about other users’ behavior, i.e., their transactions, ex-
pressed preferences, etc. Therefore, in a very abstract sense, the risk of dis-
closing information about individuals is an inherent feature of recommender
systems. This abstract risk, however, does not directly imply that the out-
put of a recommender system may violate the privacy of a specific user. In
particular, it is not clear a priori whether it is possible to draw meaningful
conclusions about any given user whose data were used, among those from
thousands of other users, to create public recommendations. Understanding
and quantifying the potential for privacy breaches caused by recommender
systems is the primary contribution of this work.
Previous work on privacy risks of recommender systems focused on
straddlers [216], whose tastes span unrelated genres. Crucially, this work as-
sumed a very strong attack model, in which the attacker is given the entire
database of individual transaction histories (i.e., the user-item transaction ma-
trix), with all entries anonymized. This model is applicable in scenarios where
the attacker has access to the raw inputs of the recommendation algorithm,
e.g., when the collaborative filtering functionality is outsourced, but is clearly
beyond the resources of a casual attacker.
By contrast, we focus on a much more realistic setting whether the at-
tacker has only a “black-box” view of the recommender system. In particular,
he does not have privileged access to the raw inputs. Just like any other user,
the attacker observes only the outputs, i.e., public recommendations provided
by the system (below, we describe several forms these recommendations may
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take). Therefore, our attacks can be effectively carried out by any user of the
system.
In the rest of this chapter, we demonstrate that, in combination with
a small amount of auxiliary information, the output of common recommender
systems can be used to accurately infer sensitive information about the actions
of users that have been used as inputs into the system, but are not directly
observable by the attacker.
Attack model and attacker’s auxiliary information. Depending on the
design of the recommender system and the interface it provides to the users,
the following pieces of information may be public and thus available to the
attacker: (1) the item similarity list, (2) the sales rank of each item, (3) for
some users, a subset of the items they purchased or rated, (4) the user-item
similarity score, i.e., the actual recommendation made by the system when
it suggests a particular item to a specific user (this is essential for active
attacks, where the attacker directly controls some of the users), and (5) the
user similarity list. We now survey these in more detail and explain how they
can be used for attacks of different types.
The item similarity list usually takes the form of “users who bought this
item also bought those items,” or “users who liked this movie also enjoyed those
movies.” For example, item similarity lists are among the primary outputs of
the Amazon recommendation algorithm. The items on a given list have varying
similarity scores, which are almost never publicly available. The size of the
similarity list depends on the system or even on the access mode: for instance,
the Amazon API [22] only provides 10 similar items, while manual access to
the Amazon website provides up to 100 (and perhaps more).
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Sales rank of each item is often available. In the crudest form, it simply
identifies the bestsellers, but in the case of Amazon, the precise sales rank of
each item is available through the API.
We assume that for some users, a subset of their transaction history is
available. This is a realistic assumption because many users disclose some of
their transactions voluntarily, through the service itself. On Amazon, many
users publicly rate some of the items they purchased. This auxiliary informa-
tion about specific users can also be collected from blog posts, conversations
with co-workers, and so on. We emphasize that the latter source of auxiliary
information is completely outside the control of the recommendation service
provider.
Our passive attack uses only the item similarity list, sales rank, and
partial user history. Intuitively, it observes the similarity lists associated with
the items that are known to have been bought or rated by a specific user. Other
items purchased or rated by this user–even if not included in the observable
partial history–are more likely to appear on the similarity list. Our algorithm
uses changes in the item similarity lists over time (e.g., appearance of an item
or an increase in its rank) to infer conclusions about this “hidden” activity.
We also describe an active attack, which assumes that in addition to
the partial user history, the attacker has access to the user-item similarity
scores, i.e., specific recommendation made by the system. Intuitively, this
attack involves creating several fake, attacker-controlled “sybil” users whose
history is artificially constructed to be very similar to that of the target user.
Then the fact that the system is recommending a particular item to the sybils
implies with some confidence that this item must have been purchased or rated
highly by the target user.
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that many recommendation services such
as last.fm and librarything.com also make user similarity lists available. For
each user, these lists explicitly identify other users who have similar histories.
By creating sybil users with a particular history or profile, the active attacker
can use these similarity lists to infer information about other users who have
been identified by the system as similar to the sybils. We defer a detailed
analysis of this attack to future work.
Attack metrics. Our attacks are designed to infer information about users’
behavior from the output of the recommender system and several types of
auxiliary information outlined above. Specifically, they produce predictions of
the following form: “User X purchased item Y during time period T” (or,
in the case of recommendation systems based on explicit ratings rather than
purchases, “User X rated item Y ”). The two main metrics for measuring the
quality of our predictions are yield and accuracy.
Definition 12 (Yield) The yield of an attack is the number of correct pre-
dictions per user per unit time.
Definition 13 (Accuracy) The accuracy of an attack is the fraction of pre-
dictions that are correct.
Understanding yield and accuracy. If there are n users, the attacker
makes p predictions per time unit, of which q are correct, then the yield is
q
n
and the accuracy is q
p
. The accuracy may be very high even if the yield is
small: what this means is that the adversary can only occasionally make a
prediction, but when he does make one, it is likely to be correct.
197
There is an inherent tradeoff between the two metrics. When yield
increases, the number of false positives (i.e., incorrect predictions) also in-
creases, resulting in a decrease in accuracy. In our experiments, we measure
the yield and accuracy for different values of a trade-off parameter, and report
the yield-accuracy curve.
Targeted vs. generic attack. There are two subtly different ways in which
our prediction algorithm can be used to infer individual transactions. The first
is a targeted attack. In this attack, the attacker already knows that the target
user made a transaction on a certain date. The attacker’s objective is to learn
which item was purchased or rated. For example, a curious co-worker may
notice an empty Amazon box in the hallway and try to find out what product
has been bought. This attack results in a higher yield per customer, but to
carry it out on a large scale, the attacker needs auxiliary information beyond
what is available from the recommender system itself (e.g., it can be feasibly
done by a postal employee).
The second attack is the generic attack. In this attack, the attacker does
not know when transactions occur. His objective is to infer both the fact that
a certain customer has performed a transaction and which item was involved
in the transaction. The yield of this attack is necessarily lower, but–as we show
in our experiments–it can be carried out on a large scale because the auxiliary
information needed for this attack is available from the recommender system
itself and does not require offline observations of individual customers.
Privacy breach. We emphasize that even though our attack takes advan-
tage of the user’s public history of purchases and/or ratings, the predictions
made by our algorithm concern the user’s non-public transactions and thus
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constitute a privacy breach. The public history is completely under the user’s
control: he decides which items to rate and which purchases to reveal. By
contrast, the item similarity lists and (in the case of an active attack) user-
item recommendation scores revealed by the recommender system are based
on the user’s entire history, including transactions that the user did not dis-
close voluntarily. The main privacy risk of the public recommender systems, as
empirically demonstrated by our algorithms, is the ability to accurately infer
these “hidden” transactions.
Disclosure of non-public transactions as a result of analyzing the output
of large-scale recommender systems has several privacy implications. First, it
may violate the terms of service under which customers share their information
with Web retailers and other online providers. For example, the Amazon.com
Privacy Notice lists several situations in which it may disclose information
about individual customers [4], none of which include revealing a customer’s
purchases to another customer without consent from the former.
Second, leaking information about individual book purchases via the
bookseller’s recommender system may violate customers’ expectations as well
as societal norms that govern the transmission of information between the
buyers and online merchants [198].
Finally, unauthorized disclosure of customers’ transactions may have
legal implications under the Privacy Act of 1974 [251] and, in the case of video
material, the Video Privacy Protection Act [87]. Legal analysis is beyond the
scope of this work.
Active attacks on recommender systems. There is a literature on shilling
attacks on collaborative filtering recommender systems [185, 181], where the
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aim is not to cause a privacy breach but rather to create sybil users in order
to influence the system by “pushing” certain items, causing those items to
be recommended more often to users, presumably resulting in financial gain.
While our methods are somewhat similar, our goals are very different.
We describe a simple, yet effective attack on the k-nearest neighbor
(k-NN) recommendation algorithm [9]. Consider the following recommender
system. For each user U , it finds k most similar users according to some
similarity metric (e.g., the Pearson correlation coefficient or cosine similarity).
Next, it ranks all items purchased or rated by one or more of these k users
according to the number of times they have been purchased and recommends
them to U in this order. We assume that the recommendation algorithm and
its parameters are known to the attacker.
Now consider an attacker whose auxiliary information consists of the
user U ’s partial transaction history, i.e., he already knows m items that U has
purchased or rated. His goal is to learn U ’s transactions that he does not yet
know about.
The attacker creates k sybil users and populates each sybil’s history
with the m items that he knows to be present in the target user U ’s history.
Due to the sparsity of a typical transaction dataset, m ≈ O(logN) is sufficient
for the attack on an average user, where N is the number of users [194]. (In
practice, m ≈ 8 is sufficient for datasets with hundreds of thousands of users.)
With high probability, the k nearest neighbors of each sybil will consist of the
other k − 1 sybils and the target user U . Therefore, the attacker can simply
inspect the list of items recommended by the system to any of the sybils.
Any item which appears on the list and is not one of the m items from the
sybils’ artificial history must be an item that U has purchased. Note that
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any such item was not previously known to the attacker and learning about it
constitutes a breach of U ’s privacy.
This attack is even more powerful if the attacker is allowed to adaptively
change the fake history he constructed for his sybils after observing the output
of the recommender system. For example, in the case of movie ratings on
Netflix, a user can change previously entered ratings. On Amazon, one can
tell the recommender system to ignore certain transactions for the purpose of
making recommendations. When this capability is supported, the attack can
be feasibly carried out on a large scale with a constant number of sybils.
8.4 Passive attack
Evaluation methodology. While we can and do apply our algorithm directly
to Amazon’s online recommendation service, measuring the accuracy of our
predictions is quite challenging without access to the actual purchase records
(which are kept confidential by Amazon, for obvious reasons). As we describe
below, it is sometimes possible to verify that the prediction is correct (e.g.,
the user publicly rates an item after our algorithm has inferred that he or she
purchased it), but for the vast majority of predictions, there is no oracle that
would tell us whether they were correct.
This presents a methodological problem: how do we prove that our
algorithms produce accurate inferences? One of the ways we address this
problem is by applying our algorithm to an artificial recommendation service
running on top of the Netflix Prize dataset. While the recommendation system
is very similar to that used by Amazon, in the case of the Netflix Prize dataset
the records of individual Netflix subscribers do tell us which movies they rated.
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Therefore, the dataset provides the “ground truth,” which can be used to
measure the accuracy of our predictions. After our algorithm infers from
the output of the recommendation system that a given user has watched a
particular movie at a certain time, we simply look at the user’s record in the
dataset to determine whether the inference is correct or not.
As described in Section 8.3, a passive adversary’s power is limited to
observing a site and its recommender system. To analyze the power of such
an adversary, we implemented an item-to-item recommender system based
on the description by Linden et al. [165, 166]. We apply the implemented
system to the Netflix prize dataset to generate item-to-item recommendations.
Based on these recommendations, knowledge of item rankings, and modeled
knowledge of past customer purchases, we generate predictions of non-public
items purchased by those customers. Two important heuristics help us to
narrow the set of predictions to improve accuracy and maintain a strong yield.
This section describes our experiments and their results in greater detail.
Netflix dataset versus Amazon dataset. Given the limitations on our
access to Amazon’s data, the large Netflix prize dataset is a useful alterna-
tive. A brief comparison of the datasets may be helpful. Netflix is an online
movie rental service, and Netflix customers are subscribers that can rent a
limited number of movies at a time. The Netflix prize dataset is a subset
of Netflix’s customer rating data released for a contest. Although the data
was “anonymized” prior to its release, Narayanan and Shmatikov suggest that
little change from the true data actually occurred [194]. This Netflix dataset
contains approximately 480,000 customers, nearly 18,000 movies, and roughly
100 million rentals by those customers. On an average day, approximately
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100,000 rentals occur. While the ratings in the Netflix dataset are not directly
associated with purchases, this distinction does not appear important for our
analysis (our algorithm ignores the numerical value of ratings).
Amazon is a large online retailer that offers a diverse catalog of products.
Based even on 2003 numbers, Amazon offers at minimum millions of items to
its tens of millions or more customers [165]. Given that Amazon sold 6.3
million items worldwide on its peak 2008 holiday sales day [14], one may
reasonably assume that Amazon sells over 100,000 items per day on average.
By singling out individual features, one could argue that either dataset
offers privacy advantages. For example, Amazon’s greater number of cus-
tomers increases the chances that a customer can blend into a crowd with
similar purchase patterns, but Netflix’s smaller catalog of items can also force
customers into crowds.
8.4.1 Prediction algorithm and pseudocode
To understand our prediction algorithm, recall that item-item similarity scores
reflect the likelihood of being purchased by the same customers. Thus, if a
customer who has previously purchased item I purchases item J , then I and J
will increase their similarity scores w.r.t. each other if there is no other change
in the system.
Suppose that customer (user) U has made public the previous purchase
of item I. On the target date T , he purchases item X. With some probability,
X will improve its position in the similarity list of I, or will enter it, not having
been on it before. This is by no means a certainty–for random items I and X
purchased by U , we do not expect X to be sufficiently similar to I to show up
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in the similarity list even after the purchase. Even if X is already in I’s list,
it might become more similar to I but not by enough to improve its position.
Finally, it might not even become more similar, being offset by purchases of
either item by customers who have not previously purchased the other item.
Nevertheless, U ’s purchase of X significantly increases the odds that
X will “climb” in I’s similarity list on target date T . Thus, the attacker’s
observation of this “climber” is a piece of supporting evidence that U purchased
X. We call I a support for the prediction (U,X, T ).
Suppose thatX climbs simultaneously in the similarity lists of I1, I2, . . . I10,
all of which have been previously purchased by U . The odds of this happening
by chance are quite small; the prediction (U,X, T ) is now supported by 10
items. Other than the number of supports, what other factors improve our
confidence in a prediction? We have identified two heuristics that are highly
effective:
Rarity of supports. Suppose that item I has been purchased only by
a single user. Then we know that that user is U . Therefore, only U ’s other
purchases could possibly affect I’s similarity list. Thus, we can be certain
that U purchased X. In general, the less popular a supporting item, the fewer
the users whose actions can influence it, and the higher the evidence that X’s
climb was due to U instead of some other user.
Diversity of supports. Suppose that all the supporting items I1, I2, . . . I10
are mutually similar, i.e., they appear on each other’s similarity lists. This
means that there are potentially many users (with similar interests to the tar-
get user) who have all purchased each of the supporting items. On the other
hand, if the supporting items are mutually unrelated, it serves as a fingerprint
of user U ’s spectrum of interest. Numerically, the diversity score is computed
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as the reciprocal of the number of other supports similar to each support,
summed over the supports.
Our notion of diversity is similar to the notion of “straddlers” discussed
by Ramakrishnan et al. in [216]. Our intuition is that given enough history,
everyone is a straddler.
That is the essence of our algorithm. It is formally described by the
pseudocode below. First it iterates through U ’s public purchases before date T
to compile a list of supporting items for each climber. Then, for each possible
prediction X, it computes the rarity and diversity score. If the combined score
exceeds a threshold, it outputs (U,X, T ).
A higher threshold leads to a higher accuracy, since there is more ev-
idence for each prediction. At the same time, it leads to a lower yield, since
fewer predictions are made. By varying the threshold continuously in [0,∞),
we get an accuracy-yield curve.
function make_predictions(cust, date, threshold){
for each possible_support in public_items(cust, date-1){
for each item in climbers(possible_support, date){
add possible_support to supports[item]
}
}
// inventory is a list of all items
for each item in inventory{
if support_score(supports[item]) >= threshold
output (cust, item, date)
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}}
function support_score(supporting_items){
rarity_score = sum(1 / (1 + item.popularity) for item in supporting_items)
function edge?(v1, v2){
return v1 in v2.similarity_list
}
graph = Graph(supporting_items, edge?)
diversity_score = sum(1 / (1 + graph.degree(item)) for item in supporting_items)
return rarity_score * diversity_score
}
// returns the items that improved their position in
// the given item’s similarity list on the given date
function climbers(item, date){
...
}
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// constructs a graph with the given nodes and edge relationships computed from
// the binary predicate edge?
function Graph(nodes, edge?){
...
}
8.4.2 Experiments
While the Netflix dataset consists of ratings rather than purchases, we use the
term purchases in order to be consistent in our terminology.
Recommendation algorithm. Our implementation closely follows
Amazon’s published description [165, 166] and the parameters observed on
amazon.com.
Given a target date T , the recommendation algorithm works as follows:
for an item I, define UT (I) to be the set of customers who have purchased item
I at or prior to date T . The similarity score between items I and J is defined
as the number of customers who have purchased both items as a fraction of
those who have purchased either:
SimT (I, J) =
|UT (I) ∩ UT (J)|
|UT (I) ∪ UT (J)|
This is the Jaccard coefficient, which is closely related to the cosine
similarity measure. Our formulation is based on Amazon’s patent [166], which
says: “A relatively high commonality index for a pair of items item A and
item B indicates that a relatively large percentage of users who bought item
A also bought item B (and vice versa).” Note that our prediction algorithm
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is not very sensitive to the choice of similarity measure, and merely requires
that a purchase of an item by a customer makes it more similar to other items
previously purchased by that customer.
The item similarity list for each item I consists of the 50 items with
the highest value of Sim(I, J). Our algorithm updates these lists daily, just
as they are on amazon.com. The number 50 was chosen because this is the
number of related items displayed on Amazon’s website for the vast majority
of items. Recently, we have observed some items showing up to 100 related
items; this would make our attack even more powerful.
We decided not to incorporate numerical ratings in our algorithm, Ama-
zon’s recommendations for the most part operate on customer purchases rather
than reviews.
We ran this recommendation algorithm for each of the 31 days in the
month of July 2005 (the Netflix prize dataset ends at December 2005). Similar-
ity lists for each of the 17,770 items in the dataset were computed, consisting
of the 50 items with the highest similarity scores.
Attack. We assume that each customer makes each purchase public
independently with a probability of 1
3
(say, by writing reviews). Our target
set consists of the customers who have made at least 100 purchases public by
June 30, 2005; there are 77,005 such customers.
A note about the choices of these parameters is in order. As of April
2009, there are around 10,000 customers on amazon.com with 100 or more
public reviews. User behavior with regard to reviews ranges from the prolific
to the occasional, and we chose 1
3
as a representative value. The choice of this
parameter does not substantially affect the yield per customer.
We run the prediction algorithm on each of the 31 target dates. The
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Figure 8.1: Targeted attack
attacker is assumed to have access to
• the public purchases of each customer on each date prior to the target
date,
• the similarity lists of each item on each date up to and including the
target date, and
• the approximate number of times each item has been purchased up to
the target date.4
Targeted attack. Recall that in a targeted attack, in addition to
the above information, the attacker knows that a specific customer made a
purchase on a specific date. Of the 77,005 customers, 57,554 had made at least
4Even if these numbers are not directly available, they can be easily approximated from
the sales rank data.
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Figure 8.2: Rank distribution
Figure 8.3: Generic attack
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one purchase during the month of July 2005 and were therefore potentially
vulnerable.
The algorithm made 132,525 predictions during this period, impacting
a total of 12,458 customers. The graph of accuracy vs. yield is shown in
Figure 8.1. Thus, with a roughly 35% accuracy, a postal service worker can
determine the contents of roughly 1 in every 100 boxes shipped from a given
online merchant that pass through his hands. This means that a prediction is
made only 1% of the time, but conditional on a prediction being made, it is
correct 35% of the time.
The predictions made had a median rank of 10,666, which is essentially
the same as the median rank of correct predictions (10,533). Recall that the
total number of items is 17,770. Less popular items, i.e., items with a higher
rank are much more likely to be predicted correctly.5 Figure 8.2 shows the
distribution of yield with item rank. Note that less popular items are generally
more sensitive from a privacy perspective.
The graph reports the yield per customer-date pair conditional on a
purchase having been made by that customer on that date. The yield per
customer per month is not 30 times this number, because not every customer
makes a purchase on each day.
Generic attack. As expected, the generic attack has a much lower
yield. The yield of this attack per customer scales linearly with time, since it
is not limited to the days on which the customer made a purchase; we report
the yield for the one-month period of our experiment. The green (lower)
curve in Figure 8.3 reports the yield vs. accuracy; for instance, the value of
5The peak results from the trade-off between the diminishing number of items with rank
X, and the increasing likelihood of an item with rank X being predicted correctly, with
increasing X.
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(0.4, 0.02) on the line means that with (say) 10,000 vulnerable customers, an
attacker can make 500 predictions per month and expect 200 of them to be
accurate (the accuracy is 200
500
= 0.4, and the yield is 200
10000
= 0.02).
Many of the incorrect predictions turn out to be not totally off-the-
mark, but “close” to the item that the customer purchased on the target date,
in the sense that the predicted item is in the similarity list of the target item.
This could still be a privacy compromise. The red (upper) curve in Figure 8.3
shows the yield vs. accuracy computed by treating a prediction as correct if
it is within the top 20 most similar items of the target item.
8.5 Passive attack on Amazon
Amazon’s data. As described in earlier sections, Amazon provides several
forms of recommendations. This includes our focus, item-to-item recommen-
dations (also known as similar items or “Customers Who Bought This Item
Also Bought . . . ”). Amazon presents these recommended items every time the
customer views an item. We have observed similarity lists including up to 100
items on Amazon’s website. These recommendations are computed using sim-
ilarity scores that appear to be updated daily or perhaps more often, though
this may differ based on the item or other factors.
In addition to recommendations, Amazon publishes sales ranks (or item
ranks) for items. Sales rank is a measure of the popularity of the item within
a given category, such as books, movies, or music. This rank appears to be
affected at minimum by the number of customers who have purchased that
item and the time elapsed since those purchases. The sales ranks are updated
at least hourly.
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Amazon allows its customers to review items, and Amazon maintains a
publicly accessible a list of tens of thousands of customers designated as “top
reviewers” along with links to each customer’s reviews. This list is ordered by
reviewer rank, which appears to be a product of the number of reviews written,
the timing of the reviews, and the number and percentage of other customers
who found the reviews helpful. Each reviewer has a unique reviewer identifier
in addition to a potentially non-unique rank (i.e., some may be tied). The
reviews themselves include the item identifier of the reviewed item, the date of
the review, and various means by which the customer can express an opinion
of the item. Customers are not required to review items that they purchase,
and customers may review items that they did not purchase from Amazon.
Amazon’s interfaces. Amazon makes its data available in two ways: via its
website and via an API (Amazon Web Services). All item, recommendation,
and customer data that Amazon makes available is accessible via the website.
The API provides data in a more convenient format but unfortunately pro-
vides only a subset of the available data. To abide by various requirements,
data collection via the site was performed manually (even though it could be
done more efficiently with automated tools) and collection via the API was
automated but limited to the request frequencies allowed by Amazon (one
request per second).
The API only allows users to collect a customer’s oldest 100 reviews.
As many customers exceed this quantity of reviews, collection via the website
was necessary at certain times. Similarly, although items are associated with
up to a hundred similar items via the website, Amazon provides only the top
ten similar items via its API. This limitation was particularly problematic for
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us as the number of items was too large to allow for meaningful additional
manual collection. Therefore, we considered just the top ten similar items.
Data collection. Via Amazon’s interfaces, we collected 999 reviewer iden-
tifiers. These customers initially occupied a contiguous set of reviewer ranks
with none falling in the top 1000. When our recommendation analysis began
on March 1, 2008, the corresponding customers had written 120.6 reviews on
average (120,452 total). We regularly updated our set of reviews throughout
the course of the study. When data collection concluded in July 2008, the
average number of reviews had reached 125.6 (125,474 total).
We monitored the recommended items lists daily for all items purchased
by a limited subset of our reviewers between March 1, 2008 and March 31, 2008
inclusive. This monitoring was performed via Amazon’s API and, therefore,
included only the top ten items from these recommendation lists. This sub-
set of monitored reviewers initially contained all customers who had written
reviews after August 25, 2007. Over the course of the month, we allowed pre-
viously inactive reviewers to join this subset if they reviewed an item. We did
not remove any customers from the subset, however. On March 1, we mon-
itored 518 users, and this number had grown to 539 by March 31. We also
retrieved limited sales rank data when it could be collected for free with the
recommendation list queries.6
Making predictions. For our analysis, we modeled an adversary’s set of prior
knowledge of a customer as all reviews previously written by that customer.
Because the set of items purchased may contain items not reviewed and vice
6Because any item can move onto and off of recommended item lists, we could not
monitor all sales ranks for all possible items for the full month. Fortunately, these ranks
can be retrieved without additional queries for all items in a given recommended item list.
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Figure 8.4: Predictions at each level of support
versa, this knowledge is imperfect. We predicted purchases as described above
based on which items rose in previously reviewed items’ recommendation lists.
Because the sales rank data was incomplete, the heuristics used on the Netflix
data were not feasible here. An adversary that has a more limited target or is
less respectful of Amazon’s restrictions could collect a more complete dataset.
The algorithm made a total of 290,182 unique (user, item) predictions
based on the month’s data. Of these, 787 had at least five supporting items.
Figure 8.4 shows the number of predictions generated at or above each level
of support. The set of predictions would be larger (and, likely, more accurate)
given access to recommended items which are outside the top ten of the list.
215
Figure 8.5: Rank change following purchase
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Validation methods and discussion. Amazon does not provide pur-
chase data, so we have no means of verifying our predictions; the best we can
do is see whether the customer reviewed the predicted item later. We observed
our target customers for a two month period after the conculusion of our main
data collection phase. During this period, we were able to validate 10 of our
predictions which had 5 or more supporting items. Of course, we expect only
a fraction of customers to write reviews during our observation period, and
so this metric is not a measure of accuracy; it is at best a weak lower bound.
Observing a review gives us a high confidence that a prediction is correct, but
the lack of a review does not invalidate a prediction.
Similarly, we are attempting to verify our predictions based on what a
customer reveals publicly. The more interesting cases from the privacy per-
spective are the purchases for which the customer would choose not to post a
review.
One interesting aspect of Amazon’s massive catalog and customer base
is that it makes sales rank more useful for narrowing predictions. Suppose
that you had previously purchased only item A, and today you purchase item
B. This has the same effect on the recommendations as if you had previously
purchased only item B and today you purchase item A. More complicated
versions of this example exist, and sales rank may help us distinguish between
the cases. We would expect sales rank for most items to stay fairly consistent
from day to day given such a large number of items and customers. Whichever
item was purchased will likely see a slightly boost in sales rank relative to the
other, however. The relative boost will be influenced by each item’s popularity,
e.g., it may be more dramatic if one of the items is extremely unpopular. For
example, Figure 8.5 demonstrates how sales rank dramatically improves for
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two items after purchase followed by a gradual return toward the original
rank. Changes in sales rank appear to be nearly instantaneous, potentially
making even simple timing attacks feasible. Given access to a complete set of
sales rank data, an analysis of its security implications could be beneficial.
Case studies. We present three case studies. These are based on our data,
but some details have been removed. To avoid confusion, the predicted item
is labeled A in all cases, and the supporting items are labeled B, C, and so
on.
William Smith (not real name) is a regular reviewer, having written
over 100 product reviews by March 1, 2008. Many of these reviews were of
gay-themed books and movies. Product A is a gay-themed movie available on
Amazon. On March 20, the sales rank for this product was just under 50,000,
but it had jumped to under 20,000 by March 21. Mr. Smith’s previous reviews
included products B, C, D, E, and F . Product A was not recommended in
the top ten for any of these five items on March 19 but had moved onto the
top ten list for all five of them by March 20. Based on the recommendation
information, our algorithm predicted that Mr. Smith had purchased product
A. Within a month of this jump, Mr. Smith reviewed product A.
Jane Brown (not real name) is also a regular reviewer that has com-
mented on several R&B albums in the past. Item A is an older R&B album.
On March 1, the album had a sales rank of over 70,000, but that rank had
decreased to under 15,000 by March 2. Ms. Brown had previously reviewed
items B, C, and D, among others. Item A moved into item B and item C’s
recommendation lists on March 2, and it rose higher in item D’s list that same
day. Based on this recommendation information, our algorithm predicted that
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Ms. Brown had purchased product A. Within two months of this activity, Ms.
Brown reviewed item A.
Mark Grant (not real name) appears to be interested in action and
fantasy stories. He is a regular Amazon reviewer as well. Product A is fairly
recent a fantasy-themed movie. On March 18, the product jumped from in
sales rank from slightly under 35,000 to under 15,000. It experienced another
minor jump the following day, indicating another potential purchase. Mr.
Grant’s previous reviews included items B, C, and D. On March 19, product
A rose in the first two items’ similarity lists and entered the top ten of the
final item’s list. None of the supporting items have sales rank changes that
indicate purchases on that date. Based on the recommendation information,
our algorithm predicted that Mr. Grant had bought product A. Within one
month of this activity, Mr. Grant reviewed product A.
In all cases, the reviewers are clearly comfortable with public disclosure
of their purchases, since they ultimately reviewed the items. Nevertheless,
our success in these cases suggests a realistic possibility that sensitive pur-
chases can be inferred. While these examples include predictions supported
by items in a similar genre, we have observed cross-domain recommendations
on Amazon, and much anecdotal evidence suggests that revealing cross-domain
predictions are possible. For example, Fortnow [100] points to a case in which
an Amazon customer’s past opera purchases resulted in a recommendation for
a book of suggestive male photography.
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8.6 Defenses
Defenses against inference attacks on recommender systems techniques should
balance the goals of allowing timely, high-quality recommendations and pro-
tecting against meaningful inference of individual user purchases.
The most effective mitigation strategy is to integrate privacy into the
collaborative filtering process in a way that offers provable privacy guarantees.
McSherry and Mironov have recently developed a technique for doing so based
on a relaxed definition of differential privacy [178]. Their approach is to first
compute an approximation to the item-item covariance matrix (and a few other
“global” statistics) in a differentially private way. This guarantees that any
further computations that depend only on this data also result in differentially
private outputs. There are a number of geometric algorithms, such as Singular
Value Decomposition, that can be evaluated using the differentially privately
computed statistics.
Although this approach limits the set of collaborative filtering algo-
rithms that may be used, and the accuracy of the output is somewhat dimin-
ished, the authors evaluate their approach on the Netflix Prize dataset and find
that an accuracy that is superior to the Cinematch baseline can be achieved
while providing reasonable privacy guarantees.
McSherry and Mironov do not address the issue of time-dependent rec-
ommendations, i.e., preserving privacy guarantees while updating frequently
recommendations, say every day, as Amazon does. While differential privacy
does guarantee “composability,” the numerical privacy bounds degrade rapidly
(linearly) with time. Nevertheless, this approach currently offers by far the
best hope for a sound defense against our attack.
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We now discuss several other heuristic mitigation techniques.
• Limit the length of recommended items lists. Amazon’s “Customers Who
Bought This Item Also Bought . . . ” list can contain one hundred items
and perhaps more. Recommendations near the top of an item’s list have
a strong relationship with that item. A single purchase is unlikely to im-
pact this relationship significantly. Recommendations near the bottom
of the list have weaker relationships with the item and, therefore, have
a more volatile ordering.
• Factor item popularity into update frequency. Less popular items tend
to be more uniquely identifying, so limiting the frequency of updates
involving these items might decrease the amount of information that can
leak. For example, Amazon might add purchases of unpopular items to
the item-item matrix only once per week or even less often. In addition,
sales rank for these items may betray when they are purchased, so sales
rank may benefit from greater inertia. Unfortunately, this may dull the
impact of sudden, important shifts in the data.
• Allow users to opt out. Amazon allows customers to request that certain
purchases not be used in personalized recommendations to themselves.
(This option primarily prevents gift purchases for others from influenc-
ing recommendations.) For a customer concerned with privacy, a more
useful option would be to prevent a purchase from influencing the rec-
ommender system in any manner whatsoever. If users habitually chose
to opt out, recommendation quality could suffer significantly. There-
fore, the feasibility of this option depends on the system design and user
behavior.
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• Avoid cross-genre recommendations. If customers with interests in mul-
tiple genres tend to be at higher risk [216], this risk could be mitigated
by avoiding cross-genre recommendations except when items have strong
relationships. This has the shortcoming of obstructing potentially sur-
prising but useful recommendations.
• Limit the speed of data access. Large-scale passive attacks require that an
adversary monitor a reasonably large quantity of data. Limiting speed
of access (by rate-limiting the API, using crawler-detection heuristics,
etc) may reduce the amount of data that an adversary can monitor and,
consequently, the scale of the attack. Unfortunately, this may prevent
legitimate uses of the data in some cases. In addition, these limits may
not stop smaller, more-focused attacks or a determined, capable attacker
(e.g., one with access to a botnet).
While each mitigation strategy has limitations, a careful combination of
them may provide substantial practical benefits with only modest drawbacks.
8.7 Summary
Recommender systems have become an essential part of the business strategies
of many online retailers. The attacks developed in this work demonstrate that
these systems can also leak information about individual user actions, posing
a serious risk to user privacy. Our primary attack can be performed by a
purely passive adversary without any special access to the system, making
this attack especially powerful and dangerous. The attack utilizes item-item
recommendations, which are available from Amazon and many other online
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retailers. A number of defenses are possible, but no known solution guarantees
privacy without degrading the quality of recommendations.
Our focus is on larger, established e-commerce sites, but our attack is
also applicable to smaller or newer sites, potentially posing an even greater
risk. While risk depends on a number of factors, the datasets of smaller, less-
established retailers tend to be less stable, increasing the likelihood that a
single user action yields a noticeable impact.
This work undermines the perceived dichotomy between individual user
data and large-scale, aggregate recommendation data. Recommender systems
produce an output which has a complex, not fully understood dependence on
the inputs. Our research underscores the need for a coherent framework for
analyzing the effects that an individual user’s actions have as they merge with
other data to create recommendations.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
The picture that is emerging from the above work is a bleak one for non-
interactive data sharing. Focusing on the problem of anonymous sharing of
high-dimensional data, we do not believe that there exists a technical solu-
tion to be found. Specifically, we do not believe that there are anonymization
strategies that can (a) satisfy a robust definition of privacy, (b) withstand
de-anonymization attacks described in our paper, and (c) preserve utility for
common data-mining purposes. Therefore, we advocate non-technical solu-
tions.
First, the false dichotomy between personally identifiable and non-
personally identifiable information should disappear from privacy policies,
laws, etc. Any aspect of an individual’s online personality can be used for
de-anonymization, and this reality should be recognized by the relevant legis-
lation and corporate privacy policies. Laws, regulations, and business practices
need to be adjusted to reflect the fine gradations of intents and purposes un-
derlying information sharing and disclosure.
Second, data collectors should stop relying on anonymization as the “get
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out of jail” card insofar as user privacy is concerned. They should inform users
when their information is disclosed to third parties, even if this information
has been anonymized, and give them an opportunity to opt out. We expect
that most users will not object to their information being used for commercial
purposes such as targeted advertising. Furthermore, service providers who
only deal with reputable advertisers and marketing partners may even enjoy
a competitive advantage in the marketplace.
In the realm of technical solutions, it appears that the future must in-
volve practitioners transitioning to the interactive setting. We propose a multi-
layered approach to make this possible: first more research. It is known that
the SuLQ model, singular value decomposition, k-means clustering, the per-
ceptron algorithm and the ID3 classifier can all be computed privately in that
setting [35]. The more complex practical applications that can be privately
computed, increases the chance privacy preserving data mining applications
with provable guarantees will become practically feasible. Second, more pro-
gramming tools like PINQ make it possible translate these theoretical results
into working systems [177], [176]. Finally, more investment in infrastructure is
needed, such as the Amazon Elastic Compute cloud that make it easier data
collectors who don’t possess much infrastructure on their own to provide such
collaborative computing services.
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Appendix A
Regular expressions for common
password patterns
To simplify the regular expressions as well as the indexing algorithms, we
specify length restrictions separately. Each regular expression has the input
alphabet {A, a, n, s}, representing uppercase, lowercase, numeral and special
characters, respectively. For each regular expression, we specify 4 numbers,
which represent how many times the corresponding symbol type is permitted to
occur in any accepted string. We also specify whether Markovian filtering is to
be used, and if so, whether it should be zero- or first-order. Finally, we specify
the threshold (recall that with Markovian filtering, we will only consider strings
whose Markovian weight is above the threshold). The threshold is specified by
stating what fraction of the keyspace should belong to the dictionary. The last
column in the table is the size of the keyspace. It is not part of the keyspace
specification. The size of the combined keyspace is the sum of the entries in
the last column.
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Determining the threshold for each regular expression is somewhat sub-
jective, but we followed these general rules: no keyspace can have a size more
than 108; the dictionary size should be 10% of the keyspace (based on Marko-
vian filtering) unless the number of characters is 4 or less; in the latter case it
should be 30% of the keyspace.
Regexes with 5 characters or less are not shown because they contribute
too little to the keyspace size. We use the first-order Markov model whenever
there are at least 6 alphabetical characters, all of them contiguous.
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Table A.1: Regular expressions
Regex A a n s Fraction Markov Size
a* 0 8 0 0 0.000478 1 108
a* 0 7 0 0 0.0124 1 108
a* 0 6 0 0 0.1 1 3.09×107
A* 8 0 0 0 0.000478 1 108
A* 7 0 0 0 0.0124 1 108
A* 6 0 0 0 0.1 1 3.09×107
[Aa]* 1 6 0 0 0.00178 1 108
[Aa]* 1 5 0 0 0.0540 1 108
n* 0 0 8 0 1 - 108
n* 0 0 7 0 1 - 107
n* 0 0 6 0 1 - 106
a*n* 0 6 1 0 0.0324 1 108
a*n* 0 5 1 0 0.1 0 1.18×107
a*n* 0 4 2 0 0.3 0 1.37×107
a*n* 0 3 3 0 1 - 1.75×107
a*n* 0 2 4 0 1 - 6.76×106
a*n* 0 1 5 0 1 - 2.6×106
a*n* 0 1 6 0 1 - 2.6×107
A*n* 6 0 1 0 0.0324 1 108
A*n* 5 0 1 0 0.1 0 1.18×107
A*n* 4 0 2 0 0.3 0 1.37×107
A*n* 3 0 3 0 1 - 1.75×107
A*n* 2 0 4 0 1 - 6.76×106
A*n* 1 0 5 0 1 - 2.6×106
A*n* 1 0 6 0 1 - 2.6×107
a*A 1 6 0 0 0.0124 1 108
a*A 1 5 0 0 0.1 1 3.09×107
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Table A.2: Regular expressions
Regex A a n s Fraction Markov Size
Aa* 1 6 0 0 0.0124 1 108
Aa* 1 5 0 0 0.1 1 3.09×107
Aa*n 1 5 1 0 0.0324 1 108
Aa*n 1 4 1 0 0.1 0 1.18×107
[An]* 5 0 1 0 0.1 0 7.13×107
[An]* 4 0 2 0 0.1 0 6.85×107
[An]* 3 0 3 0 0.284 0 108
[An]* 2 0 4 0 0.3 0 3.03×107
[An]* 1 0 5 0 1 0 1.56×107
[an]* 0 5 1 0 0.1 0 7.13×107
[an]* 0 4 2 0 0.1 0 6.85×107
[an]* 0 3 3 0 0.284 0 108
[an]* 0 2 4 0 0.3 0 3.03×107
[an]* 0 1 5 0 1 0 1.56×107
[As]* 6 0 0 1 0.0108 0 108
[As]* 5 0 0 1 0.1 0 2.97×107
[As]* 4 0 0 2 0.1 0 1.7×107
[As]* 3 0 0 3 1 - 4.38×107
[As]* 2 0 0 4 1 - 6.34×106
[As]* 1 0 0 5 1 - 4.88×105
[as]* 0 6 0 1 0.0108 0 108
[as]* 0 5 0 1 0.1 0 2.97×107
[as]* 0 4 0 2 0.1 0 1.7×107
[as]* 0 3 0 3 1 - 4.38×107
[as]* 0 2 0 4 1 - 6.34×106
[as]* 0 1 0 5 1 - 4.88×105
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Appendix B
Glossary: De-anonymization of
sparse datasets
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Table B.1: Glossary: De-anonymization of sparse datasets
Symbol Meaning
D Database
Dˆ Released sample
N Number of rows
M Number of columns
m Size of aux
X Domain of attributes
⊥ Null attribute
supp(.) Set of non-null attributes in a row/column
Sim Similarity measure
Aux Auxiliary information sampler
aux Auxiliary information
Score Scoring function
 Sparsity threshold
δ Sparsity probability
θ Closeness of de-anonymized record
ω Probability that de-anonymization succeeds
r, r′ Record
Π P.d.f over records
HS Shannon entropy
H De-anonymization entropy
φ Eccentricity
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Appendix C
Glossary: Social networks
Basic terms.
• S: a social network, consisting of:
– G: a graph containing nodes V and edges E
– X : a set of node attributes
– Y : a set of edge attributes
• X: a node attribute, part of X .
• X[v]: the value of the attribute X on the node v
• Y : an edge attribute, part of Y .
• Y [e]: the value of the attribute Y on the edge e
• PP: a privacy policy
Sanitized and auxiliary data
• Ssan: a sanitized social network, defined analogously.
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• Gsan, a sanitized graph, containing Vsan ⊂ V and Esan, a noisy version of
E
• Saux: the attacker’s aggregate auxiliary information, consisting of
– Gaux = (Vaux, Eaux)
– Aux = AuxX ∪ AuxY , (probabilistic) auxiliary information about
node and edge attributes
• Aux[X, v]: the probability distribution of the attacker’s knowledge of the
value of the attribute X on the node v
• Aux[Y, e]: likewise for edge attributes
Re-identification
• µG(.): ground truth, a 1-1 mapping between Vaux and Vsan
• µ˜(., .): a probabilistic mapping output by a re-identification algorithm
• µ(.): a specific mapping between Vaux and Vsan sampled from µ˜
• ν(v): node centrality (Section 7.4.6).
• αV : node overlap between Vaux and Vsan (Section 7.6.2)
• αE: edge overlap between Eaux and Esan projected on Vmapped (Section
7.6.2)
• : noise parameter (for seed identification)
• β: noise parameter (for propagation; Section 7.6.2)
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Appendix D
Measuring the effect of
perturbation
The Jaccard Coefficient can be used to measure the amount of perturbation
introduced to the sanitized graph Ssan during the release process:
∑
u∈Vsan ν(u)JC(u)∑
u∈Vsan ν(u)
where ν(u) is the centrality of the node u and the Jaccard Coefficient
JC(u) is defined in this context as follows:
|{v ∈ V˜ : (E(u, v) ∧ E˜(u, v)) ∨ (E(v, u) ∧ E˜(v, u))}|
|{v ∈ V˜ : E(u, v) ∨ E˜(u, v) ∨ E(v, u) ∨ E˜(v, u)}|
where V˜ = Vsan and E˜ = Esan. In the above expression, the numerator
counts the number of edges that are left unchanged in Esan, taking direc-
tionality into account. The denominator counts all edges that exist in either
direction in either E, or Esan.
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A more obvious measure that simply counts the number of edges added
or removed, as a fraction of the total number of edges, would ignore the effect
of perturbation on individual nodes. By contrast, our measure takes this into
account, weighing nodes in proportion to their centrality in the network (this
is the purpose of the ν factor).
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Appendix E
Glossary: Collaborative filtering
User-to-item recommendations. The traditional notion of a recom-
mender system, where products are suggested to customers.
User similarity list. A list of users (customers) whose behavior is
most similar to a given user.
User-based recommendations. User-to-item recommendations com-
puted using user similarity lists (or similarity scores).
User-to-user recommendations. The practice of suggesting users
(customers) to other customers, i.e., revealing the user similarity list.
Item similarity list. A list of items (products) that have the most
similar set of customers who purchased them.
Item-based recommendations. User-to-item recommendations com-
puted using item similarity lists, by aggregating over the item similarity lists
of all the items that a customer has previously purchased.
Item-to-item recommendations. The practice of suggesting items
that are similar to an item being viewed or purchased, i.e., revealing the item
similarity list.
236
Note. Linden et al. [165] use “item-to-item collaborative filtering” syn-
onymously with “item-based recommender system.”
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